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BEFORE LOVING: 
THE LOST ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
 
Michael Boucai* 
 
Abstract 
For almost two centuries of this nation’s history, the basic contours 
of the fundamental right to marry were fairly clear as a matter of natural, 
not constitutional, law. The right encompassed marriage’s essential 
characteristics: conjugality and contract, portability and permanence. 
This Article defines those four dimensions of the natural right to marry 
and describes their reflections and contradictions in positive law prior to 
Loving v. Virginia (1967). In that landmark case, the Supreme Court 
enforced a constitutional “freedom to marry” just when marriage’s 
definitive attributes were on the brink of legal collapse. Not only did 
wedlock proceed in Loving’s wake to lose its exclusive claims to licit sex 
and legitimate procreation, personal autonomy in those very domains 
gained independent constitutional protection. Drained of its conjugal 
essence, today’s constitutional right to marry is thus an anachronism, the 
vestige of a bygone consensus about what, if anything, “marriage” 
fundamentally is. 
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There are . . . in legal consciousness at any moment, concepts that legal 
thinkers find in . . . a preceding age, and perhaps themselves mouth 
ritualistically, without any confidence that they have a meaning.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental right to marry is a paradox in contemporary American 
jurisprudence: repeatedly and reverently affirmed by the Supreme Court, but viewed 
with puzzlement, skepticism, even outright disbelief by legal scholars. On the 
judicial side of the ledger, we encounter a line of precedents stretching from Meyer 
v. Nebraska (1923), with its fleeting invocation of a “right . . . to . . . marry, establish 
a home and bring up children,” to Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which extended the 
marriage right to same-sex couples.2 The case that definitively identified marriage 
as a constitutional right was decided about midway between those two rulings. In 
Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Court held that prohibitions of interracial marriage 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, violating both the Equal Protection Clause and 
an independent “freedom to marry” anchored in the Due Process Clause.3 Since that 
landmark decision, the Court has consistently cast marriage as the most august, 
central, and specific among a family of freedoms—privacy, intimate association, 
sexual autonomy, the rights to procreate and not to procreate—traveling together 
under the banner of “substantive due process.”4 That doctrine is notoriously 
                                                   
1 DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 70 (1975). 
2 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2600–01 (2015) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399). 
3 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
4 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
726 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–
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controversial, but Loving has gone to show that it cannot possibly be all wrong. 
Justices who quarrel vehemently over the bounds of due-process “liberty” evince 
shared faith that marriage, though “nowhere mentioned” in the Constitution, is a 
fundamental right thereunder.5 
To legal scholars, Loving’s “freedom to marry” comes as a challenge, a riddle. 
Our quandary originates in the fact that every decision vindicating the right involves 
access to civil matrimony, a state-run institution. Is that really what “the freedom to 
marry” guarantees? If so, access to marital status would be one of few unenumerated, 
positive entitlements gleaned from a constitution reductively but not unaccountably 
styled a “charter of negative liberties.”6 Hypotheticals about marriage abolition are 
                                                   
52 (1992); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 n.18 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
152–54, 159 (1973). 
5 Casey, 505 U.S. at 847–48 (referring to marriage and citing Loving); cf. id. at 951–53 
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Loving’s right to marry from the right to 
abortion). For similarly competing uses of Loving’s right to marry, compare Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503 (1977) with Moore, 431 U.S. at 535–56 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting); compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, 204–05 (1986) with 
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2598, 2602–03 (2015) with Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614–15, 2619 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). In 1978, Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist expressed doubt as to 
whether the marriage right was properly called “fundamental,” but less than a decade later 
they joined an opinion holding a Missouri prison regulation to violate “the fundamental right 
to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396–403, 407–11 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 81, 94–99 (1987). Since 
Turner, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, has come closer than any 
member of the Court to flatly repudiating the constitutional right to marry. His discussion of 
the right assumes only arguendo that “the ‘liberty’” protected by the Due Process Clause 
embraces anything beyond “freedom from physical restraint.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
6 Judge Richard Posner coined the phrase “charter of negative liberties” and had a hand 
in popularizing it. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); Richard A. 
Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe’s Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551, 
558 (1986). Commitment to a “negative” understanding of constitutional rights was evident 
in the Obergefell dissents, which stressed the distinction between entitlement to “privileges 
. . . that exist solely because of . . . government” and rights to engage in conduct long 
“associated with marriage,” like “making vows, . . . raising children, and otherwise enjoying 
the society of one’s spouse.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2636 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“refus[ing] 
to . . . convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive 
entitlements from the State”). For criticism of the Obergefell dissenters’ adherence to a strict 
“negative/positive binary,” see Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the 
Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 922, 929 (2016) (arguing that the binary “obscures 
complexities” that partly derive from the “distinctive features” of marriage and endorsing 
scholarship that has more broadly “exposed the distinction as specious”) (citing Susan 
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2292–93 (1990) and 
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
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adduced to test this possibility—to locate the institution’s definitive and 
indispensable characteristics. Usually it is a fruitless search. Most scholars find no 
attribute of marriage that cannot be altered or jettisoned, though they assure us that 
Loving and its progeny could have yielded the same desirable results on grounds 
other than the right to marry.7 Others, defending the notion of a positive right to 
marry, offer subtle and philosophically rich explanations tethered at varying lengths 
to judicial precedent.8 Compelling or not, their theories grapple creatively with the 
problem at the heart of this constitutional matter: the meaning of marriage itself. 
This Article approaches the puzzle of our modern right to marry from the 
standpoint of legal history. Rather than trying to rationalize what the Supreme Court 
has said and done since “the freedom to marry” gained constitutional bite in Loving, 
it asks what American lawyers said and did (and did not say or do) about the right 
                                                   
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (1983)). For an endorsement of the negative-positive distinction’s 
relevance in this context (from a scholar otherwise known for deconstructing such stark 
dichotomies), see Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of 
Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 139 (2015) (crediting the Obergefell dissenters’ 
argument that “the dominant strain of our constitutional tradition emphasizes . . . negative” 
rather than “positive” rights). 
7 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 
50 (1996); Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 43 (2015); 
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 687 (2010); Joseph A. Pull, 
Questioning the Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 26 (2006); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2081 (2005); Nelson Tebbe & 
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377 
(2010); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 n.14 (D. Mass. 
2003) (“[T]he State could, in theory, abolish . . . civil marriage,” though not “without chaotic 
consequences.”). Some skeptics construe the “right to marry” to promise scrupulously equal 
access to an important but mutable and ultimately disposable civil institution; others see a 
proxy for liberties that transcend state-sponsored matrimony, like religious exercise and 
intimate association. The two views are not incompatible. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra, at 
671–72, 685–88, 694–96 (endorsing both theories); Sunstein, supra, at 2086–98 (same). 
8 One scholar argues that the marriage right guarantees a just framework for 
administering the unusually flexible duties characteristic of long-term intimate relationships, 
and furthermore that contemporary divorce law’s basic design is exactly the enforcement 
regime the Constitution requires. Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: 
A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1310 (2015) (arguing the first 
theory); Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1739 (2016) 
(arguing the second theory). Another scholar draws on Hegel to define marriage as a 
“uniquely ethical bond” whose “transcendent unity of feeling” depends on “individuals’ 
particular commitment to each other,” “the state’s commitment to [them], and [their] 
commitment to the state.” Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: 
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1528, 1576 (1997); 
see also Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE. J.L. & 
FEMINISM 331, 360 (2016) (arguing that “States have the power never to extend the right to 
its citizens in the first instance, but once they [do so], they cannot subsequently withdraw it” 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause).  
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to marry in the nearly two centuries before Loving. We will call this period the 
classical age of American marriage jurisprudence. The word “classical” here refers 
not to the era’s temporal and intellectual imbrications with the age of “Classical 
Legal Thought,” but, more colloquially, to the longevity, ubiquity, traditionalism, 
and relative coherence of the marital ideology that prevailed from the Revolutionary 
War to the Sexual Revolution.9 Whatever other traits that ideology may share with 
Classical Legal Thought, by far the most important, so far as this Article is 
concerned, is “the very idea that marriage is anything—anything at all.”10 
The classical ideology of marriage was rooted in natural law, deeply and 
unabashedly. Often dubbed a “contract of natural law,”11 marriage as classically 
conceived was an organic human relation “founded on the distinction of sex,”12 
                                                   
9 Duncan Kennedy associates Classical Legal Thought (“CLT”) most strongly with a 
period that begins around 1850 and ends around either 1914 or 1935. Noting “a tendency to 
identify” CLT “with ‘formalism,’ ‘deduction,’ or ‘conceptual jurisprudence,’” he says its 
“most important” features were: (1) the idea that law emanates “either from private or from 
public will, with the distinction between the two being of primary importance”; and (2) “the 
public/private distinction as the central way of organizing legal rules.” See KENNEDY, supra 
note 1, at 28; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 21 (David 
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations]. These 
CLT hallmarks related in complex ways to contemporaneous jurisprudence on the family. 
See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1, 
71–74, 81 (using Kennedy’s periodization to describe “how . . . Domestic Relations emerged 
as a distinct legal topic” defined against “the law of contract and . . . of the market”). What 
the present Article calls the “classical” ideology of marriage preceded and survived CLT’s 
heyday, but that ideology shared several habits of the CLT mindset: emphatic concern for 
the rights-bearing individual; commitment to formal equality; normative ideas of “will [and] 
fault”; and an aspiration to “synthesiz[e] . . . the positivist science of law [and] natural rights 
constitutionalism.” Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra, at 20–22; KENNEDY, supra note 
1, at 3.  
10 Janet E. Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): Status/Contract to the Marriage 
System, 6 UNBOUND 1, 1–3 (2010) [hereinafter Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage] (calling 
this idea “symptomatically classical” in the sense that it is characteristic of Classical Legal 
Thought) (emphasis in original). 
11 See, e.g., Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173, 176 (1860) (“[M]arriage is a civil contract.”); 
In re Soeder’s Estate, 209 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ohio Prob. 1965); FRANK KEEZER, THE LAW OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 6–7 (1906); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 108 (1st ed. 1834) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834)].  
12 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 
OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES; 
EMBRACING ALSO PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND EVIDENCE IN DIVORCE CAUSES, WITH FORMS 
§ 3 (4th ed. 1864) [hereinafter 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864)]. Bishop’s definition 
appeared in multiple editions of Black’s Law Dictionary. See, e.g., Marriage, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891); Marriage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933); Marriage, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); see also Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 348 (Cal. 
1888) (calling marriage an “association [] founded on the distinction of sex”); State v. 
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supposedly “[t]he first difference which nature . . . established among persons.”13 
Marriage on this understanding derived from sources—God, instinct, moral 
necessity—higher than the positive law of any given people or place. As such, 
marriage ranked high among “the natural rights of man.”14 
The natural right to marry was a multifarious creature, neither wholly negative 
nor wholly positive. It encompassed the relation’s essential features: conjugality and 
contract, portability and permanence. Where the conjugal right to marry assured 
matrimony’s unique and definitive prerogatives—namely, licit sex and legitimate 
procreation—the contractual right to marry guaranteed autonomy at the institution’s 
threshold.15 Individuals inherently possessed a right against involuntary marriage (in 
other words, a right not to marry); a right to marry by mutual agreement, without 
permission or formalities (what Americans came to call “common-law marriage”); 
and, more contentiously, a right to marry the person of one’s choice.16 Finally, 
wedded couples had a right to stay married.17 Natural law promised portability, 
meaning that a marriage valid where contracted was valid everywhere; and it 
promised permanence, meaning that the relation couldn’t be dissolved unless—
depending whom you asked—at least one of the spouses died, committed adultery, 
was guilty of some other fault, or simply wished to part ways.18 
Legal culture of the classical period saw a broad, generally stable consensus 
around the natural—and Christian, and often markedly Protestant—ideology of 
marriage. But the precepts of this higher law were expressed as moral and political 
ideals, not constitutional imperatives. No doubt many provisions of positive family 
regulation were deemed “agreeable to the order of nature” and were judicially 
construed in that light.19 On occasion, the natural right to marry also served as a gap-
filler or furnished a default rule. (It played this role, for instance, in the doctrine that 
marriage is “a contract so completely of natural and moral law” that it could be 
solemnized with literally global effect even in a place “where there are no 
established laws,” as might happen between a man and woman “cast away on an 
                                                   
Adams, 78 S.W. 588, 589 (Mo. 1904) (same); Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 238 N.W. 351, 354 
(Neb. 1931) (same). 
13 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 61 (1851). 
14 James Wilson, Lectures on Law [1790–1792], in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 316 
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). 
15 See infra Part I, Section II.A., and Section II.B. 
16 See infra Section II.B. 
17 See infra Section II.C. 
18 Id. 
19 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 18 (1985) (quoting JESSE ROOT, REPORTS OF CASES 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS FROM JULY, A.D. 1789, 
TO JUNE, A.D. 1793 xxvii (1898)). 
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unknown island.”20) Yet it was not until the turn of the twentieth century, in the 
heady atmosphere of Lochner-style judicial review,21 that the natural right to marry 
began its slow, sporadic ascent into our constitutional pantheon. 
Loving’s enforcement in 1967 of a “fundamental freedom” to marry took place 
in a legal context still permeated with the ideology of natural marriage. Even at that 
late date, the likeness between marriage’s natural- and positive-law forms remained 
close enough, in abstract principle and juridical fact, that Loving’s “right to marry” 
could pass as the constitutional incarnation of an ancient idea. But that resemblance, 
already under considerable strain by the mid-1960s, went on to deteriorate with 
breathtaking speed. True, nearly forty long years passed before Lawrence v. Texas 
(2003) ratified a universal “liberty . . . in matters pertaining to sex”;22 in hindsight, 
however, the game probably was up in 1972, when Eisenstadt v. Baird declared that 
any right of married people to engage in contracepted intercourse “must be the same 
for the unmarried.”23  
Eisenstadt’s precise holding was sufficiently narrow, and the Court’s reasoning 
sufficiently fractured, to obscure the decision’s radical implications.24 But canny 
observers, mainly unhappy conservatives, saw where the wind was blowing. In 
1976, Mary Ann Glendon remarked that the constitutional “ideologizing of the 
freedom to marry” appeared to hit its stride “just when . . . legal distinctions between 
the married and unmarried are being blurred or erased.”25 Three years earlier, John 
Noonan had expressed bewilderment at “[h]ow quickly . . . the vital personal right 
recognized in Loving”—that is, “the right to be immune to the legal disabilities of 
the unmarried and to acquire . . . the unique legal privileges of heterosexual 
monogamy”—was becoming “constitutionally obsolete.”26 Though partial in any 
sense of the word, Noonan’s definition stands among the most incisive post-Loving 
                                                   
20 STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 122; Note, Tug-Boat 
Marriages and the Lex Domicilii, 12 HARV. L. REV. 273, 274 (1898) [hereinafter Tug-Boat 
Marriages]. 
21 See infra note 494. 
22 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). 
23 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
24 Three Justices joined William Brennan’s majority opinion. Justice Byron White, 
joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, concurred separately. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438, 460 
(White, J., concurring). 
25 Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 
VA. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (1976); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., The New Marriage, 12 
WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 445, 450 (1975) (describing judicial decisions “significantly reducing 
the legal importance of marriage or . . . drastically altering its definition” and worrying that 
same-sex marriage would upend “the most fundamental of all characteristics of marriage.”).  
26 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255, 
273 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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descriptions of the marriage right’s pre-Loving content.27 To appreciate its truth is 
not to endorse it. To acknowledge its demise is not to mourn it.28 
 
* * * 
 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains in broad strokes how 
participants in classical American legal culture understood the ideal of natural 
marriage. Part II turns squarely to the natural right to marry. It describes each of the 
right’s subsidiary guarantees—conjugality, contract, portability, and permanence—
and it documents how those entitlements were and were not inscribed in positive 
law. Part III traces the right’s slow, spotty, and sometimes tentative introduction into 
constitutional discourse in the first half of the twentieth century. Part IV discusses 
the right’s apparent triumph in Loving and the subsequent collapse of its original 
meanings. A concluding section summarizes the Article’s main descriptive claims 
and flags some of their doctrinal and political implications. Above all, it affirms that 
Loving’s “right to marry,” forged out of a bygone consensus about the fundamental 
meaning of “marriage,” now hides a jurisprudential void that, a priori, we have no 
cause to fill. 
  
                                                   
27 Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
“not to discriminate” between fornication and sex within marriage “would entirely 
misconceive” why marriage has a preferred constitutional status). 
28 For some scholars, recognition that the marriage right’s foundations have crumbled 
beneath it prompts (or at least predicates) valiant efforts to reconstruct it on new grounds. 
See Nicolas, supra note 8, at 361 (arguing that, although “the negative . . . right to marry 
disappeared when the Court decided Lawrence, . . . the Due Process Clause protects the right 
of existing couples to retain their marriages, while the Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
existing unmarried couples the right to enter such marriages on an equal basis with those 
who . . . previously . . . exercise[d] the right”) (emphasis added); Strauss, supra note 8, at 
1699 (recognizing that “the rights to procreate and form a family [formerly] entailed a right 
to marriage” that became “obsolete” when those rights came to “receive independent 
constitutional protection,” but positing a constitutional right to marry along the lines 
described in note 8 above). Other scholars appear content to retire the right to marry entirely 
now that “modern developments in constitutional law,” most importantly Lawrence v. Texas, 
have “completely eroded” its “natural law justification.” Pull, supra note 7, at 75; see also 
Tucker B. Culbertson, The End of Marriage, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL 
WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 253, 254–57 (Kevin Noble Maillard & 
Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012) (proposing that “fundamental rights to sex, family, and the 
other ends of marriage” more generously uphold Loving’s ideals of “liberty and equality”) 
(emphasis added); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1399 (“[U]nder modern constitutional 
principles, a right to enter marriage is no longer necessary to protect . . . liberty interests 
associated with . . . sexual intimacy [and] child rearing.”). 
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I.  NATURAL MARRIAGE 
 
Natural law, like marriage, is a concept with ancient roots and myriad, tangled 
branches. Among the variants most influential on and in American legal culture prior 
to the twentieth century, nearly all claimed a divine origin. “There is a law of nature, 
or in more proper words, a law of God, the author of nature,” wrote John Quincy 
Adams in 1842, and “[b]y this law . . . the human being comes into life, the child of 
two parents, male and female, both of one species, but of different constitutions, 
adapted to each other for union.”29 Nature’s rules on marriage transcended the 
doctrines of particular faiths.30 In the context of American religious pluralism, what 
Thomas Jefferson called “the law of nature and of nature’s God”31 tended to be 
radically ecumenical—of “absolute, immutable, and . . . universal validity,”32 not 
unlike the physical laws of the universe.33 
Natural law’s theological meaning was the first of eight usages, notionally 
distinct but rarely differentiated in practice, catalogued in Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright’s enduring 1931 survey of the concept’s career in American legal and 
political thought.34 His remaining definitions encompassed a diverse range of ideas: 
“rational or reasonable . . . principles discovered out of the nature of things”; law 
consistent with human nature; the law most “appropriate or useful” to human 
                                                   
29 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE SOCIAL COMPACT, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1842); see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE 
PROVINCE OF JUSTICE DETERMINED (1832) (noting that “the law of God” is “frequently 
styled the law of nature, or natural law”); James Wilson, Lectures on Law [1790], in 1 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 498 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (“[T]his law, natural or 
revealed, made for men or for nations, flows from the same divine source: it is the law of 
God. . . .”); THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, OR, THE STATE THEORETICALLY 
AND PRACTICALLY CONSIDERED 124–25 (1878) (describing natural law as “coeval with the 
divine mind”) [hereinafter WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE]. 
30 “In many civilized countries,” where marriage “has . . . the sanctions of religion 
superadded, . . . [i]t becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil contract.” STORY, 
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 108 (quoting Dalrymple v. Dalrymple 
(1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 669) (emphasis added). 
31 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
32 EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 333 (1982). 
33 See Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural 
Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 427 
(1999); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39–42 (comparing God’s “rules 
. . . for the perpetual . . . motion” of “matter” to “certain immutable laws of human nature”); 
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF LAW 112–13 (1870) 
(subsuming within the “Law of Nature . . . those laws which govern the physical universe” 
and “the characteristic qualities of mind or spirit as displayed in rational creatures”). 
34 BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 1, 338 
(1931) (observing natural law’s “indefinite” and “confused . . . mixture of . . . meanings” and 
noting “numerous instances” in which “natural law has been given [multiple] meanings by 
the same author, sometimes in the same statement.”). 
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“happiness” and flourishing; law that is “just or equitable”; “ideal” as opposed to 
“actual” law; “ordinal” rather than “conventional” law;35 and finally, anticipating 
what would soon become standard judicial speech on the scope of substantive due 
process, “laws and customs . . . so firmly established that they are clearly 
fundamental.”36  
Observe how forthrightly that last usage, equating “firmly established” with 
“fundamental” norms, conflates is and ought. As the nineteenth century progressed, 
American lawyers became increasingly hesitant to excavate moral truths from an 
imagined prehistory (“the state of nature”)37 or to apprehend them through one or 
another aspect of “the essential nature of man,”38 be it innate instinct or “right 
reason.”39 Under the influence of “historical jurisprudence,” however, they could 
still engage the natural-law tradition by seeking the “natural” in what was, in a deep 
sense, “conventional.”40 From Hugo Grotius, the Dutch statesman and scholar 
credited with founding international law on natural-law principles, they learned to 
infer the jus naturale from the jus gentium—rules universally acknowledged by all, 
“or at least the more civilized,” human societies;41 and following Edward Coke, the 
preeminent jurist of Elizabethan and Jacobean England, they discerned the 
predicates of natural justice in the primordial common law, source and safeguard of 
the “immemorial rights of Englishmen.”42 The image of that age-old corpus 
“mirroring what had existed in a prior state of nature” loomed large in American 
                                                   
35 Id. at 333–38, 342. 
36 Id. at 335; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), the first of 
many cases interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect 
“principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.” 
37 WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 333; see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, 
Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 926 (1993). 
38 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 65 (1838). 
39 See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7–8; see also R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN 
COURT 2 (2015). 
40 WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 338. 
41 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 23–24 (Francis W. Kelsey 
trans., 1925); see also WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7 (reporting that Grotius was “widely read 
and utilized in [early] America”). 
42 Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 287, 342, 344, 
349 (1942) (describing the “transition” of natural rights’ “theoretical basis from natural law 
to history” and noting American lawyers’ identification of common-law rights, “as 
expounded by Coke,” with both “the natural rights of man” and “rights guaranteed under 
constitutions”); see also Schweber, supra note 33, at 427 (agreeing with Pound that 
Blackstone’s “substitution of the authority of custom for natural law” helped to “develop[] 
the idea of historical jurisprudence”). 
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legal consciousness,43 with some thinkers stressing how thoroughly “[t]he Christian 
religion is part of our common law, . . . the very texture of which it is interwoven.”44  
However much natural law in general may have “lost its hold on . . . most 
lawyers” as the nineteenth century wore on,45 classical marriage jurisprudence 
continuously and unapologetically reflected the full variety of natural-law 
discourses that Wright came to identify in 1931. “Marriage was before human law,” 
wrote the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1875, “and exists by higher and holier 
authority—the Divine Order, which we call the law of nature.”46 Legal writers 
described marriage as an institution “of divine origin,”47 “begun in the garden of 
Eden,”48 “established by God himself,”49 who implanted the nuptial ideal as “a 
principle in our nature.”50 Marriage was an imperative supported by reason, evident 
upon “the most mature and thoughtful reflection,”51 yet knowable equally by 
                                                   
43 Morton Horwitz, Natural Law and Natural Rights, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL 
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 43–44 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996). 
44 SIMON GREENLEAF, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE 
AUTHOR AS ROYALL PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 24 (1834); see also 
Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 673 (1870) (“it has been said, by the highest authority, 
that Christianity is a part of the common law”); Roscoe Pound, The Ideal Element in 
American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 136, 139 (1931) [hereinafter Pound, Ideal 
Element] (discussing “historical warrant in the old English law books for saying that 
Christianity was part of the common law”). 
45 R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights 
in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 402 (2007). 
46 Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, 214 (1875); see also LEONARD SHELFOLD, THE 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 2 (1841) (defining marriage 
“according to the primitive law of God and Nature”). 
47 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 31 (1st ed. 1852) [hereinafter BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852)]; see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (“The 
constitution of the family organization . . . is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in 
the nature of things.”). 
48 EDWARD DEERING MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF 
WOMEN 235 (1845). 
49 State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871); see also JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 24 (1st ed. 1870) [hereinafter SCHOULER, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870)] (marriage was “instituted by God himself, and has its 
foundation in the law of nature”). 
50 Dickson v. Dickson’s Heirs, 9 Tenn. 110, 112 (1826); see also THEODORE D. 
WOOLSEY, ESSAY ON DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 234 (1869) [hereinafter 
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION] (describing marriage “as a divine institution established 
both in our nature and by positive precept”). 
51 W.C. RODGERS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE § 2 (1899); see also 
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 8 (“Whether we consult 
the facts of history or the inspirations of human reason, the family may justly be pronounced 
the earliest of all social institutions . . . .”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra 
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“instinct.”52 It existed, or would exist, “in the state of nature,” as John Locke had 
claimed,53 and it was “as much contemplated in the common as in the divine law.”54 
Marriage was jus gentium—“in the highest sense, a matter pertaining to the law of 
nations,” “applicable in all places, to the entire race of man wherever man is found 
on the earth.”55 As with natural-law talk more broadly, these sundry ways of 
describing marriage tended to be voiced in combination, as if their differences could 
only complement one another.56  
Classical American jurists emphasized marriage’s antiquity, especially relative 
to the advent of positive law,57 and they insisted with equal vigor that no civilization 
                                                   
note 47, at § 36 (discussing society’s “interest in [marriage] . . . according to the law of nature 
and reason”). 
52 1 JAMES SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 10 (6th ed. 1921) 
[hereinafter 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921)] (“the 
fundamental rights and duties involved in this relation are recognized by something akin to 
instinct, so as to require by no means an intellectual insight; intellect, in fact, impairing often 
. . . the charm of the relation”); see also JOEL FOOTE BINGHAM, CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 16 
(1871) (marriage “depends on the Divine appointment of sexes [and] on the Divinely 
implanted instincts of each”). 
53 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 46 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952) 
(1689); see also STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at §108 (“It may exist 
between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person existed in the world, as 
happened in the case of the common ancestors of mankind.”). 
54 Nichols v. Nichols, 48 S.W. 947, 954 (Mo. 1898). 
55 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 6, 167, 351 (“Its 
source is the law of nature, whence it has flowed into . . . the general law of nations.”). 
56 See, e.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 861, 861 (Ch. 1820) (explaining 
that “the marriage of a lunatic” should be nullified “in the absence of any statutory 
prohibition” no less than “a marriage between parent and child,” as both are “criminal and 
void by the law of nature, . . . those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has 
prescribed to man, . . . and which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason, 
though they may be more . . . explicitly declared by divine revelation”); RODGERS, supra 
note 51, at 1 (declaring that marriage was “ordained by the Creator,” has been “practiced and 
sanctioned by all civilized people from the earliest times,” is “prompted by [a] natural 
instinct,” and is affirmed by “mature and thoughtful reflection”); Wilson, supra note 14, at 
316 (“Whether we consult the soundest deductions of reason, or resort to the best information 
conveyed to us by history, or listed to the undoubted intelligence communicated in the holy 
writ, we shall find, that to the institution of marriage the true origin of society must be 
traced.”). 
57 See, e.g., In re Estate of McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 30 P. 651, 653 (Wash. 1892) 
(“[M]arriage is . . . anterior to all human law.”); SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 
1870), supra note 49, at 7–8 (naming the marital family “the earliest of all social institutions” 
and declaring that “the law of the domestic relations is . . . older than that of civil society”). 
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could appear or survive without it.58 Marriage marked humankind’s “first step from 
barbarism.”59 One chestnut called marriage “the parent, not the child of society.”60 
Judges and scholars strained to convey matrimony’s necessity to the “peace, 
happiness, and well-being” of persons and polities.61 In 1869, Theodore Dwight 
Woolsey, President of Yale College, declared: “If any relations in human life can be 
called natural and necessary, . . . [i]f any are of importance in themselves and for the 
conservation of all others, . . . if any show the prevision of the divine mind,” it is 
marriage.62 “But for this institution,” admonished a legal scholar of the same era, 
“all that is valuable, all that is virtuous, all that is desirable in human existence, 
would . . . fade[] away in . . . perilous darkness.”63 The warning was no less fervent 
at century’s end. Forsake marriage, wrote William Champ Rodgers in 1899, and 
“religion, government, morals, progress, enlightened learning, and domestic 
happiness must all fall into most certain and inevitable decay.”64 
Underlying professions of marriage’s centrality to the birth and survival of 
civilized society was a particular understanding of what that relation—“in an 
abstract and general shape,” as a moral category “really existing” prior to any civil 
recognition—naturally entails.65 This understanding was so ubiquitously shared and 
so far beyond question that it most often went without saying.66 But legal writers 
found their words when circumstances required. In 1870, the Alabama Supreme 
Court looked to Thomas Rutherford’s celebrated Institutes of Natural Law (1754) 
for a definition that “all writers . . . seem to agree in”: “Marriage is a contract 
between a man and woman, in which, by their mutual consent, each acquires a right 
in the person of the other, for the purpose of their mutual happiness and for the 
production and education of children.”67 For a pithier description, the Supreme Court 
                                                   
58 See State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402–03 (1871) (explaining that “society could not 
exist without the institution of marriage”); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 
11, at § 108 (calling marriage “the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society”). 
59 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 
485 (Me. 1863)). 
60 KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5 (“Marriage . . . is the parent of civil society. . . .”); 
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 24; STORY, 
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 108. 
61 Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 275 (Ct. App. 1877) (calling marriage 
“essential” to these ends); see also 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, JR., THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
556 (1st ed. 1853) (“The relation of marriage is founded upon the will of God, and the nature 
of man; and it is the foundation of all moral improvement, and all true happiness.”). 
62 WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 84.  
63 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 12. 
64 RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2. 
65 WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 132. 
66 Cf. THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 35 
(2017) (“One right that all founders accepted, but which was rarely mentioned because no 
one questioned it, is the natural right to marry.”). 
67 Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 674 (1870) (citing, in accord with this definition, 
treatises by Joel Prentiss Bishop, James Kent, and John Bouvier); see also SHELFOLD, supra 
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of Missouri relied in 1835 on Matthew Bacon’s New Abridgment of the Law (1768), 
calling marriage “a compact between a man and a woman for the procreation and 
education of children.”68 Joel Prentiss Bishop and James Schouler, authors of the 
nineteenth century’s preeminent treatises on domestic relations, characterized 
marriage in part by what it was not; crediting Lord Stowell’s famous opinion in the 
Scottish case of Lindo v. Belisario (1795),69 Bishop explained:  
 
a marriage . . . is not every carnal commerce; nor would it be so even in 
the law of nature. . . . But when two persons agree to have that commerce 
for the procreation and bringing up of children, and for . . . lasting 
cohabitation,—that, in a state of nature, would be a marriage, and, in the 
absence of all civil and religious institutions, might safely be presumed to 
be . . . a marriage in the sight of god.70  
 
The foregoing definitions attest to the two core features of natural marriage as 
classically conceived: contract and conjugality. Regarding the contractual aspect, it 
suffices for now to state very generally that it refers to the mutual consent by which 
a marriage comes into being. “Conjugality” describes the relation’s substance, its 
basic content.71 Revivified of late by debates over legal recognition of same-sex 
unions and other nontraditional domestic relationships,72 the term “conjugality” is 
                                                   
note 46, at 2 (“From various learned authors, it may be inferred that marriage is, according 
to the primitive law of God and Nature, . . . a solemn contract, whereby a man and a woman, 
for their mutual benefit, and the procreation of children, engage to live in a kind and 
affectionate manner.”). See generally Gary L. McDowell, The Limits of Natural Law: 
Thomas Rutherforth and the American Legal Tradition, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 57, 59–61 (1992) 
(commenting on American legal culture’s embrace of Rutherford (alternatively rendered as 
“Rutherforth”), particularly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
68 State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 151 (1835). 
69 Lindo v. Belisario (1797) 161 Eng. Rep. 530 (HC). The listed author of Lindo, Sir 
William Scott, is commonly known as Lord Stowell. See William Scott, Lord Stowell (1845–
1836), ROYAL BERKSHIRE HISTORY, http://www.berkshirehistory.com/bios/wscott_ls.html 
[https://perma.cc/2FEW-3EU6] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).  
70 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 68 (quoting Lord Stowell) 
(emphasis in original); see also SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 
49, at 40–41; ALBERT J. FARRAH & JOHN W. DWYER, CASES ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND 
WIFE 66 (1900). 
71 “Marriage is the conjugal union of one man with one woman for life.” RANSOM H. 
TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY, INCLUDING GUARDIANSHIP AND THE 
CUSTODY OF INFANTS, AND THE LAW OF COVERTURE, EMBRACING DOWER MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE, AND THE STATUTORY POLICY OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN RESPECT TO HUSBAND 
AND WIFE 805 (2d. ed. 1882). 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (defining the “‘conjugal’ view” of marriage as one that envisions “an intrinsically 
opposite-sex institution . . . inextricably linked to procreation and biological kinship”); LAW 
COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE 
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used here to mean the status or condition of matrimony as a supposedly organic 
phenomenon, one closely related to cohabitation and parenthood but defined first 
and foremost by morally permissible sexual relations and the possibility of 
legitimate procreation.73  
According to natural law, conjugal marriage was a “natural institution 
proceeding necessarily from the organization and the condition of the sexes”;74 it 
was “the state of existence ordained by the Creator[,] who . . . fashioned man and 
woman expressly” for one another.75 “The universal sentiment of mankind,” wrote 
Bishop, “accepts the fundamental doctrine of the law of marriage, that the sexes 
should not associate promiscuously as prompted by mere animal instinct, but 
[should] ‘pair off,’ . . . [like] the birds of the air.”76 Natural marriage “necessarily” 
entailed sexual union;77 this was its “essence.”78 And there could be no sexual union 
                                                   
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 3, 34, 131 (2001) (nowhere defining “conjugal” explicitly 
but using the word to describe a marital or “marriage-like” relationship—i.e., an 
“enduring . . . sexual relationship” between adults); see also Perry Dane, Natural Law, 
Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 291, 307–08 (2014) (“[T]he argument 
for heterosexual marriage as an institution of natural law . . . resemble[s] . . . arguments 
already heard in the same-sex marriage debate.”). 
73 This ranking of natural marriage’s most important features is elaborated in Section 
II.A. below, but for an influential statement of the primacy of sexual intercourse, see 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 62 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (1785) 
(“Sexual union in accordance with law is marriage (matrimonium), that is, the union of two 
persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes.”). 
74 Elisha Hurlbut, The Rights of Women, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR 
POLITICAL GUARANTEES 144, 146 (E. P. Hurlbut ed., 1845). 
75 RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2; see also BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 16 (predicting 
that marriage would exist “were there no civil law nor civil society” because “it depends on 
the divine appointment of the sexes.”); WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 
84 (referring to “the formation of the sexes for each other”). 
76 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 
WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT 
DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 1 (6th ed. 1881) [hereinafter 
1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (6th ed. 1881)]. This doctrine “proceed[ed] from the nature of 
man, and voic[ed] the wisdom of God.” 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON 
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION AS TO THE LAW, EVIDENCE, PLEADING, PRACTICE, 
FORMS AND THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES ON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL 
EXPOSITION § 7 (8th ed. 1891) [hereinafter 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891)]; 
see also Lyannes v. Lyannes, 177 N.W. 683, 685 (Wis. 1920) (explaining that marriage 
provides for “the proper mating of the male and female of the human race”).  
77 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the 
intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the 
institution of marriage”); Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129 (Tex. 1913) (stating that 
“marriage was not originated by human law” and that a marriage without sexual cohabitation 
“is in defiance of the commands of God”). 
78 KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5; see also Millar v. Millar, 167 P. 394, 396 (Cal. 1917) 
(calling sexual intercourse “essential to the very existence of the marriage relation,” an 
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without marriage, “the only . . . relation by which Providence has permitted the 
continuance of human life.”79  
Procreation was thus “the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and 
society.”80 On this point practically all authors agreed. They cast marital procreation 
as “a consummation of the Divine command to ‘multiply and replenish the earth,’”81 
and marriage itself as “a divine institution . . . ordained for obtaining a legitimate 
increase of the human family.”82 That word “legitimate” signals other personal and 
social advantages of marriage, most importantly “the proper nurture . . . of 
offspring”83 and the familial descent of property—another natural “institution,” 
which, “together with . . . matrimony,” secured “the only firm foundation of all 
civilization.”84 But the reproduction of individuals and families was not the only 
                                                   
“obligation” of marital status “fixed by society in accordance with the principles of natural 
law”); TYLER, supra note 71, at 822 (“Without sexual intercourse, the ends of marriage, the 
procreation of children, and the pleasures and enjoyment of matrimony, cannot be 
attained.”).  
79 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 76 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed. 
1896) [hereinafter 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896)]; see also Raymond v. 
Raymond, 79 A. 430, 431 (N.J. Ch. 1909) (“The human race was created male and female 
with the manifest purpose of perpetuating the race. Marriage without sexual intercourse 
utterly defeats its purpose, as sexual intercourse except in the marital relation is contrary to 
divine law.”). 
80 Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859); see also LOCKE, supra note 53, at 44 
(“Conjugal society . . . consist[s] chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s 
bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation.”). 
81 RODGERS, supra note 51, at § 2; see also BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 102 (“The end 
of marriage is the procreation of children and the propagation of the species.”). 
82 JOHN H. LIVINGSTON, A DISSERTATION ON THE MARRIAGE OF A MAN WITH HIS 
SISTER IN LAW 2 (1816); see also Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 108 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 
1942) (“The procreation of offspring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its 
permanency is the foundation of the social order.”). 
83 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at 
§ 10. 
84 LIEBER, supra note 38, at 135. For a famous but somewhat unconventional statement 
of marriage’s close connection to parenthood, see LOCKE, supra note 53, at 44–45: 
 
[T]he end of conjunction between male and female being not barely procreation 
but the continuation of the species, this conjunction . . . ought to last . . . so long 
as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones . . . by those that 
got them till they are able to . . . provide for themselves. 
 
For echoes of Lieber’s designation of civilization’s two most necessary institutions, see 
WILLIAM SLADE, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE WITHIN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA 17 (1837) (arguing that slavery’s demise in Vermont “has not dissolved the 
natural relations,” for “[n]one who deserve to be named think of . . . abolishing the marriage 
institution, or of annulling the laws which protect the acquisition, enjoyment, and inheritance 
of property”); J.L. Stocks, Preface to PASCHAL LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
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reason for confining sex to marriage. Equally important was a decent “satisfaction 
of [humankind’s] most powerful passion.”85 “[T]he avoiding of fornication” was a 
vital moral norm in its own right.86 Thus the second of marriage’s “principal ends” 
was “a lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent licentiousness.”87 
Contract and conjugality weren’t natural marriage’s only attributes, but they 
stood among a handful that commanded practically unanimous agreement.88 Aside 
from rights of portability and permanence discussed below,89 only the rule of 
endogamy—the incest taboo—saw comparable consensus.90 On other questions, 
large and small, opinions differed. Many American jurists assumed wifely 
“subjugation” to be an aspect of “the conjugal union in . . . a state of nature,”91 but 
other authorities, following Locke and his comparably influential contemporary 
Samuel von Pufendorf,92 denied that “absolute sovereignty . . . naturally belonged to 
the husband” or was “necessary to . . . conjugal society.”93 A few jurists even 
                                                   
CENTURY, at v (1930) (“Property exists, like marriage and the family, antecedently to 
government, and belongs to the state of nature on which government is superimposed. . . .”). 
85 Félix Esquirou de Parieu, Marriage, in 2 CYCLOPÆDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 810, 810 
(John J. Lalor ed., 1883). 
86 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76 at § 760; see also Dane, 
supra note 72, at 307 (emphasizing that, “given the[] sexual natures” of “[h]eterosexual men 
and women,” the natural-law “conception of marriage does not see it as merely the engine 
for reproduction.”). 
87 Grover v. Zook, 87 P. 638, 641 (Wash. 1906).  
88 How striking it is to find the ironic, iconoclastic Karl Llewellyn espousing “the old 
truth” that “[m]arriage . . . is built on the fact that there are two sexes, and attraction between 
them, and that sexual union has results. On the fact that . . . children are not kittens, and need 
long years before they come to handling their own lives.” K.N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law 
of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1932). 
89 See infra Sections II.C and II.D. 
90 Although incest was generally abhorred, there was widespread uncertainty about the 
degree of familial relation “at which the laws of nature have ceased to discountenance the 
union.” 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 71 (1st ed. 1827) [hereinafter 2 
KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827)]; see also 2 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON 
DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 166 (Nugent trans., A. Donaldson & J. Reid 3d ed. 
1762) (1750) (“With regard to the prohibition of marriage between relations, it is a thing 
extremely delicate to fix exactly the point at which the laws of nature stop and where the 
civil laws begin.”). 
91 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at 
§ 10 (suggesting that coverture was a “divine” rather than “human” element of the marriage 
contract); see also BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 62 (“By the natural law, the superior control 
in a state of marriage belongs to the man rather than the woman.”). 
92 See WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 7 (identifying Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium among “the most important” contributions to “American theories of natural law”). 
93 LOCKE, supra note 53, at 46–47; SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE 
AND NATIONS 448–49 (L. Lichfield trans., 2d ed. 1710) (1672). In an antebellum contest over 
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protested that women’s subordination in marriage was in certain respects contrary 
to natural law.94 As to the ideal of lifelong union, some authors argued that nature 
imposed an absolute prohibition of divorce,95 others that adultery and perhaps 
abandonment gave aggrieved spouses a natural right to dissolution,96 and still others 
that marriages contracted in a state of nature could be disbanded at any time for any 
reason.97 Some claimed that “miscegenation” bans followed natural law; others said 
they violated it.98 Even polygamy, generally deemed “contrary to the spirit of 
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western 
                                                   
which state’s coverture rules dictated ownership of a married woman’s slave, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court noted that marriage,  
 
[o]f itself, . . . gives no property to, nor takes any away from, either of the parties: 
what alteration it shall make between the parties, in the dominion of the one, or 
the subjection of the other, . . . are subjects of municipal regulation. It is the law, 
and not the marriage, which confers rights and duties in the relation; if it were the 
marriage, the rights and duties would be natural, and should be alike everywhere.  
 
Moye v. May, 54 N.C. 84, 86 (1853) (emphasis in original); see also Allen v. Miles, 36 Miss. 
640, 647–48 (1859) (criticizing the English common law’s “idea that it was against natural 
right, that [married women] should own property in their own right”). 
94 NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 117–19 (1982) (describing Thomas Herttell’s belief that 
“the common law deprived wives of their natural, inalienable right to property”). 
95 See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237, 239 (1858) (“the law of nature requires that 
the [marriage] contract should be perpetual”). 
96 WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 101 (doubting whether natural 
law permits “any . . . ground for divorce” but adultery); 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT 
DIVORCE, AND OF EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES; EMBRACING ALSO PLEADING, 
PRACTICE, AND EVIDENCE IN DIVORCE CAUSES, WITH FORMS § 167 (4th ed. 1864) 
(advocating divorce where “one of the parties . . . is permanently out of the country,” because 
such a marriage is “not matrimony, as viewed by the law of nature”). 
97 Johnson v. Johnson’s Administrator, 30 Mo. 72, 88 (1860) (“It can hardly be said 
that the power of divorce, in one or both of the parties to the contract, at his or her pleasure, 
is inconsistent with the law of nature.”); see also BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), 
supra note 47, at § 720 n.3 (rejecting as a “fallacy” the notion that “the dissolubility or 
indissolubility of the marriage is an essential part of the contract,” and thus a matter “of 
universal obligation,” rather than a locally determined “incident to the status of husband and 
wife”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS 680–
95 (1838)). 
98 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 409 (1857) (stating that “intermarriages between 
white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral” by the 
legislators who voted to proscribe them); see also infra notes 388–392 and accompanying 
text (describing a range of views on interracial marriage’s status under natural law). 
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world,”99 was not to all minds unnatural. In classical America no less than in 
Pufendorf’s day, “[w]hether or not this Practice be repugnant to the Law of Nature, 
[was] a Point not fully settled amongst the Learn’d.”100 Some authors unequivocally 
deemed plural marriage unnatural;101 some considered it simply “a legal, not a 
natural, disability”;102 some asserted that having multiple husbands, but not multiple 
wives, is “intrinsically evil” and “can in no way be reconciled with natural law”;103 
and some were ambivalent,104 as Aquinas had been in concluding that “plurality of 
wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.”105 Still more 
idiosyncratic claims about natural marriage touched on such diverse subjects as 
                                                   
99 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 
U.S. 1, 49 (1890). 
100 PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 455. 
101 WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 29, at 95–96 (calling polygamy “contrary 
to nature and an abuse of nature” but acknowledging that, “in all the races of men, except 
the Indo-European, . . . [it] has been allowed and practiced from time immemorial.”). 
102 MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 240. There was precedent for this view in 1 HUGO 
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 196 (Fancis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (scoffing at “those 
who . . . labour in the effort to prove that things which are forbidden by the Gospel are not 
permissible by the law of nature, as concubinage, divorce, and polygamy.”). 
103 JOSEPH J. C. PETROVITS, THE NEW CHURCH LAW ON MATRIMONY 17–19 (1921). 
104 Avoiding direct reference to natural law, classical writers on polygamy often relied 
instead on the universal “condemnation of all Christendom.” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st 
ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 201; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) 
(“Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries. . . .”); 
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 33 (“Polygamy, or 
bigamy as it is often termed—since the common law of England could scarcely conceive of 
such conjunctions carried beyond a double marriage—is discarded by all Christian 
communities.”); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 25 (naming 
polygamy among the “institutions . . . adapted to heathen nations” but “totally repugnant to 
. . . those which embrace Christianity.”). Striking something of a middle course, courts 
regularly referred to “the law of nature, as generally recognized in Christian countries,” to 
support departures from the rule of lex loci contractus in cases involving polygamous 
marriages valid where celebrated. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cook, 100 N.E. 222, 222 (Ill. 1912); 
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1889); Heflinger v. Heflinger, 118 S.E. 316, 320 
(Va. 1923). 
105 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE “SUMMA THEOLOGICA” OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
THIRD PART 331 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., 1922) (1265–74) 
(attempting to reconcile Christian morality with the domestic lives of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob). 
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spousal support and maintenance,106 doctrines governing marital jurisdiction,107 and 
criminal law’s leniency toward men who answer wifely infidelity with homicide.108 
Discussion of natural marriage was rarely pursued for its own sake. The “higher 
law” of nature was at once a foundation and an aspiration for practical governance.109 
According to John Bouvier’s popular survey of American jurisprudence, “marriage 
owes its institution to the law of nature, and its perfection to the municipal or civil 
law.”110 While it was no secret that “the essential character of the relation of husband 
and wife, as determined by the law of nature,” could be “perverted” or 
“confused . . . by the positive law,”111 classical jurists generally believed that 
“legislation [governing marriage] is ordinarily in accord with the notion of the true 
relation.”112 
Faith that “positive law . . . enforces the mandates of the law of nature, and 
develops rather than creates a system,” was hardly confined to the field of domestic 
relations,113 but in the United States a distinctly Protestant theology of marriage lent 
this belief special force and meaning.114 As Joseph Story explained in 1834, whereas 
                                                   
106 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Hawkins, 367 P.2d 196, 198 (Ariz. 1961) (“[I]t is generally 
agreed that alimony . . . provide[s] for the maintenance and support of the wife and is founded 
on the natural and legal duty which marriage imposes. . . .”); Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 
206, 213–15 (1875) (“Judgment of divorce can sever the legal bond of marriage, but it cannot 
undo the natural relation . . . and consequent obligation [of] . . . support from the 
husband. . . .”). 
107 See, e.g., SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 9 (“The 
domicile of the wife follows that of the husband; the domicile of the infant may be changed 
by the parent. Thus does the law of domicile conform to the law of nature.”); JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (3d ed., 1846) [hereinafter STORY, 
COMMENTARIES (3d ed. 1846)] (noting that “every civilized country” locates a marriage’s 
“rights, duties, and obligations” in “the law of the domicil”). 
108 Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858) (crediting “nature” as the “origin” of 
the doctrine that a husband is guilty of manslaughter, not murder, if he discovers another 
man “in the act of adultery with his wife, and instantly kills him”); see also infra note 151 
(discussing nature’s provision for self-help in such circumstances).  
109 “The traditional view of natural law is that it is a body of immutable rules superior 
to positive law. It is ideal law since it consists of the highest principles of morality.” A.G. 
Chloros, What Is Natural Law?, 21 MOD. L. REV. 609, 609 (1958). 
110 BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 101; see also 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at § 13 (“[T]he rights and obligations of [marriage] 
are fixed by society, in accordance with principles of natural law.”). 
111 Mathewson v. Mathewson, 63 A. 285, 286 (Conn. 1906). 
112 Id. 
113 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 5. 
114 To stress the especially Protestant character of classical ideas about the 
complementarity of natural- and positive-law marriage is not to deny comparable beliefs in 
other religions, including Roman Catholicism. See, e.g., Brendan F. Brown, The Natural 
Law, the Marriage Bond, and Divorce, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 93 (1955) (“Natural law 
sets the minimum requirements of a juridical institution, authorizing Church and State to 
establish additional reasonable requirements in the light of specific social conditions of the 
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Catholics “consider marriage as a sacrament . . . governed by the Divine law[,] . . . 
Protestants . . . have considered it mainly as a civil institution, . . . subject to the 
legislative authority.”115 This did not mean that Protestantism’s proliferating 
denominations renounced belief in matrimony as a “holy estate.”116 Quite the 
opposite. As one treatise put it in 1845, “what the natural law has founded and the 
revealed law confirmed, the law of society . . . enforces.”117 Marriage on this view 
“was . . . to be administered by . . . civil authorities who had been called as God’s 
vice-regents.”118 Far from rejecting the natural law of marriage, this allocation of 
responsibility was premised partly on its universality, its manifest transcendence of 
religious difference.119 Civil control was also justified by moral necessity. Marriage 
“being essential to the peace, . . . harmony, . . . virtues and improvements of civil 
society”—to sexual continence and “the purity of families” above all—its 
permissions and prohibitions were best entrusted to a power that could enforce them 
against all citizens, not just believers, in this world rather than the next.120 
Not coincidentally, it was “only in the light of a civil institution” that American 
law claimed to view marriage.121 This was no mere pretense, notwithstanding 
constant reference to Christian morality in judicial and scholarly disquisitions on the 
                                                   
time and place.”). But see FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RACES 70, 72 (2009) 
(contrasting, in the context of American disputes over interracial marriage, a typically 
Catholic emphasis on the moral force of natural law’s right to marry with the commitment 
to civil control that “exemplified the traditional Protestant position”). 
115 STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 209. 
116 CHURCH OF ENGLAND, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: THE TEXTS OF 1549, 1559, 
AND 1662, 64–65, 434, 436 (Brian Cummings ed., 2011). On the Protestant invention of 
marriage as an institution subject to “regulation . . . by the secular political community,” see 
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 26, 30–34 (1989). 
117 An 1845 survey of American women’s legal condition found it “proper . . . to recite 
a few of the leading principles of Scripture in regard to the duties of husbands and wives, in 
order that we may observe hereafter, how far the law of man has grown out of, and been 
made in conformity to that of God.” MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 261–62, 312 (explaining 
that, “in Christian countries, human laws . . . may indeed exist without, but not in opposition 
to,” God’s law). 
118 JOHN WITTE, LAW AND PROTESTANTISM 253 (2002). 
119 “That the children of this world, distinctly from the followers of Christ, should 
marry, is quite natural. And this shows . . . that it is a civil right and a civil institution, properly 
belonging to the citizens of the world, and therefore the privilege of every man who chooses 
to use it.” JOHN DUNLAVY, THE MANIFESTO, OR A DECLARATION OF THE DOCTRINE AND 
PRACTICE OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST 317 (1818). 
120 BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 14–15, 18–20, n.10 (“[A] matter . . . of an importance 
so immense, . . . pervading to every fibre of human rights and happiness, were a thing 
impossible to be ignored by the civil law.”). 
121 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31 (emphasis added). 
“To distinguish . . . marriage as the law views it from marriage as a religious rite, the courts 
and text-writers almost uniformly speak of and describe it as . . . a ‘civil contract.’” Id.  
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subject.122 Religious and natural-law tenets rarely (if ever) provided the sole grounds 
of decision in matrimonial cases.123 And if, as a rule, classical jurists frowned upon 
marital regulation contrary to ecclesiastical teaching, they never questioned its legal 
efficacy. It was black-letter law that secular government possessed complete control 
over the marital institution. Indeed, Protestantism’s principle of divine delegation 
echoed in the classical period’s most important constitutional word on marriage: 
“the doctrine of status,” which held that “marriage being a status and in its nature 
semi-public, the legislative power over it is nearly, perhaps absolutely, 
omnipotent.”124 In some of its most important applications, this doctrine was the 
mortal enemy of the natural right to marry, to which we now turn. 
 
II. “A THING OF NATURAL RIGHT” 
 
Classical American jurists described marriage as “a thing of natural right,”125 
“one of the natural rights of human nature,”126 a “right of which each individual is 
equally possessed,”127 “a natural and civil right pertaining to all persons,”128 a “right 
                                                   
122 “Mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public spokesmen had hardly been able 
to speak of marriage without mentioning Christian morality.” NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS 
197 (2000). 
123 Though theoretically consonant with disestablishment principles, this forbearance 
was sometimes facilitated in practice by Christianity’s supposed absorption into English 
common law. See, e.g., Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 347–50 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) 
(“The principles of canonical jurisprudence, and the rules of the common law, are the 
same. . . . Prohibitions of the natural law . . . become rules of the common law, . . . sanctioned 
by immemorial usage, and, as such, are clearly binding.”). 
124 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 824. The phrase 
“doctrine of status” refers to the idea that a state has full “sovereign power to regulate the 
status of its own domiciled subjects” and therefore has full power to regulate marriage. See 
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166 (1901); id. at 175 (Peckham, J., dissenting); see also 
infra notes 350–352, 354, 484. 
125 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 13. 
126 Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town 
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829); see also United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. 525, 530 
(1854) (quoting appellants’ argument that “Indians were human beings entitled to the rights 
of humanity, . . . including the rights of marriage and descent”); Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 
147 (counting marriage among “the rights of humanity”). 
127 THOMAS HERTTELL, REMARKS COMPRISING IN SUBSTANCE JUDGE HERTTELL’S 
ARGUMENT IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN THE SESSION OF 
1837 29 (1839). 
128 Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150 (1875). 
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of personality,”129 and so on.130 As Joel Prentiss Bishop explained, “all persons are 
naturally entitled” to marry because marriage “involves the most valued interests of 
every class” and “awakens the thoughts and engages the care of nearly every 
individual.”131 This truth, he said, was “recognized in all countries, in all ages, 
among all people, all religions, all philosophies.”132  
Perhaps because the natural right to marry was thought to be eternally and 
ubiquitously accepted, classical jurists never bothered to give a full account of it. 
None so much as observed that, by their own scattered descriptions, this singular, 
undifferentiated “right to marry” consisted of several distinct attributes: conjugality, 
contract, portability, and permanence. To agree to become husband and wife 
(contract) was to enter an exclusively sexual and ideally procreative relationship 
(conjugality) that was both entitled to recognition everywhere (portability) and 
immune from dissolution without cause (permanence). The natural right to marry 
protected this unity. The following sections explain why it did so and how its 
protections fared in positive law before Loving. 
 
A.  The Conjugal Right to Marry 
 
Family ties between slaves occasioned some of the classical period’s most 
poignant allusions to the conjugal right to marry. Nineteenth-century lawyers took 
for granted that enslavement was an absolute bar to civil matrimony, but most 
believed that slaves were nonetheless capable of “natural marriage,”133 or what 
President Abraham Lincoln described in 1864 as marriage “in fact.”134 During 
                                                   
129 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 105 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942) (elsewhere describing 
marriage as a “natural right . . . not created by law”); see also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The 
Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 74 (2007) 
(characterizing “rights of personality” as those whose “objects . . . are . . . so closely 
connected to the individual that [they] cannot be freely alienated, unlike property rights and 
contractual rights”) (citing 1 LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS 
74–75 (2d. ed. 1932)). 
130 Courtright v. Courtright, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413, 413 (Com. Pl. 1891) (“The right 
to marry is a natural one, recognized and regulated by the laws of all Christian countries.”); 
Cumby v. Garland, 25 S.W. 673, 675 (Tex. 1894) (“Marriage existed before statutes; it is of 
natural right. . . .”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 719 (calling 
marriage “a thing . . . of universal private right”). 
131 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at v; 1 BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 13; see also SCHOULER, DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 9 (declaring the marital bond of “man and 
woman” to be “for all classes and conditions,” with “neither rank, wealth, nor social 
influence weigh[ing] heavily in the scales.”). 
132 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 351. 
133 Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 338 (1878). 
134 Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Senator Charles Sumner (May 19, 1864) 
(emphasis in original) (urging Congress to make available to “widows . . . of colored soldiers 
who fall in our service” the same “provisions made the widows . . . of white soldiers”), 
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Reconstruction, a number of state legislatures adopted procedures for regularizing 
slaves’ “quasi marriages” and set evidentiary standards for “recogniz[ing] as a legal 
relation that which the parties had constituted a natural one.”135 Pursuant to these 
measures, proof that a couple had “cohabitated” or otherwise “associated as husband 
and wife” transformed thousands of “de facto” spouses into lawfully wedded 
couples—usually voluntarily, sometimes not—and rescued tens of thousands of 
“offspring [from] the disgrace of bastardy.”136 
“The unhappy condition” of servitude, declared the Alabama Supreme Court in 
1870, may have kept slaves’ “marriages from being perfect in the . . . legal sense,” 
but it did not and could not extinguish their “natural right” to marry.137 Slaves had 
exercised this right, explained the Texas Supreme Court three years later, through a 
“sort of contubernium”—an “observance of the matrimonial condition” that often 
“resulted in procreation of families” and sometimes incorporated “a certain degree 
of continence.”138 Emancipation made these facts of slaves’ family lives newly 
salient, not newly visible.139 They were discernable even in an atmosphere congested 
                                                   
reproduced in Roy P. Basler, “And for His Widow and His Orphan,” 27 Q. J. LIB. CONG. 
290 (1970). 
135 State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 5 (1868); see also TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN 
WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 174 (2017) 
(quoting Rep. Reverdy Johnson’s 1864 description of slaves who had “lived together but 
were never man and wife except in the eye of Heaven.”). Legislators also saw to the 
legitimation of children born of such marriages. A Louisiana statute, for example, provided 
that  
 
natural fathers and mothers shall have power to legitimate their natural 
children . . . provided, that there existed at the time of the conception of such 
children no other legal impediments to the intermarriage of their natural father 
and mother, except those resulting from color or the institution of slavery.  
 
Marionneaux v. Dupuy, 19 So. 466, 467 (La. 1896). 
136 Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 337, 344 (1878); KATHERINE FRANKE, 
WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 43 (2015). “Although the process of 
regularizing slave marriages began during the Civil War, tens of thousands of marriage 
certificates were drawn up in a short period of time soon after.” HUNTER, supra note 135, at 
5. 
137 Stikes v. Swanson, 44 Ala. 633, 636 (1870). 
138 Honey v. Clark, 37 Tex. 686, 708 (1873) (acknowledging that “[t]he laws of slavery 
did not forbid the coupling together of man and woman in this manner.”). “Contubernium” 
was a doctrine of ancient Roman law that gave retroactive civil effect to the de facto 
marriages of emancipated slaves. See ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF 
ROMAN LAW 415 (1953) (defining contubernium as a “permanent, marriage-like union 
between slaves”). 
139 Prior to the Civil War, “leading jurists distinguished between ‘natural law’ and ‘civil 
law,’ . . . [and] recognized that slaves were compelled by human impulses, as old as Adam 
and Eve, to mate, to procreate, and to form marital bonds.” Significantly, antebellum judges 
“typically used the word ‘marriage’” to describe these bonds, sometimes using formulations 
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with racist accounts of slaves’ supposedly inferior capacity for virtue.140 Not long 
before the Civil War, in a ruling that mitigated to manslaughter a slave’s fatal attack 
on the lover of his de facto wife, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that 
“there is in moral contemplation, and in the nature of man, a wide distinction 
between the cohabitation of slaves ‘as man and wife’ and indiscriminate sexual 
intercourse; and this is recognized among slaves, for as a general rule, they respect 
the exclusive rights of fellow slaves who are married.”141 
As the preceding descriptions of slave marriages suggest, sex and procreation, 
the main elements of marital conjugality, were in turn the definitive privileges of the 
conjugal right to marry. Sexual intercourse—the relation’s sine qua non, its 
“distinguishing feature”—was unquestionably the right’s most essential attribute.142 
An entitlement to procreate both justified the physical union of spouses and followed 
from it. By contrast, parenthood and cohabitation were not entitlements belonging 
specifically to natural marriage, however strongly they were associated with it. 
Parenthood was ideally but not inevitably the province of married couples. Rights to 
the custody and control of children traveled with parental obligations—duties of care 
and support that natural law (unlike a good deal of positive law) imposed on 
procreators regardless of marital status.143 As for “cohabitation” (a constant 
reference point in postbellum appraisals of freedmen’s antebellum family lives),144 
the dictates of natural law depended on the particular usage at issue. In the bare, 
literal sense of living together, “cohabitation” was both an expectation and a right 
of natural marriage, but not exclusively so; a man and his wife were hardly the only 
combination of individuals who were permitted or indeed entitled to dwell under a 
single roof. And in its more metaphorical sense, “cohabitation” was practically 
redundant with—and, in effect, a euphemism for—conjugality’s first and most 
important prerogative: sexual intercourse.145 
  
                                                   
like “quasi marriage” and “marriage de facto” to distinguish them from civil marriages. 
HUNTER, supra note 135, at 76–77. 
140 Id. at 188 (highlighting the contradiction between “assertions that slaves were 
immoral and incapable of handling the prerequisites of Christian marriage” and observations 
that “slaves formed meaningful conjugal bonds witnessed by and affirmed before God.”). 
141 Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858). 
142 Williams v. Williams, 99 S.W. 42, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906). 
143 See infra notes 186–197 and accompanying text. 
144 See, e.g., Washington v. Washington, 69 Ala. 281, 283, 284, 285 (1881); Gregley v. 
Jackson, 38 Ark. 487, 490, 493 (1882); Anderson v. Smith, 2 Mackey 275, 275 (D.C. 1883); 
Daniel v. Sams, 17 Fla. 487, 492, 496, 497 (1880); United States v. Route, 33 F. 246, 247 
(E.D. Mo. 1887); Woodard v. Blue, 9 S.E. 492, 492–94 (N.C. 1889); Baity v. Cranfill, 91 
N.C. 293, 299 (1884); Livingston v. Williams, 13 S.W. 173, 173–74 (Tex. 1890); Smith v. 
Perry, 80 Va. 563, 565–66 (1885). 
145 See infra notes 198–212 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Sex and Procreation 
 
Marital conjugality—strictly speaking, a redundancy—was a matter of natural 
duty as well as natural right. A duty of sexual fidelity was written into the very 
definition of marriage as a carnal union between two persons “to the exclusion of all 
others.”146 The fundamental promise of “constancy, a virtue demanded by all moral 
systems and purer religions,”147 gave each spouse “the right that the other shall be 
continent.”148 A 1904 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court called this “a right of the 
highest kind, upon . . . which the whole social order rests,”149 and from it a number 
of subsidiary rules could be inferred. As Justice Joseph Story wrote in 1836, “[i]f 
marriage be an institution derived from the law of nature, then, whatever has a 
natural tendency to discourage it, or to destroy its value, is by the same law 
prohibited. Hence we may deduce the criminality of fornication, . . . adultery, 
seduction, and other lewdness.”150 This web of penal regulation indicates a 
conspicuously positive aspect of the natural right to marry: an obligation on the state 
to deter sexual infidelity, lest a jealous husband “be left to his natural remedies.”151 
The natural-law complement of sexual fidelity was sexual access. For much of 
Western history, the expression “conjugal right” referred precisely to “the natural 
rights of . . . husband and wife to each other’s person.”152 The concept harked back 
to St. Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, which, “echoing Mosaic and natural law 
                                                   
146 Riddle v. Riddle, 72 P. 1081, 1084 (Utah 1903). Minus the word “two,” this principle 
was equally important to conceptions of natural law that permitted polygamy (never 
polyandry). See 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (6th ed. 1881), supra note 76, at § 1 (“Even where 
polygamy is tolerated, fidelity to and among the family of wives is enjoined, the same as is 
the more restricted fidelity in monogamy.”). 
147 LIEBER, supra note 38, at 63. 
148 State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 181 (1835) (citing 1 THOMAS RUTHERFORD, 
INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 314 (1756)). 
149 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 484 (1904). 
150 Joseph Story, Natural Law (1836), in JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 313, 316 (James McClellan ed., 1971) [hereinafter Story, Natural Law]. 
151 Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 129–32 (suggesting that, in the absence of “a due measure 
of [public] protection” of marital fidelity, the state has no “right to molest [an] individual 
who resorts to self-redress” when his spouse has been unfaithful). Where legal deterrence of 
wives’ inconstancy was weak or unavailable, natural law was said to permit a husband “to 
take the law into his hands” by killing his wife’s seducer. Hendrik Hartog, Lawyering, 
Husbands’ Rights, and the Unwritten Law, 84 J. AM. HIST. 79, 88 (1997) (quoting a defense 
attorney who in 1870 called husbands’ right to kill in such circumstances “perfect under 
Divine law”). 
152 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 238 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1949) (1936). For discussions of 
the idea’s development, see Charles Reid, The Conjugal Debt, in WOMEN AND GENDER IN 
MEDIEVAL EUROPE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 164 (Margaret Schaus ed., 2006), and Elizabeth M. 
Makowski, The Conjugal Debt and Medieval Canon Law, 3 J. MEDIEVAL HIST. 99 (1977). 
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precedents,”153 admonished a man to “give to his wife her conjugal rights, and 
likewise the wife to her husband.”154 The jus conjugale was a right to payment of 
what medieval canonists called “the conjugal debt,”155 “the obligation of a spouse to 
engage in sexual intercourse upon the demand of the other.”156 Just as surely as a 
man and woman gained by marriage “the right that the other shall be continent,” 
each committed “to demean him or herself that the ends proposed by the marriage 
shall be accomplished.”157 On this foundation rested the common law’s rule that a 
woman could not be raped by her husband, as well as its fixation of ages of 
consent—“fourteen in males and twelve in females”158—at points when each sex 
was presumed to have attained “natural and corporal ability to perform the duty of 
marriage.”159 
However draconian in its sanction of forcible intercourse between spouses, the 
allegedly mutual right of sexual access expressed a basic interest at the heart of the 
conjugal right to marry: the “natural indulgence of natural desire,”160 narrowly 
understood as coitus between husband and wife.161 This restrictive view of natural 
sexuality indicated the specifically procreative end of marriage and of the sexual 
“instinct” itself.162 But marital sex was more than a mere means to reproduction. 
“The indulgence of natural cravings” was a purpose distinct from the imperative to 
                                                   
153 John Witte, Jr., The Nature of Family, the Family of Nature: The Surprising Liberal 
Defense of the Traditional Family in the Enlightenment, 64 EMORY L.J. 591, 618 (2015). 
154 1 Corinthians 7:3 (English Standard Version). 
155 See Makowski, supra note 152, at 99. 
156 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1195 (1990).  
157 State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 181 (1835) (quoting RUTHERFORD, supra 
note 148, at 314). 
158 According to Rutherford, because “the law of nature gives each party a perpetual 
right to the person of the other,” consummation by force is rape only if the predicate marriage 
contract was itself “extorted” against a bride’s will. If the marriage was voluntary, he wrote, 
“[c]onsummation is no more than a taking actual possession of what, by the previous 
contract, each had a right to.” RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 364; see also Mary Becker, 
Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2001) (linking the assumption that “consent . . . had already been given” to the 
common law’s “marital rape exemption”); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Rights and the Legal Equality 
of Men and Women in Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Canon Law, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
471, 511 (2002) (noting that “[t]he violence of a forcible consummation was nearly 
completely masked by the invocation of rights language” in early medieval Christian 
theology and that “[e]ven Thomas Aquinas, who was willing to . . . condemn [as sin] . . . a 
husband’s forcible intercourse with his newly wed bride,” determined that the sin “did not 
amount to the crime of rape, because [the husband] had some right to take this action.”). 
159 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 144 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
160 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 232 (quoting Deane v. 
Aveling [1845] 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 299). 
161 Even “imperfect coitus” was considered “unnatural.” Id. 
162 RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 350 (“Now by the contract of marriage each party 
has an exclusive right in the person of the other for the purposes of producing children.”). 
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“propagate the human family.”163 Apart from “the love of life,” the erotic love of 
man and woman was the only “passion[] in the human heart . . . superior to 
government and control of reason,” for it was “planted there by a particular 
Providence, for the preservation of the species.”164 Recalling the Pauline admonition 
that “it is better to marry than to burn,”165 as well as Martin Luther’s teaching that 
sex is “as necessary to the nature of man as eating and drinking,”166 classical jurists 
evinced a measure of respect, sometimes grudging, for humans’ “baser appetites.”167 
They acknowledged that “[t]he passions which draw together the sexes are from 
nature, and beyond the control of legislation,” except insofar as “law, aided by 
religious and moral teachings, may prescribe for them reasonable limits and 
restraints.”168 “To marry is one of the natural rights of human nature,” pronounced 
one court in 1829, for it was “instituted in a state of innocence for the protection 
thereof.”169  
Just as temptation to carnal transgression served throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as a reason to permit divorce in cases of abandonment and 
to abolish prohibitions of remarriage after divorce,170 classical legal discourse 
                                                   
163 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 31. Under both 
natural and civil law, failure to consummate a marriage was cause for annulment; failure to 
procreate was not. See RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 356; see also John T. Noonan, Tokos 
and Atokion: An Examination of Natural Law Reasoning Against Usury and Against 
Contraception, 10 NAT. L. F. 215, 228 (1965) [hereinafter Noonan, Tokos and Atokion] 
(discussing Christian theology’s recognition of “a purpose other than generation” in marital 
intercourse).  
164 Debate on Mr. Fox’s Appeal for the Repeal of the Marriage Act, in COBBETT’S 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, 
COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM THE TWENTY-SIXTH OF MARCH 1781, TO THE SEVENTH OF 
MAY 1782, at 398 (William Cobbett ed., 1814); see also HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A FEW 
LECTURES ON NATURAL LAW 11 (1844) (“Besides the principle of self-preservation, there 
are I conceive some others not less universal. The first of these is the natural inclination 
between the sexes.”). 
165 1 Corinthians 7:9 (King James). 
166 Martin Luther, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, in THREE TREATISES 
68 (Charles M. Jacobs trans., 1970) (1520). 
167 “Marriage is . . . divinely instituted for the natural comfort . . . and happiness of both 
man and woman. . . . It affords necessarily a discipline to both sexes; sexual indulgence is 
mutually permitted under healthy restraints.” 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, at § 10. 
168 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 51. 
169 Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town 
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829). 
170 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 51 (arguing for 
divorce where cohabitation has ceased because “it is the simple fact, growing out of the 
natures which for the preservation of the species God has given to men and women, that the 
larger part of those who were originally inclined to marry will not submit to what they see to 
be a never-ending and childless isolation”); LOUIS FREELAND POST, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 89 (1906) (arguing for a right to remarry after divorce because 
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recognized a natural right to marry partly on the ground that perfect continence was 
too much to ask of most people—that abstinence was “repugnant to human nature,” 
as Grotius had asserted centuries earlier in his defense of “the right to seek . . . and 
contract marriages.”171 In 1837, Judge Thomas Herttell reminded the New York 
Assembly that, because “the right to marry is a natural right, and the exercise of it is 
as imperative as the natural incitements which dictate it are influential and 
dominant,” the state lacks power either to “enjoin celibacy” or to forbid “its 
constituents to marry.”172 Several years later, Elisha Hurlbut, another New York 
lawyer (and later judge), named “the innate love of the opposite sex” among several 
attributes that, “spring[ing] from the very existence of a human being,” furnish the 
basis of “human rights.”173 “Wherever Nature has ordained desire,” Hurlbut 
explained, “she has . . . [supplied] the means of gratification. From this we infer the 
right to its indulgence.”174 Of course, the existence of a “right to the gratification, 
indulgence, and exercise of every innate power and faculty” was a question separate 
from “the manner of its exercise”; when it came to the sexual powers, Hurlbut was 
unequivocal: marriage’s “sacred exclusiveness” was the one and only outlet.175 
                                                   
“natural law”—manifest here in the human “passion for sex”—“is stronger than legislation, 
stronger even than social institutions.”). Similar arguments were advanced for abolishing 
divorce a mensa et thoro (i.e., divorce from bed and board), a mechanism for effecting 
permanent physical separation while most marital obligations, including sexual fidelity, 
remained intact. See, e.g., 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 108 
(calling such “qualified divorces . . . hazardous to the morals of the parties” insofar as they 
required spouses “to live chastely and continently”). 
171 GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 204. Pufendorf considered it obvious “that a Prince or 
State would act most ridiculously, as well as most unjustly, should they in general forbid 
Matrimony to all their Subjects: Or should they allow this Privilege to the First born only of 
every Family, and enjoin strict Celibacy to all the rest. For it is impossible, that in so great a 
number, All should be able to lead a life of Severity and Continence.” PUFENDORF, supra 
note 93, at 445. 
172 HERTTELL, supra note 127, at 29; see also John A. Ryan, Why Private Land 
Ownership Is a Natural Right, 18 CATH. U. BULL. 228, 228–29 (1912) (arguing for a “natural 
right to embrace or reject the conjugal condition” given that the “only conceivable 
alternatives are free love,” which “is inadequate for any person,” and “celibacy,” which “is 
adequate only for a minority”). 
173 Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 13. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 13, 146; see also WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 170 (Liberty Fund ed., 2002) (1785) (“The passion being natural, proves that it 
was intended to be gratified; but under what restrictions, or whether without any, must be 
collected from different considerations.”). Cf. DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A 
CRITICISM OF SOME POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS 46–47 (1916) (“Natural rights 
have been explained as ‘biological rights,’ by which I understand is meant that there are 
certain natural instincts or tendencies in human nature which must be respected by 
legislation. This is . . . much less than is meant by ‘rights’ under the law of nature in its old 
sense. It is . . . an appeal to fact” that fails to tell us “which instincts deserve our respect and 
which do not . . . .”). 
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Procreation was the second dimension of the conjugal right to marry. As a 
Texas court stated in 1926, “[t]he right of the opposite sexes to mate for the purpose 
of becoming husband and wife . . . is, always has been, and always will be, an 
inherent, natural right of the highest importance.”176 Why? Because this right was 
“indispensable for the propagation of the human family.”177 The idea was not new. 
Quoting Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748), the Missouri Supreme Court in 
1910 spoke admiringly of ancient Roman laws that had upheld “the natural right 
which every one had to marry and beget children,” a right which “could not be taken 
away.”178  
It would have been easy for classical lawyers to argue, as some did with respect 
to sexual intercourse, that the biological capacity to bear and beget offspring is a 
near-universal human capacity, that its exercise is therefore a human right, and that 
natural law circumscribes such exercise to the institution of marriage.179 But 
nineteenth-century jurists apparently found it unnecessary to defend the procreative 
aspect of the natural right to marry. The point was obvious enough to go without 
saying. It had a self-evidence that marital intercourse, when it was not potentially 
procreative, lacked.180 Given Christianity’s mistrust of carnal pleasure, sex within 
marriage had to be justified precisely to the extent that spouses didn’t or couldn’t 
intend to produce offspring.181 Marital procreation needed no such apology. Rather 
it was so widely assumed to be the chief end of marriage that its inclusion within the 
right to marry was usually implicit.182 Not until the early twentieth century, when 
eugenic regulation endangered procreative freedom in newly troubling ways, did 
Americans begin to talk about it in terms of natural right—a natural right to 
procreate, yes, but also the natural right to marry.183 Infringements of the latter were 
                                                   
176 Hedrick v. Marshall, 282 S.W. 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). 
177 Id. 
178 Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910). 
179 For judicial endorsement of the first two propositions, see Simpson v. Found. Co., 
95 N.E. 10, 14 (N.Y. 1911) (acknowledging an injured plaintiff’s “natural right to possess 
unimpaired the power of procreation during the normal period”). 
180 See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text. 
181 Hence Bishop’s sad observation that “persons of mature years who lack the 
capabilities on which the matrimonial connection is based, are, for this reason, disqualified 
to contract perfect marriage.” 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 
144 (emphasis added). In Pufendorf’s more vivid explanation, “when an ancient Couple are 
link’d together without any Prospect of a Blessing from the Bed, . . . we shall not speak 
improperly if we call these Honorary Marriages, as we term those Offices Honorary, in 
which a Title only is conferr’d, without Action or Business.” PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 
465. 
182 PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 465. 
183 But see EDWARD BLISS FOOTE, PLAIN HOME TALK ABOUT THE HUMAN SYSTEM 758 
(1870) (discussing a 1787 Connecticut case in which a woman was “prosecuted . . . for the 
fifth time for having illegitimate children” and calling “her defense [at trial] . . . an admirable 
vindication of her natural right to bear children”); WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra 
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asserted whether states pursued their eugenic aims indirectly, by restricting 
individuals’ eligibility to secure a marriage license, or directly, through sterilization 
schemes like the one successfully challenged in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942).184 As 
the Supreme Court famously said in that case, “We are dealing here with legislation 
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”185 This was no sleight 
of hand. To imagine “[m]arriage and procreation” as a single, compound right was 
perfectly consonant with the natural-law tradition from which the “rights of man” 
emerged. 
 
2.  Parenthood and Cohabitation? 
 
Parenthood and cohabitation were no less strongly associated with natural 
marriage than sexual intercourse and procreation, but they weren’t quite as strongly 
associated with the natural right to marry. Although matrimony was unquestionably 
natural law’s preferred context for raising as well as bearing children, it actually 
wasn’t a prerequisite for exercising the rights—nor, crucially, the duties—of 
parenthood. Cohabitation, on the other hand, was most certainly a natural right of 
marriage, in that husband and wife were presumptively entitled to dwell with one 
another. Yet unlike sexual intercourse and procreation, two (or more) individuals’ 
natural freedom to live together wasn’t contingent on marriage—except in the many 
instances where “cohabitation” was euphemistic shorthand for sexual intimacy. 
In light of parenthood’s close connection to marriage generally and to the 
procreative prerogative that natural law reserved to marriage, it may be surprising to 
learn that rights to the “care, custody, and control” of one’s child were not also 
subsumed under the conjugal right to marry. After all, wasn’t marriage designed to 
turn procreators into parents? That’s surely what classical jurists believed. The sex 
instinct being indifferent if not inimical to stable family relationships, it was thought 
that Providence had supplemented “the natural inclination between the sexes” with 
both a moral tendency toward sexual fidelity and the “natural affection” of parents 
for their children.186 Were it not so, explained James Schouler in 1870, “the human 
race must have perished in the cradle.”187 Through marriage, “the sexual cravings of 
nature were speedily brought under wholesome regulations” dictated by “[n]atural 
law or the teachings of a divine providence.”188 Thanks to marriage a man could be 
                                                   
note 50, at 136–37 (counting “the right . . . to reproduce and multiply our being” among the 
“rights inherent in the nature which God has formed”). 
184 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
185 Id. at 541. 
186 TUCKER, supra note 164, at 11 (1844); see also MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 312 
(noting that “the ties of natural affection towards offspring” are “so close . . . that if there 
were no other laws than those of nature, the majority of mankind would unquestionably 
perform all the duties which that relation requires.”). 
187 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 8. 
188 Id. 
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certain of the paternity of his wife’s children, and then would feel compelled—by 
conscience, or in advanced society by positive law—to attend to “the helplessness 
of [his] tender offspring, and for their sake [to] put[] a check upon his baser appetites, 
and concentrate[] his affection upon the home he has founded.”189 
Under natural law, then, marriage, procreation, and parenthood were parts of a 
unified whole. Or to put the point more precisely, an exclusive heterosexual 
relationship of indefinite duration (“marriage”) was the context to which natural law 
relegated the begetting and rearing of offspring.190 Children, indeed, had “a natural 
right . . . to be born of a . . . marriage.”191 
Despite their close connection to marital reproduction, however, rights to the 
care, custody, and control of one’s child were not subsumed under the conjugal right 
to marry. Instead the privileges and duties of parenthood derived from, and extended 
only so far as to effectuate, the “natural duties” that arose—regardless of marital 
status—from procreation.192 According to Rutherford, “[t]he right, which parents 
have over their children, arises originally from generation . . . .”193 Echoing 
Enlightenment philosophers like John Locke and Moses Mendelssohn,194 Tapping 
                                                   
189 1 SCHOULER & BLAKEMORE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921), supra note 52, 
at § 10; see also MONTESQUIEU, supra note 90, at 88 (“The natural obligation of the father 
to provide for his children has established marriage, which makes known the person who 
ought to fulfill this obligation.”). 
190 See, e.g., Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (stating that marriage, as “an 
institution . . . deemed to arise from the law of nature, . . . tends to the procreation of the 
greatest number of healthy citizens, and to their proper maintenance and education”); John 
Witherspoon, Lectures in Moral Philosophy, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 
195 (Thomas P. Miller ed., 1990) (“[M]arriage is a relation expressly founded upon th[e] 
necessity” of providing for offspring who “at their birth are weaker and more helpless than 
any other animals.”). 
191 POST, supra note 170, at 55. 
192 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 186, 
204, 206 (1795) (noting that such duties are “founded in nature, and result from [parents’] 
ardent affection towards their offspring” and that even civil law in Connecticut “enjoins on 
parents toward their illegitimate offspring” a “duty . . . of maintenance.”). In 1844, Henry St. 
George Tucker affirmed that “[t]he natural right of a parent over a child is the obvious 
consequence of his duties.” TUCKER, supra note 164, at 106. In the seven pages Tucker 
devoted specifically to natural rights of parenthood, marriage is mentioned but once, and 
then only respecting the question of whether a parent’s nonconsent invalidates his child’s 
marriage under natural law (Tucker said it doesn’t). Id. at 106–13; see also Current Topics, 
23 ALBANY L.J. 141, 143 (1881) (noting that, under Austrian law, “the duty of a father to 
provide for the maintenance of his child ‘till they can support themselves’ . . . is a natural 
one.”). 
193 RUTHERFORD, supra note 148, at 159. 
194 LOCKE, supra note 53, at 30 (“all parents, were, by the law of nature, ‘under an 
obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children’ they had begotten”); MOSES 
MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM 50 (Allan Arkush trans., 1983) (“Whoever helps to beget a 
being capable of felicity is obligated, by the laws of nature, to promote its felicity, as long as 
it is not yet able to provide for its own advancement.”). 
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Reeve similarly wrote in his 1816 treatise on The Law of Baron and Femme that 
“whoever has been the instrument of giving life to a being incapable of supporting 
itself, is bound by the law of morality to support such being, during such 
incapacity.”195 Whereas civil law in most American jurisdictions tended to sharply 
distinguish between children born in and out of wedlock so far as parental (especially 
paternal) obligations and the descent of property were concerned, natural law 
evidently did not.196 In fact, for most of the classical period, it is far from clear that 
jurists understood “the Prerogative of Paternal Power” as a fundamental or natural 
right at all.197 
Compared to parenthood, cohabitation has a much superior claim to protection 
under the natural right to marry. What James Schouler called “the universal law” of 
matrimony “necessarily suppose[d] a home and mutual cohabitation”; married 
couples were expected “to live together—or as the expression sometimes goes, to 
adhere.”198 Nature guaranteed each spouse “a right to the society of the other.”199  
Although American courts of the classical period viewed joint residence as “the 
great central fact” of a relationship “in its nature matrimonial,”200 cohabitation 
wasn’t an exclusive right of marriage—except, again, insofar as it implied a sexual 
relationship. Very often it did, in social perception no less than in speech. As the 
California Supreme Court declared in 1888, “the cohabitation of persons of opposite 
sexes, whether legal or illicit, suggests sexual intercourse, and is evidence of it.”201 
Considering the commonplace circumstances in which an adult male and an adult 
female might chastely cohabit—a mother residing with her grown son, for instance, 
or a gentleman bachelor living with his female housekeeper—this was a sweeping 
overgeneralization, but no less telling for that. 
                                                   
195 TAPPING REEVE, LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 283 (1816). 
196 Cf. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847) (“The great end of matrimony is not 
the comfort or convenience of the parties, . . . but the procreation of a progeny having legal 
title to maintenance by the father.”). Surely it’s suggestive that, in “the phraseology of the 
English or American law” as reported in 1864, “natural children are children born out of 
wedlock, or bastards, and are distinguished from legitimate children.” 2 JOHN BOUVIER, LAW 
DICTIONARY: ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 200 
(1864) (emphasis added). 
197 JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT 3, 5 (2014). The reference to 
paternal prerogative—one of Shulman’s voluminous proofs that twenty-first century belief 
in the timelessness of parental rights is “incomplete and anachronistic”—derives in this 
instance from John Locke, who called education the “privilege of children, and [the] duty of 
parents.” LOCKE, supra note 53, at 36. 
198 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 53. 
199 Id. 
200 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 457, 540 (noting the 
interest “of the parties, of the children, and of the community, that all intercourse between 
the sexes in its nature matrimonial should be such in fact”); see also JOSEPH R. LONG, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 62 (1905) (“It is the duty of husband and 
wife to live together, cohabitation being an essential element of the notion of marriage.”). 
201 E.g., Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 358 (Cal. 1888). 
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According to Frank Keezer’s treatise on The Law of Marriage and Divorce 
(1906), “cohabitation” could refer to any state of affairs in which “a man and woman 
are conveniently situated as to each other,” whether they be in “an open field, or 
railroad train . . . .”202 As this pointedly gendered definition suggests, classical legal 
discourse on marriage used “cohabitation” to mean sharing not (or not just) a home 
but a bed.203 An exception neatly proves the rule. In Cannon v. United States (1885), 
an alleged bigamist challenged his conviction for “unlawful cohabitation” under 
Utah territorial law.204 He argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury 
that sexual intercourse was a necessary element of the crime and should have let him 
present evidence of “non-access” to his alleged second “wife.”205 The U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected both claims, adopting an unusually broad definition of the key 
statutory term. It reasoned that Utah’s ban on polygamous “cohabitation” was less 
concerned with “the intimacies of the marriage relation” than with the “outward 
appearances” of a “bigamous household,” and therefore that Angus Cannon was 
properly convicted even if he did not “occupy the same bed or sleep in the same 
room . . . or actually have sexual intercourse with either of” his supposed brides.206 
Two Justices dissented, finding “no instance in which the word ‘cohabitation’ has 
been used to describe a criminal offense where it did not imply sexual 
intercourse.”207 The majority opinion conceded this point. It cited two dictionaries, 
both of which defined “cohabit” to mean, first, “to dwell with,” and second, “to live 
together as husband and wife”—that is, in a sexual relationship; and the opinion 
acknowledged that “[t]he word is never used in its first meaning in a criminal statute 
. . . .”208 In short, every Justice on the Cannon Court understood that “cohabitation,” 
to the extent it was an exclusive privilege of civil marriage, was “used in the limited 
sense of sexual intercourse.”209  
The linguistic practice documented in Cannon was equally true of natural law, 
which found it not only “agreeable” that “one man should be joined to one woman 
in a constant society of cohabiting together” but “necessary for the propagation 
                                                   
202 KEEZER, supra note 11, at § 99.  
203 For example, the two words were used interchangeably to mean “sexual intercourse” 
in Jewell’s Lessee v. Jewell, 42 U.S. 219, 224 (1843) (addressing “whether, if the contract 
be made per verba de presenti, and remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba de 
futuro, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also LONG, supra note 200, at § 105 (describing the infidelities 
punished by offenses like “alienation of affections” and “criminal conversation” as “wrongs 
against the right of marital cohabitation”). 
204 Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 70 (1885). 
205 Id. at 70. 
206 Id. at 72–74. 
207 Id. at 80 (Miller, J., dissenting).  
208 Id. at 74 (majority opinion). 
209 Id. at 75. 
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of . . . their offspring; and to render clear and certain the right of succession.”210 To 
take a particularly ubiquitous example: Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries’ heated discussions of the right to informally contract a marriage, the 
perennial question of whether “consensus” alone or “consensus et concubitus” 
constitutes matrimonium was rendered in English as whether a natural marriage was 
made by consent alone or by consent plus intercourse, with the latter denoted by 
either “consummation” or (just as often) “cohabitation.”211 The two expressions 
were used interchangeably, often in the same text.212 “Cohabitation” was the 
signifier; sex is what it signified. 
 
3.  The Conjugal Right in Positive Law 
 
The conjugal right to marry had both positive and negative aspects. It obligated 
the state to both act and abstain from acting.213 In its positive (and probably more 
familiar) guise, the right required a substantial regulatory infrastructure designed to 
enforce spouses’ sexual commitments. Mandated by natural justice,214 this body of 
strictures was in practice of such a punitive bent that classical jurists occasionally 
spoke of marriage as a status belonging fundamentally to penal law.215 The 
relegation of sex to matrimony, a norm so fundamental that it was said to govern 
even the polygamous marriages of certain “warm countries” and “eastern” lands,216 
                                                   
210 ROOT, supra note 19, at xxvii; see also Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, 214 
(1875) (insisting that a judicial decree “may separate husband and wife and set them legally 
free; but . . . [it] cannot obliterate their cohabitation in marriage, [n]or the natural and 
indelible relation which cohabitation in marriage fixes on them forever.”). 
211 PARSONS, supra note 61, at 557. 
212 See, e.g., Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886 (Ala. 1915) (referring to verbal contracts of 
marriage “consummated by cohabitation”); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 372 (1821) 
(using “cohabitation” and “consummation” interchangeably); 1 BISHOP, NEW 
COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 300 (identifying “fornication” and 
“marriage” as “the only forms of sexual cohabitation” known to law). 
213 Dane, supra note 72, at 321–22 (discussing natural law’s requirement that worldly 
governments institute marriage, “including both interpersonal rights [as between spouses] 
and [spouses’] rights of liberty against the state”).  
214 Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (“If marriage be an institution derived 
from the law of nature, then, whatever has a natural tendency to . . . destroy its value . . . is 
by the same law prohibited.”). 
215 See, e.g., Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260, 265 (1813) (“Regulations on the subject of 
marriage and divorce are rather parts of the criminal, than of the civil, code” and are imposed 
“with a principal view to the public order . . . and the happiness of the community.”); 
Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 115, 136 (1867) (emphasizing that “the legal rights of husband 
and wife” entail “corresponding disabilities, . . . many of which are of a severely penal 
character”); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. 1953) (noting the “grave 
criminal and moral ramifications” of determining the validity of a marriage). 
216 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS 
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was secured through criminal sanction of fornication, nonmarital cohabitation, 
homosexual conduct, and adultery.217 Civil law had a major role to play as well. To 
keep spouses from “defiling and disgracing the marriage bed,” it imposed disabilities 
on “illegitimate” children and provided money damages for torts like “alienation of 
affections” and “criminal conversation.”218 
Classical marriage regulation enforced the duty of sex within marriage less 
concertedly—and, excluding the marital rape exception, less harshly—than it 
enforced the prohibition of sex outside of marriage. But they did enforce it. For all 
their hesitation to find against the existence of an otherwise regular marriage, 
American courts were accustomed to granting annulments for impotency, want of 
consummation, undisclosed sterility, and fraudulent representation of intent to have 
children.219 And in the twentieth century, legislatures increasingly authorized 
divorces for “refusal of marital relations,” a species of “constructive 
abandonment.”220 
In its negative guise, the conjugal right to marry was a strictly bounded freedom 
of intimate association—an entitlement to the marital lifestyle, understood as a 
monogamous heterosexual relationship (or, more controversially, an internally 
exclusive polygamous relationship) that normally but not necessarily embraced 
procreation, parenthood, and cohabitation.221 Having been fashioned by nature to 
gravitate toward this conjugal pattern, human beings had a right to do so.222 Apart 
                                                   
WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 1 (5th ed. 1873) 
[hereinafter 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873)] (“Even where polygamy is tolerated, 
fidelity to and among the family of wives is enjoined, the same as is the more restricted 
fidelity in monogamy.”). 
217 See Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150, 150 (1875) (“[A]dultery is offensive to all laws 
human and divine, and human laws must impose punishments adequate to the enormity of 
the offence and its insult to public decency.”); Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 
(“deduc[ing]” from natural law “the criminality of fornication, incest, adultery, seduction, 
and other lewdness”). 
218 Alexander H. Robbins, Note, Right of Husband to Maintain an Action for the 
Debauchery of His Wife Due to Her Own Improper Advances, 54 CENT. L.J. 61, 71–72 
(1902). 
219 See H.H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 110 
(2d ed. 1988); see also TYLER, supra note 71, at 822 (urging that, “in the case of the 
impotence of either of the parties, none of the peculiar ends of matrimony can be 
accomplished . . . and a union should be discarded as much as the marriage of two persons 
of the same sex.”). 
220 See Refusal of Sexual Intercourse as Justifying Divorce or Separation, 148 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 329 (2015). 
221 On the range of opinion concerning polygamy’s compatibility with natural law, see 
supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text.  
222 A marvelous study of slave marriages in the British Caribbean cites an 1816 letter 
in which an Anglican pastor in the Bahamas argues that 
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from restrictions based on natural disqualifications like inability to consummate a 
marriage or incapacity to contract one, deprivations of the conjugal right were so 
inconceivable that explicit affirmations of it were at once extremely rare and 
supremely confident. In 1787, when Connecticut Federalist Oliver Ellsworth argued 
against appending a bill of rights to the proposed national constitution, he assured 
readers that certain freedoms, enumerated or not, were beyond Congress’s “power 
to prohibit”—“liberty of conscience,” for example, “or of matrimony, or of burial of 
the dead”223 Four decades later, the Vermont Supreme Court proclaimed that 
marriage “was ordained by the great Lawgiver of the universe, and [is] not to be 
prohibited by man.”224 Just what would it mean for “man” to prohibit marriage? It’s 
hard to tell exactly what kinds of suppression these writers had in mind. On its face, 
their language seems broad enough to encompass restrictions fixed upon specific 
individuals, particular social groups, or the populace as a whole.225 A passage from 
the 1873 edition of Bishop’s famous Commentaries appears to be concerned mainly, 
perhaps only, with exclusions of specific individuals:  
 
Matrimony is a natural right and, being such, . . . can be forfeited only by 
some wrongful act. Therefore the government is under obligation to permit 
every person of mature years to be the husband or wife of another, who 
will substantially perform the duties required in the matrimonial 
relation.226  
 
                                                   
[m]arriage was instituted by God himself . . . . Although, therefore, human laws 
may, and indeed must regulate many things respecting it, . . . yet it is impossible 
that they can have any right to set it aside, or to restrict any class of human beings 
from the use and enjoyment of it.  
 
Cecilia A. Green, “A Civil Inconvenience”? The Vexed Question of Slave Marriage in the 
British West Indies, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 18 (2007) (citations omitted). 
223 “A Landholder” [Oliver Ellsworth], Letter to the Landholders and Farmers, CONN. 
COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 161, 164 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (emphasis added). 
224 Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town 
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 159 (1829). 
225 For further discussion of whether classical jurists understood the Constitution to bar 
marriage abolition, see infra Section II.D on the right of marital permanence. 
226 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33. Two years earlier, 
Reverend Joel Foote Bingham went even further than Bishop, arguing that  
 
marriage . . . is not a thing of human institution; nor is it competent for human law 
to forbid or do it away. No matter what may be the commands of Caesar, God 
Almighty has appointed it; and men may in innocence and duty enter into its holy 
union in defiance, even, of any civil mandate.  
 
BINGHAM, supra note 52, at 15–16. 
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In practice, did American governments fulfill their “obligation” to make 
marriage universally available? Bishop almost certainly would have thought so. 
Wholesale denials of the conjugal right to marry were unusual. American law 
tolerated such deprivations insofar as slaves had no right in civil law to have sex, 
procreate, cohabit, or parent children over their masters’ objection, despite a widely 
if not universally acknowledged capacity for natural marriage.227 When it came to 
free persons, however, positive law generally protected subjects against privately 
imposed celibacy—refusing, for example, to enforce contracts and testamentary 
provisions “in restraint of marriage.”228 Public impositions of lifelong celibacy were 
effected primarily through two mechanisms: statutes and common-law doctrines 
denying marriage to individuals deemed incapable of consent (a category of 
exclusion discussed below in terms of the contractual rather than the conjugal right 
to marry);229 and laws and judgments barring the guilty party in a divorce action 
(usually a proven adulterer) from remarriage.230 This latter class of prohibition was 
widely criticized for withholding the medicine of wedlock from society’s sickest 
patients, whose “sexual passion . . . will probably be indulged either licitly or 
                                                   
227 See Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 338 (1878) (“There was no law forbidding 
marriage among slaves, but the intention of slavery made the right of property in the master 
paramount, and natural marriage could not be allowed to interfere with that power. . .”); see 
also Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235, 237 (1858) (discussing extralegal “marriages” 
between slaves that were “permitted and encouraged by owners”). 
228 See Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910) (discussing inheritances 
“received . . . on condition of not marrying” and construing legal hostility to such conditions 
as a marker of respect for “the natural right which every one had to marry and beget 
children”); PARSONS, supra note 61, at 555 (“Contracts in Restraint of Marriage . . . are 
wholly void . . . .”); REEVE, supra note 195, at 220–21 (“If the contract by A with B, be, that 
he never would marry, this would be a void contract.”). But see 2 JAMES SCHOULER & 
ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION 
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1270 (6th ed. 1921) (noting “only one main qualification to the 
rule against total restraint of marriage, and that is an exception touching widows,” in whose 
“viduity” deceased husbands retained “a sort of mournful property right”). 
229 See infra notes 252–255 and accompanying text (describing marital disqualifications 
based on incapacity to consent). 
230 Some bars on remarriage obtained only so long as the innocent ex-spouse was still 
living. Others applied for a statutorily or judicially fixed time and/or were limited to 
marriages between adulterers and their partners in crime. Strictly speaking, the latter 
prohibition would have been a restriction on marital choice, see infra section II(B)(3), not on 
the conjugal right to marry. See 3 GEORGE ELLIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 18–20, 79 (1964). 
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illicitly.”231 Even so, they exemplified Bishop’s principle that revocations of the 
right to marry must be based on “some wrongful act.”232 
 
B.  The Contractual Right to Marry 
 
Lawyers of the classical period frequently described the relation of husband and 
wife as “a contract of natural law.”233 They said that marriage’s eternal form, what 
Pufendorf had called “the Principal Contract of true and perfect Matrimony,” was 
inscribed in “the Law of Nature”234—devised, “unlike other contracts, by God 
himself.”235 In turn they held that “the right to contract a marriage is a natural right, 
not a legislatively conferred privilege.”236  
Thus “the natural right of marriage”—a right to the relation itself, to a 
presumptively lifelong heterosexual union—was thought to entail “freedom of 
contract in the exercise of the right.”237 In positive law, this freedom referred to the 
civil contract of marriage and was properly styled a “civil right.” As in our own day, 
the designation “civil” served mainly to distinguish “marriage as the law views it 
from marriage as a religious rite,”238 but it also signaled a quality and quantity of 
regulation at odds with the conventional ideal of contract. The state both wrote the 
                                                   
231 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 211; see also Current 
Topics, supra note 192, at 142 (objecting that “the prohibition against remarriage in decrees 
for divorce . . . proposes to punish adultery by holding out a premium for more adultery.”). 
232 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33 (“[W]hether [the 
guilty party] . . . should be permitted to marry, or not, is a question, not of right with him, 
but of public expediency.”). 
233 See, e.g., KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5; STORY, COMMENTARIES (3d ed., 1846), supra 
note 107, at § 108. 
234 PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 448–49. 
235 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 24 (locating the 
contract’s “foundation in the law of nature”) (quoting PATRICK FRASER, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF SCOTLAND: AS APPLICABLE TO THE PERSONAL AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS: 
COMPRISING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER 
AND SERVANT, AND MASTER AND APPRENTICE: WITH AN APPENDIX OF FORMS (1846)). 
236 Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305 (1953) (emphasis added); see also 
Butterfield v. Ennis, 186 S.W. 1173, 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (“The contract of marriage 
being one of natural right . . . the contract proven in this case [is presumptively] valid . . . .”); 
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 44 (invoking “the law of 
nature whereby all marriageable persons are entitled to enter [marriage] at will”). 
237 Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 613 (Conn. 1905) (Hamersley, J., concurring in result) 
(emphasis added). 
238 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31; see also Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 212 (1888) (calling marriage “a civil contract, as distinguished from a 
religious sacrament”); MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 235 (explaining that “the term civil” as 
applied to the “civil contract” of marriage refers “to the artificial laws of society and not to 
those of nature or revelation”). 
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contract and considered itself a “third party” to it.239 To be sure, marriage 
“settlements” were fairly common in the nineteenth century; along with wills, trusts, 
and other devices, these instruments enabled affianced and wedded couples to opt 
out of certain standardized rules.240 But even people with wherewithal to make such 
arrangements did so only by the grace of the state. For them, too, marriage remained 
primarily a status—a “legal position or condition”241 patterned according to public 
rather than private design.242 
The contract/status dialectic caused a fair amount of jurisprudential 
handwringing in the early-to-mid nineteenth century,243 but one contractual element 
of marriage was never doubted: its foundation in mutual agreement.244 The bedrock 
requirement that marriage be voluntary—that it be “founded on mutual consent, 
which is the essence of all contracts”—was no less a tenet of positive than of natural 
law.245 One important effect of this principle was to make marriageability hinge, in 
large part, on a person’s capacity to contract in general.246 Certain civil incapacities, 
                                                   
239 See 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, AND 
DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS 
WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES § 230 (6th ed. 
1881). 
240 See SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 263–64; 
STORY, COMMENTARIES (3d ed., 1846), supra note 107, at §§ 183–88. 
241 2 STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT LINN LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH AND 
AMERICAN LAW 1218 (1883) (defining “status”).  
242 In substance, of course, civil marriage had always been a “status,” as that term is 
defined above. See Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 49 (1857) (“At common law, marriage as a 
status had few elements of contract about it . . . .”). That being said, the institution’s 
nineteenth-century “transformation . . . from contract to status” was no mere rhetorical shift. 
See Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10 (explaining this conceptual evolution 
and its steep ideological stakes). 
243 See generally Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10. For a subtle 
disclosure of contract’s decline as the prevailing descriptor of marriage, compare SCHOULER, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 22 (“It is frequently said . . . that 
marriage is nothing more than a civil contract.”) and JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 22 (5th ed. 1895) [hereinafter SCHOULER, DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895)] (“It has been frequently said . . . that marriage is nothing more 
than a civil contract.”) (emphases added). 
244 “Whatever question or controversy may exist . . . concerning the nature of the 
relation subsisting between husband and wife after marriage—whether the[ir] rights and 
liabilities . . . are then to be . . . governed by the principles applicable to all civil contracts, 
or the contract is to be considered as merged in the higher nature of the status created by the 
agreement of the parties—all the authorities concur in this, that marriage has its origin and 
foundation in a purely civil contract.” TYLER, supra note 71, at 806. 
245 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 31; see also BOUVIER, 
supra note 13, at 102 (“As an institution of the law of nature, [marriage] consists in the free 
and voluntary consent of both parties. . . .”). 
246 See WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 86 (“If either of the parties 
is . . . not sui juris, he or she cannot enter into the state” of matrimony); see also RAPALJE & 
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like slavery, claimed little or no basis in natural law.247 Slaves were incapable of 
legal marriage not because they lacked “moral power to agree to such a contract,”248 
but because, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1875, “the slave was incapable 
of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage.”249 Not twenty 
years earlier, Justice Benjamin Curtis had seized upon this “inflexible . . . law of 
African slavery”250 to argue that Dred Scott’s status as a slave in Missouri had been 
extinguished by a civil marriage he contracted in Illinois.251 
                                                   
LAWRENCE, supra note 241, at 1243 (“A person is said to be sui juris if he is not subject to 
any general disability,” including the inability “to enter into contracts . . . with the same 
freedom as ordinary persons.”). 
247 See supra notes 135–142 and accompanying text (describing slaves’ perceived 
capacity for natural marriage even in the absence of legal recognition). Well before the period 
under study here, Christian theologians who accepted the institution of slavery nonetheless 
believed that slaves were naturally entitled to “lawfully contract marriage.” MARRIAGE 
CANONS FROM THE DECRETUM OF GRATIAN AND THE DECRETALS, SEXT, CLEMENTINES AND 
EXTRAVAGANTES, Case 29 (Question II (C.1.)) (Augustine Thompson, O.P., eds. & John T. 
Noonan, trans. 1967) (quoting Pope Julius I (d. 352)); see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, THIRD PART 177 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, supp. 
1947) (as “slavery is of positive law” and “marriage is of natural and Divine law, . . . 
even . . . a slave” may “marry freely, even without his master’s consent or knowledge”); John 
T. Noonan, Power to Choose, in 4 VIATOR 419, 430 (1973) [hereinafter Noonan, Power to 
Choose] (discussing Gratian’s view that “there is neither slave nor free . . . in the marriage 
of Christians”). 
248 Girod v. Lewis, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 559, 559–60 (1819) (stating that slaves, by definition 
“deprived of all civil rights,” had “no legal capacity to assent to any contract,” including that 
of matrimony, but holding that a marriage contracted with “the consent of the master and 
moral assent of the slave, from the moment of freedom, although dormant during slavery, 
produces all the effects which result from such a contract among free persons”). 
249 Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875); see also REEVE, supra note 195, at 341 
(affirming that “the rights and duties of a husband are inconsistent with a state of slavery.”); 
PARSONS, supra note 61, at 341 (calling the “incidents of marriage . . . so inconsistent with 
the condition of slavery, that we do not see how any ceremonies . . . could make such 
marriage legal.”). Astonishingly, certain states prior to the Civil War officially declined to 
recognize any contract, including one of marriage, entered into by a “free negro.” See Bryan 
v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201 (1853) (“[T]o become a citizen . . . capable of contracting, [or] 
of marrying . . . requires . . . more than the mere act of enfranchisement.”); 1 BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 310 (describing a provision of the Indiana 
Constitution). Other states appear to have limited civil marriage, if not other contracts, to 
white people. See HUNTER, supra note 135, at 101, 104 (describing antebellum laws in 
Mississippi and Virginia).  
250 Hall, 92 U.S. at 30. 
251 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 600 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“There can be no 
more effectual . . . act of emancipation . . . than by the consent of the master that the slave 
should enter into a contract of marriage, . . . attended by all the civil rights and obligations 
which belong to that condition.”). 
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Unlike the condition of slavery, several other marital incapacities were thought 
to denote a supposed lack of intellectual or “moral power” to consent.252 As 
Chancellor Kent wrote in 1827, “all persons who have not the regular use of the 
understanding sufficient to deal with discretion in the common affairs of life,” such 
as “idiots and lunatics . . . , are incapable of agreeing to . . . marriage,” just as they 
were “incapable of agreeing to any contract.”253 Another important incapacity, 
justified mainly by physical immaturity but sometimes also by intellectual 
immaturity, was “want of age.”254 Like “idiocy” and insanity, this was “both a 
natural and a legal disability.”255 
Marital disqualifications based on incapacity obviously limited exercise of the 
otherwise “universal” freedom to contract a marriage.256 In natural law, this freedom 
embraced two, arguably three, more specific entitlements. First, marriage’s origin in 
free and mutual consent inherently implied a natural right not to marry—a 
prohibition against compelling any person to marry against her will. Second, an 
otherwise eligible man and woman had a right to marry one another by simple 
mutual agreement, without observance of particular formalities and without the 
permission or participation of any third parties. To the extent this right placed the 
power to marry in individuals’ own hands, it implied a third dimension of the 
freedom to contract marriage: a right to marry the person of one’s choice. Rarely 
described in so many words, this last was increasingly repudiated after the Civil 
War, primarily for the sake of racial segregation in marriage. 
The following sections elaborate the three main aspects of the contractual right 
to marry, and they show in broad strokes how each aspect was discussed, respected, 
and disrespected in classical American marriage law. First, as a matter of principle, 
black-letter doctrine consistently and uncontroversially acknowledged a right not to 
marry, but courts only found “involuntary” agreement to marry in cases of extreme 
fraud or duress.257 Second, in protracted and shifting debates over “common-law 
                                                   
252 This distinction was drawn, for example, in Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 317, 344 
(1878) (explaining that a slave’s “incapacity to marry [civilly] was not in re, but per lege”—
not “in itself,” but “by law”).  
253 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 65; see also 1 BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 126, 143 (describing age, “idiocy,” and 
insanity as “general” and “universal” impediments). 
254 MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 239. Disqualification for “want of age” didn’t 
necessarily encompass everyone yet to reach the usual threshold of adulthood. Following 
canon law and common law, many jurisdictions allowed female “infants” to wed if they were 
at least twelve years old and males to do so if they were at least fourteen years old. See 1 
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at §§ 143–46. 
255 MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 239; see also 2 THOMAS EDLYNE TOMLINS, Marriage, 
in THE LAW-DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1820) (counting “age” and “want of reason” as disabilities 
“grounded on natural law”); Hurlbut, supra note 74, at 152 (insisting, contrary to provision 
for marriage “during a lucid interval,” that “the laws of nature forbid” a “lunatic . . . from 
marrying at all times”). 
256 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 838. 
257 See infra Section II.B.1. 
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marriage,” classical lawyers and lawmakers wrestled earnestly with whether and 
how civil law should accommodate the natural right to marry by mutual 
agreement.258 Finally, although a right to marry the person of one’s choice was but 
a small logical step from marriage by private agreement, jurists of the period 
generally affirmed the validity, indeed the propriety, of civil constraints on mate 
selection.259 
 
1.  The Right Not to Marry 
 
Through all the law of marriage runs the principle which puts it in the 
power of parties to assume or not, at their own election, the marriage 
status, while the status is imposed upon no one who does not accept it 
voluntarily.260 
 
The right not to marry, or the principle that “marriage . . . must be the effect of 
willingness as well as capacity to contract it[,]”261 operated against state and private 
actors alike. While states avowedly “favored” and encouraged marriage, not least by 
making nonmarital sex and procreation illegal,262 Joel Prentiss Bishop could 
nonetheless assert without qualification in 1864 that “the law compels no one to 
assume the matrimonial status.”263 When scholars of our own day speak of a “right 
not to marry,” this is exactly what they mean: a “right to be free from state-imposed 
marriage, . . . a negative right.”264 
With regard to coercion by nonstate actors, all but slaves were protected from 
involuntary marriage.265 In cases where A’s marriage to B was challenged for want 
of genuine consent, courts worked from a universally accepted premise that “a 
marriage procured by force or fraud is . . . void ab initio, and may be treated as null 
by every court.”266 This did not mean that arranged marriages were invalid, that 
parental consent couldn’t be required by statute, or that parents and guardians had 
                                                   
258 See infra Section II.B.2. 
259 See infra Section II.B.3. 
260 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 121. 
261 James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
323 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). 
262 KEEZER, supra note 11, at 5 (1906) (“the law favors and encourages marriage”). 
263 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 218. 
264 Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1513 
(2016). 
265 On owners who compelled slaves into conjugal unions, see Margaret A. Burnham, 
An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 196 (1987). 
266 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 67 (explaining that “the 
ingredient of fraud or duress . . . in this . . . as in any other contract” vitiates “the free assent 
of the mind”). 
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to abstain from pressuring children and wards into a favored match.267 Absent 
serious threats of personal and usually physical harm, courts were prepared to find 
“free assent of the mind” in all of these circumstances,268 just as they readily 
accepted marriages undertaken to avoid prosecution or punishment for criminal 
seduction.269 In suits for fraud, moreover, courts gave eager suitors wide berth for 
exaggeration and even outright prevarication so long as no misrepresentations went 
to the conjugal “essentials of the marriage.”270 
Like many classical ideas about marriage, the prohibition of involuntary unions 
was attributed to natural law and inferred from many of natural law’s standard 
reference points.271 It had analogues in Christian theology and an especially long 
heritage in canon law.272 According to Bishop, the rule that marriage is “never . . . 
                                                   
267 See, e.g., WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra note 50, at 86 (“[I]t is flagitious 
to force a child or ward into consent without his or her own will confirming it.”). 
268 MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 238 (“If . . . a marriage is forced by imprisonment, or 
by threats of the loss of life or limb, such contract is absolutely void.”). 
269 See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012). In 
the same year that Loving v. Virginia was decided, an eminent family law expert 
demonstrated that “a great many of our laws dealing with sexual intercourse between 
unmarried parties . . . have been consciously oriented toward or have in fact served to 
encourage or force marriage between parties who indulge in such conduct.” Walter 
Wadlington, Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law, 1 GA. L. REV. 183, 193 (1967) (finding 
thirty-five jurisdictions in which subsequent marriage or “a renewed offer” to marry “will 
serve as a defense” to the crime of seduction and noting “several jurisdictions which permit 
[the defense] in prosecutions for statutory rape, bastardy, . . . adultery,” and/or fornication).  
270 LONG, supra note 200, at §§ 43–52; see also Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Only fraud going to the ‘essentials’ of the marriage—lies about 
sex or procreation—qualified a marriage for annulment.”). 
271 BOUVIER, supra note 13, at 101 (“As an institution established by nature, [marriage] 
consists in the free and voluntary consent of both parties . . . .”); MANSFIELD, supra note 48, 
at 238 (explaining prohibitions of involuntary marriage as means of “securing . . . women in 
the just exercise of all their natural rights”). 
272 Medieval Church doctrine had “create[d] a zone of freedom” around marital choice, 
with “the facultus contrahendi matrimonium, the faculty of contracting marriage,” coming 
to be considered “a right [that] . . . a person was free to exercise . . . as he or she saw fit,” 
without “coercion.” Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights 
Tradition, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37, 77–78 (1991). The eminent sixteenth-century theologian 
Francisco de Vitoria held that “no pope, prince, or parent can harm or impede th[e] natural 
right” to voluntary marriage and that “no one can be coerced, tricked, or otherwise misled 
into . . . marriage.” Witte, supra note 153, at 618 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de 
Matrimonio, in RELECTIONES THEOLOGICAE XII (1557)). This principle proved no less 
important in most Protestant teachings on marriage. See, e.g., DUNLAVY, supra note 119, at 
317 (stating the Shaker doctrine that “no one man, or association of men, have any right to 
forbid or require anyone to marry”). For an excellent account of the contractarian model’s 
development in Protestant thought on the family, see generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM 
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 
(1997). 
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imposed on parties who do not consent to accept the status . . . runs throughout the 
entire extent of that unwritten law which our forefathers brought hither from the 
mother country” and which “radiates, too, through all the domains of our reason.”273 
Dictated by “the first principles of natural equity,”274 the rule of voluntariness was 
also juris gentium, a policy “to which the world long ago assented, and which no 
man yet has appeared, either in this country or in any other, with enough folly to 
deny.”275 
The natural right not to marry was so fervently cherished that, to an unusual 
extent, jurists spoke of it in constitutional and quasi-constitutional terms. Quoting 
Thomas Cooley, that “most conservative of all commentators on constitutional law,” 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi proclaimed in 1931: “For the legislature to marry 
parties against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against the law of the 
land.”276 Marriage contrary to the will of one or both parties, the court continued, 
“has always been odious to the free people of this country, and, with the abolition of 
slavery, the last remnant of it disappeared from among us.”277 Unlike in “oriental 
and semibarbarious nations,” it said, such marriages “have never received toleration 
here and . . . would be none the less odious if attempted . . . by the state itself instead 
of the smaller despotisms of inner circles.”278 Bishop had made a similar point half 
a century earlier: “A government which should compel people into matrimony 
without their consent, could not be endured.”279 To illustrate, he sketched the 
following scenario:  
 
Now, if a man and woman . . . should be brought together by brute force, 
and an official person should say a marriage ceremony over them, they not 
consenting, this profanation . . . would not make them husband and wife. 
And if the legislature should step in and declare them to be, therefore, 
married, the act would be a high outrage . . . [and] there would be, at least, 
doubt, whether it would be binding under the constitutions of our States.280  
                                                   
273 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 95. 
274 Natural equity’s first rule held that government should not “adopt any rule which is 
inherently oppressive to its subjects.” 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 
12, at § 12. 
275 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 95. 
276 White v. Williams, 132 So. 573, 580 (Miss. 1931) (quoting 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE 
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 778 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927)). 
277 Id. at 579. 
278 Id. 
279 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 94. 
280 Id. at § 90a. Borrowing Bishop’s admonition that “the status of marriage is never 
superinduced by any government,” the Mississippi Supreme Court imputed a minimum 
requirement of implied consent to a law that purported converted extant cohabitations “as 
husband and wife” into legal marriages. Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357, 373–76 (1873) 
(quoting 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1873), supra note 12, at § 218). 
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Notably, Bishop gave no indication which constitutional provisions a forced 
marriage might violate. 
 
2.  The Right to Marry by Mutual Consent 
 
Mutual consent is of the essence of marriage; it constitutes of itself . . . a 
perfect marriage according to natural law.281 
 
Reciprocal consent, as we have seen, was a necessary condition of marriage 
under natural law. In the United States, it has always and everywhere been necessary 
to a valid civil marriage. But was consent alone sufficient? Or were further 
formalities required?—particular recitations, parental sanction, community notice, 
witnesses, “the interposition of person in holy orders, . . . or solemniz[ation] in a 
church”?282 Answers to these questions have fluctuated widely over time and across 
jurisdictions. Their variation attests to the turbulent rise and unfinished fall of that 
peculiarly American doctrine—peculiar in both name and substance—known as 
“common-law marriage,”283 broadly defined as “marriage which does not depend 
for its validity upon any religious or civil ceremony but is created by the consent of 
the parties as any other contract.”284 
Common-law marriage was never so uncontroversial an institution as many of 
its supporters proclaimed it, and questions regarding its adoption and regulation 
generated prolific case law and commentary throughout the nineteenth and early-
                                                   
281 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 63.  
282 REEVE, supra note 195, at 196 (railing against mandatory clerical officiation as a 
“usurpation of the church of Rome on the rights of the civilian”). 
283 English, Scotch, and Irish jurists did not speak of “common-law marriage.” Instead 
they described nuptials that failed to adhere to legal formalities as “informal,” “irregular,” 
or, where the union was solemnized outside a church, “clandestine.” Substantively, 
American common-law marriage differed from its English variants in several respects. For 
example, American courts treated such marriages as fully valid, endowing them with all the 
same legal incidents as “regular” marriages; and some states refused to recognize informal 
marriages not consummated by sexual intercourse. See GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 69 
(describing how post-Revolutionary American law “rechristened ‘irregular marriage’ as 
‘common-law marriage’” and “made matrimony much easier for a couple to enter”); 
REBECCA PROBERT, MARRIAGE LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE LONG EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
21–69 (2009) (calling common-law marriage a “distinctive[ly] American concept” and 
detailing the important ways in which English law differentiated between regular and 
irregular marriages, including its limitation of permissible sexual intercourse to the former); 
see also supra notes 211–212 and accompanying text and infra note 288 and accompanying 
text (discussing American debates on the necessity of sexual consummation to a valid 
common-law marriage).  
284 OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (1922). 
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twentieth centuries.285 Those sources interest us here primarily for their bearing on 
an important feature of the natural right to marry—namely, the right to wed by 
mutual consent, without any formalities except mutual assent to be husband and 
wife. 
Conflicting and often fervent beliefs about sexual morality and social order 
motivated a good deal of both legislative and judicial decision-making on common-
law marriage.286 Nonetheless, judges and treatise writers spilled less ink on such 
policy concerns than on two relatively technical matters: Did the common law of a 
given jurisdiction historically respect a right of informal marriage?287 And if so, did 
anything of that common-law right survive legislation codifying procedures for 
proper solemnization? Both inquiries could prove quite intricate, involving a host of 
subtle distinctions: between a marriage forged by words of present assent (a 
“contract per verba de praesenti”) and one that arises upon sexual consummation of 
an “engagement of matrimony” (a “promise per verba de future cum copula”);288 
                                                   
285 In a 1915 case presenting just one of many subsidiary questions relating to common-
law marriage (viz., whether a marriage per verba de praesenti could be found where there 
was no subsequent “cohabitation as man and wife”), the Alabama Supreme Court 
complained that “[i]t would consume too much time and space to attempt to review the text-
books and adjudicated cases on this subject. There is not only lack of unanimity, but great 
conflict . . . [that] amounts almost to a state of anarchy.” Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 887 (Ala. 
1915). 
286 For explicit engagements with the policy implications of common-law marriage, see 
REEVE, supra note 195, at 198 (arguing that “it would be very inconvenient” if “the common 
law . . . consider[ed] a marriage, celebrated irregularly, as void”); Rodebaugh v. Sanks, 2 
Watts 9, 11 (Pa. 1833) (foreseeing that “a rigid execution of [solemnization statutes] would 
bastardize a vast majority of the children which have been born within the state for half a 
century”); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904) (arguing that the “ancient 
doctrine” of common-law marriage “tends to weaken the public estimate of the sanctity of 
the marriage relation [and] puts in doubt the certainty of the rights of inheritance”); Huard v. 
McTeigh, 113 Or. 279, 295 (1925) (citing as reason to strictly apply solemnization statutes 
the court’s “opinion” that common-law marriage “is contrary to public policy and public 
morals” because it “places a premium upon illicit cohabitation and offers encouragement to 
the harlot and the adventuress”); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. 1953) 
(noting the issue’s “grave criminal and moral ramifications, e.g., the possible bastardization 
of issue and [the] existence of a meretricious relationship”).  
287 An equivalent question was raised, mutatis mutandis, in states and territories with a 
colonial heritage of civil rather than common law. In a case involving a marriage supposedly 
celebrated in Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court looked “to the laws in force in the Spanish 
colonies previous to their cession” in determining the validity of a union contracted before a 
civil magistrate rather than a priest. Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850); see also 
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 163 (naming ten states in which 
“the intervention of a minister in holy orders . . . has been held unnecessary at common law” 
and reporting that “the same has been held in Louisiana” even though that state “derived its 
common law from Spain”). 
288 Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 377, 374 (1872); see also Askew v. Dupree, 30 
Ga. 173, 189 (1860) (“[I]f the contract is per verba de presenti— that is, I take you to be my 
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between an invalid and an illegal marriage;289 between laws preserving and laws 
abrogating common-law rights;290 between the great swaths of law that English 
colonists imported to America and the portions they left behind;291 “between the 
common law of England and the canon law of Europe”;292 between “English canon 
law as it stood previous to the Council of Trent” in the mid-sixteenth century and 
English canon law after the Council;293 and on and on.294 
                                                   
wife, and I take you to be my husband—though it be not consummated by cohabitation, or 
if it be made per verba de futuro, and be consummated, it amounts to a valid marriage, in the 
absence of all municipal regulations to the contrary . . . .”). 
289 See, e.g., Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 352 (Cal. 1888) (citing a unanimous holding 
of the House of Lords that, “by the law of England” as it existed prior to Lord Hardwicke’s 
Act of 1753, “a contract of marriage per verba de proesenti was indissoluble between the 
parties themselves” and enabled one to sue the other for solemnization in ecclesiastical court, 
“but such contract never constituted a full and complete marriage”) (quoting Regina v. Millis 
(1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844; 10 Cl. & F. 534); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 370–71 (1821) 
(distinguishing between the informal marriages that English common law had “deemed valid 
to most purposes” and a properly solemnized “marriage de jure, . . . valid to every purpose”); 
Denison, 35 Md. at 376 (invoking “common law authorities” to the effect that a “contract 
per verba de præsenti, or per verba de futuro cum copula, . . . was incomplete, and did not 
confer the civil rights incident to the married state until” its solemnization was “duly 
performed”). 
290 See infra notes 320–332 and accompanying text. 
291 See, e.g., Dumaresly, 10 Ky. 368 at 377 (Mills, J., dissenting) (accepting arguendo 
that the English common law permitted informal marriage, but maintaining that the 
American colonies and then states “adopted the common law of England . . . only so far as 
suited our local situation, and was compatible with the genius and spirit of our government”); 
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 418 (“assuming,” contrary 
to the authors’ own view, “that the English common law did when our country was settled, 
render impossible a marriage without a priest,” but doubting that “this impediment to 
matrimony [was] adapted to our altered situation and circumstances”); REEVE, supra note 
195, at 199 n.1 (arguing that Lord Hardwicke’s Act of 1752, “although . . . passed while we 
were colonists of Great Britain,” was “entirely hostile to the spirit of our institutions” and 
“could [n]ever be extended here by construction”). 
292 Denison, 35 Md. at 375. 
293 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 40; see also 
Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850) (“That marriage might be validly contracted by 
mutual promises alone . . . was an established principle of civil and canon law antecedent to 
the Council of Trent,” which declared in 1563 that a marriage not celebrated before clergy 
or multiple witnesses was henceforth “ecclesiastically void”). 
294 Jurists also deliberated on the differences [1] between the Council of Trent’s initial 
statement that marriages by verba de praesenti are “vera matrimonia” and its contrary decree 
that such contracts are “null and void,” Hallett, 51 U.S. at 181–82; [2] between recognizing 
informal marriage and accepting cohabitation and repute as evidence of a properly 
solemnized marriage contract, KOEGEL, supra note 284, at 110; [3] between a marriage 
“clandestine” in the specialized sense that it wasn’t witnessed by clergy (or that it lacked 
some “other requisite[] of ecclesiastical law”) and a truly “secret” marriage—i.e., one 
without witnesses, Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P.345, 377 (Cal. 1888) (McFarland, J., dissenting); 
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Throughout 150 years of wrangling over so many fine points of law and legal 
history, one background proposition seems to have passed without contradiction. 
Time and again, classical writers on “common-law,” “informal,” and otherwise 
“irregular” matrimony avowed that two persons’ good-faith agreement to be 
husband and wife constitutes a marriage valid “in the sight of heaven.”295 “[B]y the 
law of nature the contract is binding.”296 For proponents of informal marriage, 
invocations of the “natural right of union between a man and a woman” traded on a 
widely perceived kinship between natural and common law.297 But even the 
institution’s opponents regularly admitted (and certainly never denied) that, under 
“the law of nature, marriage may be constituted by the mutual present consent of 
competent persons, without the addition of any formality.”298 Often this principle 
was stated by reference to “the state of nature, where no solemnities of marriage are 
prescribed.”299 American jurists frequently adopted Lord Stowell’s account in Lindo 
v. Belisario (1795)300 of the bilateral consent to cohabitation and procreation that, 
“in a state of nature, would be a marriage,”301 and they were still more enamored of 
his description in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) of the “contract of natural law” 
that existed between “the common ancestors of mankind.”302 In 1908, a Missouri 
court named those ancestors explicitly, stating that “the marriage of Adam and Eve 
was not only without a witness, . . . but, so far as the record shows, they married 
themselves; he repeating the contract and she acquiescing by silence.”303 
                                                   
[4] between recorded and unrecorded contracts per verba de praesenti, Maryland v. Baldwin, 
112 U.S. 490, 495 (1884) (requiring, at least under Pennsylvania law, “some public 
recognition” of the union after an unrecorded informal marriage but not after a recorded one).  
295 Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69 (Com. Pl. 1850). 
296 TOMLINS, supra note 255, at Marriage (“[T]hough the positive law of man ordains 
Marriage to be made by a priest, that law only makes this Marriage irregular, and not 
expressly void.”). 
297 In re Strauther’s Estate, 29 Pa.C.C. 321, 321 (Orph. 1904) (recapitulating an alleged 
widow’s argument that she and the decedent had exercised this right when they “came 
together and lived by agreement as husband and wife under the [doctrine of] common-law 
marriage.”). 
298 Frank Gaylord Cook, Marriage Celebration in the United States, 61 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 520, 531 (Apr. 1888). 
299 State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1, 4–5 (1868); see also BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 
1852) supra note 47, at § 42 (“[M]utual agreement is the only thing requisite, in a state of 
nature, to constitute marriage”). 
300 Lindo v. Belisario (1795) 161 Eng. Rep. 530; 1 Hag. Con. 215. 
301 See BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 158 (enthusing that 
Lord Stowell’s opinion, though not “universally approved,” was “regarded as a production 
of matchless beauty and learning”); see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text 
(discussing and documenting the opinion’s influence). 
302 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 669; 2 Hag. Con. 54, 63; see 
also In re Hulett’s Estate, 69 N.W. 31, 34 (1896) (referring to “the leading case of Dalrymple 
v. Dalrymple, . . . which is the foundation of much of the law on the subject”). 
303 Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (citing Genesis 2:23). 
 
118 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
In canon law, it wasn’t the fertile bond of Adam and Eve but the chaste marriage 
of Mary and Joseph that had proved decisive as to whether consent alone or “consent 
cum copula” was the basis of true matrimony (“verum matrimonium”).304 Since the 
twelfth century, the Church generally followed Peter Lombard in rejecting the view 
“that without carnal union, matrimony cannot be contracted.”305 To put the point in 
positive terms, canon law “adopted,” for largely theological reasons, the adage of 
the Roman civil law that “consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium”306—that 
“it is the contract, . . . not the cohabitation, which makes [a] marriage.”307 In the 
American jurisdictions that recognized informal marriage, courts imputed this 
doctrine of the medieval Church to the common law of England—and, in turn, to the 
                                                   
304 Regina v. Millis (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844; 10 Cl. & F. 534 (Op. of the Lord 
Chancellor) (“a mutual promise or contract of present matrimony . . . was considered to be 
of the essence of matrimony, and was therefore, and by reason of its indissoluble nature, 
styled in the ecclesiastical law verum matrimonium, and sometimes ipsum matrimonium”); 
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 106 (2005); see also Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 
1124, 1129 (Tex. 1913) (invoking Adam and Eve’s fulfillment of the divine command to 
“multiply and replenish the earth” as reason to reject an alleged common-law not perfected 
by “cohabitation”). 
305 ELIZABETH FRANCES ROGERS, PETER LOMBARD AND THE SACRAMENTAL SYSTEM 
246 app. (1917); see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN 
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 264–65 (1987) (describing the “triumph” of Peter Lombard’s theory that 
“consummation was legally irrelevant” where “a couple . . . had exchanged present consent 
to marry”). 
306 PATRICK IRVINE, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INEXPEDIENCY OF THE LAW OF 
MARRIAGE IN SCOTLAND 13 (1828); see also 12 CORPUS JURIS: BEING A COMPLETE AND 
SYSTEMATIC STATEMENT OF THE WHOLE BODY OF THE LAW 514 (William Mack & William 
Benjamin Hale eds., 1917) (explaining, with citation to Blackstone, that this “maxim . . . is 
adopted by the common lawyers who, indeed, have borrowed (especially in ancient times) 
almost all their notions of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws”). 
307 Bullock v. Bullock, 32 N.Y.S. 1009, 1010 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1895) (calling this “a 
maxim as old as the common law”); see also McKenna v. McKenna, 54 N.E. 641, 643 (Ill. 
1899) (reciting this “universally accepted maxim”). The maxim stood in tension with the 
availability of annulment in certain cases of nonconsummation, including those where one 
party had failed before marrying to disclose his or her inability to consummate. Following 
Rutherford, some jurists resolved this tension by holding that “want of consummation . . . 
rather invalidates by non-performance a marriage, that was otherwise complete, than makes 
it a nullity from the beginning by any defect in the marriage itself.” RUTHERFORTH, supra 
note 148, at 356–57. Fraud, mistake, and analogous claims offered supplementary 
justifications for annulment in such cases; see BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra 
note 47, at § 227 (citing the aforementioned lines from Rutherford); Jerosolimski v. 
Jerosolimski, 188 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (stating that an “assertion of [ ] 
sexual potency . . . is [presumptively] implicit in every offer of marriage” and therefore 
holding that an annulment on the ground of impotency should have been granted in the trial 
court). 
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common law of their own states.308 Conformity to “principles of natural law” only 
bolstered this lineage.309 An 1821 decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, for 
instance, proceeded directly from nature’s barebones model for contracting marriage 
to the conclusion that “a marriage thus made without further ceremony, was, 
according to the simplicity of the ancient common law, deemed valid to all 
persons.”310 
Accounts of American common-law marriage often begin with Fenton v. Reed 
(1809), a short per curium decision attributed to Chancellor James Kent. Fenton 
declared the law in New York to be, first, that “a contract of marriage made per 
verba de presenti amounts to an actual marriage, and is as valid as if made in facie 
ecclesiae,” and second, that such a contract “may be proved . . . from cohabitation, 
reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, reception in the family, and other 
[relevant] circumstances . . . .”311 The inaugural edition of Kent’s Commentaries 
(1827) elaborated these points. In what proved to be an immensely influential 
passage, Kent appealed to natural law and several of its positive-law repositories to 
burnish his particular gloss on the common law of marriage: 
 
No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law as to the valid 
celebration of [a] marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required; 
and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that 
is required by natural or public law. The Roman lawyers strongly 
inculcated the doctrine that . . . [n]uptias non concubitus, sed consensus 
facit. This is the language equally of the common and canon law, and of 
common reason.312 
                                                   
308 See, e.g., In re Hulett’s Estate, 69 N.W. 31, 33 (Minn. 1896) (describing “the 
authorities” as “practically unanimous to this effect”); Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 285 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (applying this “maxim of the common law”); Jackson v. Winne, 7 
Wend. 47, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (stating that “the maxim of the civil law . . . has ever been 
regarded in courts of common law as a good definition of marriage”). A minority of courts 
held otherwise. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 142 Ala. 573, 574 (1905) (finding “no 
marriage” where “the formal consent to be man and wife was not consummated into that 
relation”). 
309 See, e.g., Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. 368, 370, 372 (1821) (upholding “a marriage 
de facto” that “was not consummated by cohabitation” and explaining that “the maxim of 
the common law . . . that ‘consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium’” may have been 
“borrowed, it is true, from the civil law, but [was] founded on the . . . nature of the thing.”); 
see also FRASER, supra note 235, at 91 (opining that “the maxim . . . is not so much of positive 
law as of natural reason”). 
310 Dumaresly, 10 Ky. 368 at 370. 
311 Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). 
312 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 75. Kent’s long chain of 
mutual corroborations resounded a generation later in another influential volume of 
Commentaries. See BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 67 (reporting 
that the maxim “consensus non concubitus” was the rule of Roman “civil law, and has 
become equally so of the ecclesiastical, of the common, and indeed of all law . . . .”). 
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As Kent’s critics protested “from the first,” the learned judge’s liberal take on 
“the freedom of the common law” of marriage formation was incomplete and largely 
erroneous.313 Even so, within a few decades of its appearance, “the Kent doctrine” 
on matrimony had become gospel to many American lawyers, including multiple 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.314 In the unanimous case of Hallett v. Collins 
(1850), Justice Robert Cooper Grier acknowledged that, in England, the supposed 
birthplace of common-law marriage, “it has been disputed as of late” that a 
“marriage might be validly contracted by mutual promises alone”; still he pretended 
that this principle was “never doubted here.”315 The latter statement was simply 
                                                   
313 See 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74 (describing New 
York’s permissive stance). “[F]rom the first, there has been a small but respectable body of 
judges and writers who have constantly and consistently questioned the Kent doctrine, and 
opposed its acceptance. Not only do they deem it pernicious to society, but they also attack 
[its] historical premises . . . .” Cook, supra note 298, at 521–23 (alleging that Fenton was not 
“borne out by the English cases [it] cited[,] . . . was based on no American authority, and 
was . . . inconsistent with the statutory system that had come down from colonial times.”). 
Even Bishop, a strong proponent of common-law marriage, could not say with certainty that 
“the law of England as it stood” prior to Lord Hardwicke’s Act incorporated the principle 
that “mutual consent, . . . constitutes of itself, and without the addition of any ceremonies, a 
perfect marriage according to natural law . . . .” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), 
supra note 47, at § 63 (emphasis added). Bishop’s hesitation was warranted. As Rebecca 
Probert has meticulously demonstrated, there were multiple and important ways in which 
English common law refused, well before Lord Hardwicke’s Act, to honor a marriage per 
verba de praesenti. See generally PROBERT, supra note 283. Interestingly, Probert’s main 
findings accord with the much older conclusions of quite a few American jurists; see, e.g., 
PARSONS, supra note 61, at 561 (recommending “Jacop’s Addenda to Roper on Husband and 
Wife” for its “elaborate” showing “that a contract of marriage in verba de praesenti, without 
ceremony of any kind, did not constitute a valid marriage at common law”); Cheney v. 
Arnold, 15 N.Y. 345, 351 (1857) (denying that informal marriage became “the law of [New 
York] by force of our adoption of the common law of England, for it was not a part of that 
common law”); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 377 (1872) (construing “all the common 
law authorities” to mean that a “contract per verba de præsenti, or per verba de futuro cum 
copula . . . was incomplete, and did not confer” any of marriage’s civil incidents “until . . . 
sanctioned by religious ceremony, duly performed”); Peacock v. Peacock, 26 S.E.2d 608, 
614 (Ga. 1943) (summoning “respectable authority” to the effect that the American doctrine 
of common-law marriage was based on “misconceptions” of English legal history); In re 
Soeder’s Estate, 220 N.E.2d 547, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (noting that, in 1684, “the 
Colonial Assembly of New York . . . passed an act requiring marriage to be solemnized 
formally,” a fact “overlooked by Chancellor Kent” in his account of New York’s law on the 
matter). 
314 See Cook, supra note 298, at 526 (surveying common-law marriage’s acceptance 
across much of the United States and concluding that “the Kent doctrine may be said to be 
the prevailing common law” in this country). 
315 Hallett v. Collins, 51 U.S. 174, 181 (1850). 
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untrue,316 and is nothing short of baffling when one considers that the Court was 
“evenly divided” only seven years earlier on a closely related—some said 
identical—question.317 
The natural, common right to marry reached its doctrinal high-water mark in 
Meister v. Moore (1877), where the question presented was whether a union 
allegedly contracted in Michigan in 1845 was valid if, contrary to a statute then and 
there in force, “neither a minister nor a magistrate was present.”318 Writing for 
another unanimous bench, Justice William Strong upheld the marriage. Like Justice 
Grier in Hallett, he professed to harbor “no doubt, in view of the adjudications made 
in this country, from its earliest settlement to the present day,” that “informal 
marriage by contract per verba de praesenti . . . constitutes a marriage at common 
law.”319 Following a popular (but not universal) practice among state courts, Justice 
Strong treated the Michigan statute as “merely directory”—that is, advisory—
pursuant to the venerable canon of statutory interpretation according to which 
legislation “passed in derogation of the common law . . . should be construed 
strictly.”320 Although “a statute may take away a common-law right[,]” Meister 
explained, “there is always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention, 
unless it be plainly expressed” in clear “words of nullity.”321 So rather than 
                                                   
316 See, e.g., Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 53 (1810) (“When our ancestors left 
England, and ever since, it is well known that a lawful marriage there must be celebrated 
before a clergyman in orders . . . .”). 
317 Although the specific question presented in Jewell v. Jewell was “what constituted 
marriage, at the time of [the parties’] cohabitation, by the laws of Georgia and South 
Carolina,” certain language in the decision could be read to contemplate a more abstract and 
universal common law. The Court “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether a “contract . . . per 
verba de presenti, . . . or . . . per verba de futuro . . . followed by consummation, . . . amounts 
to a valid marriage . . . and is as equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiae.” 42 U.S. 219, 
224, 230–34 (1843) (emphasis added). Some readers of the Jewell decision understood the 
case to involve only Georgia and South Carolina law, but others opted for the broader 
interpretation. For examples of the former, see Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391, 401 (1878) and 
In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 501 (Wyo. 1943). For examples of the latter, see Herd 
v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886 (Ala. 1915); Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69 
(Com. Pl. 1850); and PARSONS, supra note 61, at 561. 
318 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 77 (1877). 
319 Id. at 78. Forty years after Meister, the Court invoked this passage in a ruling that 
strained to discern a valid marriage in a relationship commenced in Virginia, continued in 
Maryland, and ended by the husband’s death in New Jersey, which was the only state among 
the three to recognize common-law marriage. See Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 440 
(1907).  
320 Ross v. Jones, 89 U.S. 576, 591 (1874); see also Meister, 96 U.S. at 80–81 (avowing 
the Court’s adoption of the general “rule deduced . . . from the decided cases . . . ‘. . . in most, 
if not all, the United States’”) (quoting 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 514–15 (7th ed. 1858)). On courts’ selectivity in applying the canon, see Pound, 
Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 142–43. 
321 Meister, 96 U.S. at 79. 
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withdrawing the “common-law right to form the marriage relation by words of 
present assent,” Michigan’s statute merely “provid[ed] a legitimate mode”—not the 
only one—“of solemnizing it.”322  
The doctrine of Meister treated informal marriage as a liberty that, if not a 
constitutional right, was still no ordinary object of the state’s general police power. 
Thanks to the canon that statutes in abrogation of common law are merely advisory 
unless a contrary “intention . . . be plainly expressed,” the right to privately contract 
marriage long enjoyed a formidable measure of judicial protection.323 The language 
in which judges articulated that protection enhanced the doctrine’s quasi-
constitutional feel. In Meister, the Court said that legislation may “regulate the mode 
of entering into the contract, but they do not confer the right.”324 It held Michigan’s 
solemnization “merely directory . . . because marriage is a thing of common right”—
a notable but somewhat ambiguous expression.325 “Common right” was often used 
at the time as shorthand for nothing more than a right recognized at common law,326 
but it also carried centuries-old connotations of “higher law”: “something 
fundamental, something permanent”;327 something that could not be granted or 
                                                   
322 Id.  
323 Id.; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 19, at 74 (recounting how judges’ deployment 
of the canon, coupled with “legislative inaction,” long enabled courts in multiple 
jurisdictions to “render[] nuptial statutes impotent”); cf. Follansbee v. Wilbur, 44 P. 262, 264 
(Wash. 1896) (reading Meister as “a construction of . . . a Michigan statute” and therefore 
having scant relevance in other states and territories). 
324 Meister, 96 U.S. at 78. 
325 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
326 See, e.g., Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 107 (1882), aff’d sub 
nom. Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884) (“[T]he common right 
refers to the right of citizens generally at common law.”); see also Common Right, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (defining “common right” as “the term applied to rights, 
privileges, and immunities appertaining to and enjoyed by all citizens equally and in 
common, and which have their foundation in the common law”). 
327 Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional 
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 370 (1929) (interpreting Coke’s phrase “common right and 
reason”). 
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withheld by the will of the sovereign;328 something, indeed, “of natural law.”329 In 
these loftier senses, common rights had conceptual and ethical affinities with 
constitutional rights.330 Their infringement might not, like constitutional rights, be 
overturned by judicial review,331 but insofar as “common” rights were no less than 
                                                   
328 See, e.g., Arkansas R.R. Comm’n v. Indep. Bus Lines, 285 S.W. 388, 391 (Ark. 
1926) (McCulloch, C.J., dissenting) (contrasting “common use” of a state’s highways with 
privileged “special use” and stating that only the latter could be “granted or withheld by the 
lawmakers at will”); Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (describing 
“the general sense of mankind” that “the free use of waters which can be made subservient 
to commerce” is a common right that “ought to be liberally supported”). As these examples 
suggest, “things” said to be “of common right” were often public utilities. While it’s tempting 
to consider marriage in that light—the relation itself, after all, was frequently characterized 
in divorce litigation as a res—the expression “common right” was almost always used in this 
context to refer to getting married, not to the marital status itself. See Coddington v. 
Coddington, 20 N.J. Eq. 263, 264 (Ch. 1869) (explaining that divorce actions and 
“[p]roceedings with regard to the validity . . . of marriage . . . are . . . proceedings in rem” 
because “[t]hey actually operate upon the matter; they affirm, constitute, or dissolve the 
marriage relation”). 
329 See infra notes 333–336 and accompanying text; see also Massachusetts House of 
Representatives, The Massachusetts Resolves (Oct. 29, 1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766 56 
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) (referring to “certain essential Rights of the British 
Constitution of Government, which are founded in the Law of God and Nature, and are the 
common Rights of Mankind”). 
330 For an indication of both the distance and the proximity between the two ideas, 
consider the argument that plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), 
“butchers claiming a right to pursue a lawful employment,” were essentially “invit[ing] the 
Court to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment provided absolute constitutional protection for 
all such ‘common rights.’” Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: 
A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 673 (2000); see also 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 266 (1920) 
(crediting as “one of the foundations for American constitutional law” James Otis’s 1761 
invocation of Coke’s argument in Dr. Bonham’s Case that a legislative act “against common 
right and reason” is void); Corwin, supra note 327, at 380 (suggesting that “American 
constitutional law during the last half century has tended increasingly . . . to return to the 
vaguer tests of ‘common right and reason’”); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 138 
(arguing that judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment continue a tradition of 
“ethical natural law with . . . common-law content” that “seemed to have a warrant” in 
prominent English jurists’ uses of “common right and reason” and “the nature of justice”). 
331 Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221, 228 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (“[W]e cannot pronounce 
[a] law void because, in the exercise of an unbounded constitutional power, the 
government . . . [has] restrained it within limits narrower than those allowed by common 
law, or common right.”). Inklings of such forbearance can be found even in Marbury v. 
Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall, lauding our “written constitution” as the nation’s 
“greatest improvement on political institutions,” explained that the federal government’s 
“powers . . . are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the constitution is written.” 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803) (emphases added). Five years before 
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common-law rights, judges keen to preserve them were not without options. As they 
did with laws abrogating the right to marry informally, courts could forestall through 
vigilant statutory interpretation what they could not forbid by constitutional 
decree.332 
To the extent that “common right” did mean something more—more 
fundamental, more permanent—than “common-law right,” this surplus constituted 
an especially compelling reason, or at least an exceptionally high-sounding 
justification, to make compliance with solemnization statutes optional. Decisions 
holding these laws directory, not mandatory, stressed that a natural as well as a 
common-law right was at stake.333 As James Schouler explained the thrust of many 
a nineteenth-century judicial decision, it was “out of consideration for what may be 
termed the public, or natural and theoretical law of marriage” that “many American 
courts have, to a very liberal extent and beyond all stress of necessity, upheld the 
informal marriage against even legislative provisions for a formal celebration.”334 In 
1861, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to treat such a “statute as restrictive and 
prohibitory, as invalidating what, by natural law, the general law of society, 
                                                   
Marbury, however, members of the Court had disagreed about the propriety of nullifying 
legislation on extra-constitutional grounds. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798), 
with Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
332 On courts’ quasi-constitutional use of the canon that statutes in derogation of 
common law should be strictly construed, see Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 
21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 386–88 (1908) [hereinafter Pound, Common Law and Legislation] 
(associating the canon as well as judicial review with the American common-law judge’s 
prejudice against legislation and finding the canon generally indefensible where there is a 
written constitution); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44, at 142–43 (describing a 
pronounced strain in American legal thought that posits “the historically given common law 
as natural law” and expresses itself both in the canon of strict construction “as applied to 
legislation” and in judicial interpretations of “bills of rights” “as applied to constitutions”). 
More recent scholarship has suggested that Coke’s famous claim in Dr. Bonham’s Case—
that “common law will controul . . . [and] void” legislation “against common right and 
reason”—can either be read “modestly as an example of the canon . . . of . . . strict 
construction” or “more broadly” as a harbinger of the canon of constitutional avoidance. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” 
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1005–06, 1018, 1025, 
1027, 1036 (2001). 
333 “Marriage existed before statutes; it is of natural right. . . . Hence, . . . it has become 
established authority that a marriage good at the common law is good notwithstanding the 
existence of any statute on the subject, unless the statute contains express words of nullity.” 
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at §§ 423–24 (emphasis in 
original) (citing nineteen cases in support of this proposition); see also In re McLaughlin’s 
Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 587 (1892) (summarizing but rejecting the rule of Askew v. Dupree, 30 
Ga. 173 (1860), which held “that marriage is a natural right, which always existed prior to 
the organization of any form of government, and all laws in restraint of it should be strictly 
construed in consequence thereof”).  
334 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 29 (4th 
ed. 1889) (citing, inter alia, Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877)). 
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independent of statutory prohibition, would be regarded a valid marriage.”335 Thirty 
years later, applying the same rule of construction, another Ohio decision began with 
a reminder that “statutes neither confer nor abridge the right to enter into marriage. 
The right to marry is a natural one, recognized . . . by the laws of all Christian 
countries.”336 
Appeals to “the general law of society” and “the laws of all Christian countries” 
indicate another device by which proponents of informal marriage reinforced the 
moral claims of natural law, linked them to the age-old tradition of the common law, 
and resisted legislation requiring formalities. Recall Chancellor Kent’s declaration 
that “marriage is . . . a contract jure gentium,” the simple “consent of the parties . . . 
[being] all that is required by natural or public law.”337 As the phrasing of Kent’s 
pronouncement suggests, “public law,” in the sense of public international law or 
“the law of nations,” had strong associations with natural law.338 Like the notion of 
common right, it offered all the more reason to condemn legislative encroachment 
on “contract[s] of marriage per verba de presenti,” which were said to be “valid by 
a common law prevailing throughout Christendom.”339 According to Bishop, one 
consequence of marriage’s location in the jus gentium was a rebuttable presumption 
that informal marriages are valid under the law of any foreign jurisdiction.340 
                                                   
335 Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553, 558–59 (1861). Instead the court applied the 
“rule of construction, which appears to be established by the authorities, that a marriage good 
at the common law is good notwithstanding the existence of any statute on the subject, unless 
the statute contains express words of nullity.” Id. at 555. 
336 Courtright v. Courtright, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413, 413 (Com. Pl. 1891). 
337 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 75; see also SCHOULER, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 40 (“Informal celebration constitutes 
marriage as known to natural and public law.”). 
338 See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (noting the eighteenth-century “consensus . . . that the law of nations 
rested in large measure on natural law”); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra note 
332, at 394 (“[C]ommon law dicta [to the effect] that legislation cannot change a rule of 
international law . . . proceed upon the theory that international law is the law of nature 
applied to international relations and hence is of superior authority to positive law.”). 
339 Davis v. Stouffer, 112 S.W. 282, 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (quoting with approval 
Voltaire’s belief that “marriage may exist, with all its natural and civil effects,” without 
religious solemnization, because “[m]arriage is a contract in the law of nations, of which the 
church has made a sacrament”). 
340 Bishop’s logic on this point is elaborate. Having established “the well-settled general 
principle of the common law, or perhaps more properly of international law,” that a 
marriage’s validity is governed by the lex loci contractus, Bishop explains the evidentiary 
presumption in favor of informal marriage as follows: “Marriage . . . is a thing of natural 
law, and under that law it is entered into by mutual consent alone. . . . From the law of nature 
it has ascended through the municipal institutions of all civilized countries into the general 
international code. Now,” because “all courts recognize the laws both of nature and of 
nations,” even a jurisdiction with mandatory formalities for solemnization must, unless its 
own laws expressly hold otherwise, not only honor an informal marriage validly contracted 
abroad; it must presume such validity—for “[i]t would not be safe to say that parties had 
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Favoring this approach over several alternative rules of decision,341 a Missouri court 
reasoned in 1916 that, since “[t]he contract of marriage [is] one of natural right and 
recognized by the law of nations,” a couple’s “mutual agreement” only three years 
earlier in Nebraska—“he promising her to be a good husband and she promising him 
to be a good and faithful wife”—was “valid [in Missouri] in the absence of any 
showing . . . that it was invalid where made.”342 A handful of judges pushed the 
presumption of validity still further. Faced with the text of a foreign country’s (or 
sister state’s) solemnization statutes, they applied an internationalized (or 
federalized) version of the canon of strict construction, reading statutory 
“restrictions and conditions” as hortatory unless they specifically “declare[d] 
marriages void which are not contracted according to their provisions.”343 
Common-law marriage’s vulnerability to legislative derogation is one reason 
why, especially in the long run, the doctrine’s opponents and skeptics lost little to 
concede that natural law encompasses a right to marry by private agreement344—or, 
                                                   
consented to a thing, as marriage, unless the consent were expressed as required by the law 
of the place . . . .” BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at §§ 125, 144. For 
cases applying the presumption, see, e.g., People v. Loomis, 64 N.W. 18, 18–19 (Mich. 1895) 
and Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 132 (1875). 
341 See Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N.Y. 41, 41 (1880) (“In the absence of proof it will not 
be presumed that the law of marriage of another country is different from that of this State.”); 
Fowler v. Fowler, 79 A.2d 24, 26 (N.H. 1951) (“If no evidence of the law of a foreign or 
sister state is presented to the trial court, a presumption in favor of the common law will 
govern if that law is there in force.”). 
342 Butterfield v. Ennis, 186 S.W. 1173, 1174, 1176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916). As it happens, 
Nebraska did recognize common-law marriage, albeit grudgingly, when the couple 
exchanged vows in 1913, so the presumption of extraterritorial validity was accurate in that 
case. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904). By contrast, in 1896, the 
Illinois Supreme Court upheld an interracial marriage contracted per verba de praesenti in 
Louisiana in 1869 because “marriage is a contract jure gentium” and there was no evidence 
in the record that Louisiana prohibited the marriage at that date—which, in fact, it had. See 
Laurence v. Laurence, 45 N.E. 1071, 1072 (Ill. 1896); VIRGINIA DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY 
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 26, 28 (1986) (stating that 
Louisiana repealed its “miscegenation” ban in 1870, one year after the marriage validated in 
Laurence, and did not reenact such a ban until 1894). 
343 Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town 
of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 160 (1829) (validating a Canadian marriage contract per verba de 
proesenti where the statute lacked express words of nullity); see also Hutchins, 31 Mich. at 
132 (endorsing “the doctrine of Steadman v. Powell, 1 Add. 58 (1820), where the proof of 
an Irish marriage” tended to confirm that it had been celebrated “by a popish priest” and was 
therefore illegal under local law). 
344 Roberts v. Roberts, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 368, 368–69 (Com. Pl. 1850) (ruling that 
“simple agreement between the parties . . . without solemnization . . . may, in the sight of 
heaven, be a valid marriage,” but was invalid in Ohio); see also Inhabitants of Town of 
Milford v. Inhabitants of Town of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 55 (1810) (acknowledging that “a 
mutual engagement to intermarry, by parties competent to make such contract, would in a 
moral view, be a good marriage”). The principle of legislative supremacy in this matter had 
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indeed, that mandatory nuptial statutes “invade [a] most sacred right of the 
individual.”345 If anything, critics seemed to suggest, appeals to natural law proved 
too much: In regulating the solemn business of contracting marriage, “advanced” 
societies were entitled and probably wise to forsake the do-it-yourself 
permissiveness of stateless nature.346 Who could deny that recognition of informal 
marriage was fast becoming anomalous in the “Christian” and “civilized” world?347 
The trend was but one of “many ways” in which the “natural rights or privileges of 
mankind” were “restrained . . . to promote the welfare of the community and the 
government of the many.”348 
Ultimately, when legislative push came to shove, the natural right to marry by 
private contract and its supposed incarnation in common law proved no match for 
statutes mandating formalities. In fact, contests over the fate of this ostensible 
common-law right were among American jurists’ earliest opportunities to articulate 
the classical period’s most audible and important constitutional idea about 
marriage—to wit, that “marriage being a status and in its nature semi-public, the 
legislative power over it is nearly, perhaps absolutely, omnipotent.”349 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Maynard v. Hill was the definitive statement of this “doctrine of 
                                                   
pedigree. See, e.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 476–77 (affirming the duty of “all Subjects 
to obey . . . Ordinances” that require certain “ceremonies, annex’d to Matrimony, . . . altho’ 
the Law of Nature be a Stranger to these Formalities . . . ”). 
345 HOWARD, supra note 230, at 184 (arguing that this “right . . . must yield to the higher 
claims of society”). 
346 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 31 (3d 
ed. 1884) (contrasting “informal marriage” with “formal requirements which human 
government imposes at an advanced stage of society” and noting equanimously that laws 
“now in force in England and most of the United States render certain solemnities . . . 
indispensable [sic]”); see also Inhabitants of Town of Milford, 7 Mass. at 55 (associating 
informal celebration with “fraud,” “surprise,” and “the vilest seduction”); In re Roberts’ 
Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 498 (Wyo. 1943) (suggesting that reliance on “the bare element of 
natural law” in “a contractual marriage” has “little regard for the sanctity of marriage”). 
347 See, e.g., Herd v. Herd, 69 So. 885, 886–87 (Ala. 1915) (“we know of no civilized 
nation or country which has not some civil regulations on the subject”); Cheney v. Arnold, 
15 N.Y. 345, 350–51 (1857) (endorsing Lord Mansfield’s 1753 declaration in Parliament 
that “enter[ing] into a marriage contract without . . . any religious ceremony whatever . . . 
will be a good marriage both by the law of God and the law of nature; yet the law of this 
society, and I believe of every other christian [sic] society, has declared it not to be a good 
marriage”); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 42 (“[M]utual 
agreement is the only thing requisite, in a state of nature, to constitute marriage. But the laws 
of many, perhaps most civilized countries, have added other conditions, though they may, 
philosophically, be all resolved into . . . one, since the law does not recognize that as a 
contract which is entered into contrary to the provisions of law.”); PARSONS, supra note 61, 
at 1853 (“In all Christian countries of which we have any knowledge, and as we suppose in 
all civilized countries, certain ceremonies are prescribed for the celebration of marriage, 
either by express law, or by a usage which has the force of law . . . .”). 
348 Offield v. Davis, 40 S.E. 910, 914 (Va. 1902). 
349 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES (8th ed. 1891), supra note 76, at § 824. 
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status.”350 Rejecting a claim that the Contracts Clause protects some or all of 
marriage’s obligations from legislative impairment, the Maynard Court opined that, 
apart from the relation’s initial basis in mutual consent, marriage is “simply . . . a 
status or institution”:351  
 
Marriage, . . . as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a 
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of 
the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract 
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties 
and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, 
present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its 
dissolution.352 
 
This principle of plenary legislative control wasn’t entirely without limits. 
Classical marriage jurisprudence contemplated two situations in which natural 
law—in and of itself, or through the medium of international law—might compel 
the validity of an informal marriage.353 The first of these was actually a corollary of 
the doctrine of status. In places where there was no legislative or other sovereign 
power overseeing marriage formation, as “on the high seas, or out of the jurisdiction 
of any civilized state, . . . the laws of nature and of nations” furnished the default 
rules.354 Thus it was “generally recognized . . . that parties marooned on an island, 
where ‘no law’ applies, could marry according to their own forms.”355 
                                                   
350 See supra note 123 and accompanying text, as well as infra notes 354 and 484 and 
accompanying text. 
351 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 50 (1857)) 
(emphasis in original, perhaps to convey use of a Latin or French term that had not yet been 
wholly absorbed into American legal English). For a relevant lexigraphic discussion of 
“status,” see Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, supra note 10, at 36–41. 
352 Maynard, 125 U.S. 190, at 205 (emphasis added). 
353 See PROBERT, supra note 283, at 21–22, n.3. 
354 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 144; see also Fisher v. 
Fisher, 165 N.E. 460, 461–62 (N.Y. 1929) (A marriage on the “high seas” is valid unless 
clearly condemned “by the common voice of Christendom” or by some law which “follow[s] 
the ship . . . .”). On courts’ determinations of which sovereign’s law, if any, follows a 
particular vessel onto the high seas, see Clive Parry, A Conflicts Myth: The American 
“Consular” Marriage, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1207–09 (1954) and James B. Smith, Tying 
the Knot at Sea, 112 MIL. L. REV. 155 (1986). 
355 Comment, Marriage on the High Seas, 38 YALE L.J. 1129, 1132–33, n.25 (1929) 
(making a similar argument for marriage “on the open sea,” which is either res communis, 
“subject only to international law,” or “a place without law,” where the “natural right” to 
marry is immediately operative); see also STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 
11, at § 122 (citing Philippe Antoine Merlin and other French jurists who asserted that 
marriage “is a contract so completely of natural and moral law, that when celebrated by 
savages . . . where there are no established laws, it will be recognised as good in other 
countries.”). 
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The second natural-law limitation on state control over nuptial solemnization 
was more provocative, mainly because it departed from a rule of “comity,” a “jus 
gentium,” whereby “the validity of a marriage . . . is referred to the lex loci 
contractus” (i.e., the law of the place where it was contracted).356 Here the danger 
wasn’t a regulatory vacuum, as with “parties cast away on an unknown island,”357 
but exclusionary legislation imposing formalities, typically religious, that a couple 
traveling abroad couldn’t or wouldn’t fulfill due to “peculiarities of religious 
opinion” or “conscientious scruples.”358 Under such circumstances, otherwise 
marriageable individuals were entitled to wed “in their own forms.”359 So long as 
they exchanged the requisite consent, their natural marriage would be “recognized 
at home as good.”360 
 
3.  A Right to Marry the Person of One’s Choice? 
 
The previous section offered something akin to a “constitutional” reading of 
Meister v. Moore and of the many cases before and after Meister in which judges 
resisted legislative encroachments on the supposed “common-law right” to marry. 
That reading stressed two related phenomena: courts’ determination to treat statutes 
imposing formalities as directory rather than mandatory; and their justification of 
that practice in rhetoric—“common right,” “natural right,” “jus gentium”—redolent 
of higher law. Evidently, classical legal culture did see direct access to marriage as 
“more than a mere statutory privilege.”361  
Nonetheless, drawing a direct line from Meister’s “common right” to contract 
a marriage to Loving’s constitutional right to marry is harder than some scholars 
have suggested.362 To state the obvious, the canon of construction that charged courts 
                                                   
356 Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 37 (1881). 
357 Tug-Boat Marriages, supra note 20, at 274. 
358 STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 118; see also JOSEPH 
JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 171 (2nd ed. 1969) (affirming 
that the lex loci “rule . . . is inapplicable where there is no local form, as in some unoccupied 
territory, or where the local form is not of a kind with which, for legal or moral reasons, a 
person can conform”). 
359 Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 145 (Cal. 1898); see also 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES 
(6th ed. 1881) supra note 76, at § 392 (citing, inter alia, Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361). The 
principle was often illustrated by reference to foreign authorities; see, e.g., Tug-Boat 
Marriages, supra note 20, at 273–74 (citing Lord Campbell’s opinion in Beamish v. Beamish 
(1859) 11 Eng. Rep. 735). 
360 Norman, 54 P. at 145. 
361 See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 1560–61. 
362 See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, Home on the Range: Family and Constitutionalism in 
American Continental Settlement, 52 EMORY L.J. 645, 689–90 (2003) (proffering Meister as 
“evidence” that, “by the last half of the nineteenth century[,] . . . the marital family was 
emerging as an institution partially autonomous from government”); Akiko Kawamura, 
Neglected Stories – The Constitution and Family Values, 1 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 89, 92–93 
(1999) (invoking Meister for the proposition that “the right to marry under the Fourteenth 
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to hold out for “express words of nullity”363 conceded on its face “legislative power 
to abolish the common-law rule altogether.”364 Moreover, this power was totally 
unaffected by the marriage right’s eventual constitutionalization in Loving and in 
antecedent cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma.365 Recognition 
of common-law marriage declined precipitously over the course of the twentieth 
century,366 and even after Loving its abrogation provoked barely a peep of 
constitutional concern.367 So whether one looks to the Meister doctrine itself or to 
subsequent legal developments, the “common right” to common-law marriage was 
constitutional in neither stature nor substance. 
And yet . . . in light of Loving’s identification of a right to marry the person of 
one’s choice,368 there is something to be said for the suggestion that “a new 
American charter,” improved by the Reconstruction Amendments, eventually 
“constitutionalize[d] the ‘common’ and ‘common-law’ right to marry.”369 How one 
                                                   
Amendment was recognized earlier and with more confidence than . . . other family rights”) 
(emphasis added); Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status 
of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1027–28 (2002) (“As early 
as 1877, the Supreme Court began expressly to affirm, as a matter of constitutional law, the 
importance of the family in society . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citing Meister v. Moore, 96 
U.S. 78–81 (1877)). 
363 Meister, 96 U.S. at 76, 79. 
364 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 148; Meister, 96 U.S. at 
79.  
365 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing Loving’s twentieth-century predecessors). 
366 An article published one year after Loving recounted how an erstwhile “prevailing 
view” in favor of common-law marriage had by then receded to the point of “general 
disfavor,” with only “fifteen American jurisdictions” continuing to recognize the doctrine. 
Henry H. Foster, Jr., Marriage: A “Basic Civil Right of Man,” 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 51, 58 
(1968). Within half a century, that number had shrunk to eleven. Common Law Marriage by 
State, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/hum 
an-services/common-law-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/X4S4-FM5V]. 
367 A series of searches on Westlaw yielded exactly one counter-example: Anguiano v. 
Larry’s Elec. Contracting L.L.C., 241 P.3d 175, 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010), which involved 
an allegation that Kansas’s Workers’ Compensation agency made it unconstitutionally 
difficult “to prove a common-law marriage.” The court dismissed the claim, finding no 
authority to support “a constitutional right to a common-law marriage.” But see Foster, supra 
note 366, at 60 (speculating that a “constitutional issue” might be presented if “a state that 
has abolished common law marriages refuses to recognize the validity of a common law 
marriage that was valid where entered into”). 
368 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
369 Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 313 (1993). Apparently understanding Meister’s “‘common’ 
and ‘common-law’ right” to mean a right to marry at all, Davis suggests that this 
constitutional transformation, prepared by passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was 
formally achieved through ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Id. But 
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may marry has potentially profound implications for whom one may marry. In 
jurisdictions that permitted common-law marriage, including those that did so only 
for the sake of comity, one of the doctrine’s most significant consequences was its 
facilitation of unions contrary to parental preference, community expectation, or the 
parties’ better judgment.370  
Well before informal solemnization emerged as one of the great obsessions of 
American family law, medieval canon lawyers embraced freedom in spousal choice 
as a corollary of the right to contract marriage per verba de praesenti (or per verba 
de futuro cum copula).371 To be sure, “a giant democracy in which everyone might 
marry anyone is not the way the medieval world was customarily perceived by its 
inhabitants”; but in theory and somewhat beyond, canon law protected an ample 
“power to choose.”372 Likewise “the Kent doctrine,” according to its namesake, 
placed “as few checks in the formation of the marriage contract, as in any part of the 
civilized world.”373 As the Utah Supreme Court vividly explained in 1895, the 
doctrine of common-law marriage effectively held that “a couple may meet on the 
highway at any time in the day or night, and there contract a valid marriage.”374 If 
this was, as Kent alleged, “the freedom of the common law,” then the common law 
was very free indeed.375 
Like other champions of marriage by bare present assent, Kent stopped short of 
connecting the dots from informal marriage to elopement—an understandable show 
of restraint given how strenuously proponents of formalities denounced 
“improvident and improper” unions.376 Despite the paucity of causes for which an 
unrelated, competent, different-sex couple could be prevented from marrying, 
                                                   
Meister’s “common right” related to how, not whether, one might marry, and that right was 
never constitutionalized except insofar as it arguably implied the freedom of spousal choice 
vindicated ninety years later in Loving. 
370 See, e.g., NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS 128 (2000) (describing late-nineteenth-
century opponents of informal marriage who associated the practice with “irresponsible, 
unsuited, or defiant couples”); MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 23 (1st ed. 1951) 
(lamenting the “matrimonial entanglements” that arise when “two people . . . can marry 
themselves” without public notice, state license, or other third-party participation); George 
Elliott Howard, Social Control of the Domestic Relations, in AM. SOCIOLOGICAL SOC’Y, 
FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 212, 222 (1911) (“[C]ommon law 
marriage . . . virtually invites impulsive, impure, and secret unions . . . .”); SCHOULER, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895), supra note 243, at 41 (counting “[t]he consent of 
parents and guardians,” though unnecessary “to perfect a marriage at common law,” among 
“those formalities which marriage celebration [statutes] now commonly prescribe in the 
interest of society, as they do banns or the procurement of a license for better publicity.”). 
371 See generally Noonan, Power to Choose, supra note 247. 
372 Id. at 419, 430–31, 433 (“[R]ecognizing an area of freedom where parents should 
not trespass, the canons acknowledged rights of the individual . . . .”).  
373 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74. 
374 United States v. Simpson, 7 P. 257, 258 (Utah 1885). 
375 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 74. 
376 In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 30 P. 651, 658 (Wash. 1892). 
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classical jurists were reluctant to follow John Witherspoon’s lead in situating “the 
right to marriage” within the individual’s “perfect right[] in a state of natural liberty 
. . . to associate, if he so incline, with any person or persons, whom he can persuade 
(not force).”377 If anything, jurists were more apt to affirm states’ authority to 
stipulate disqualifications beyond the fundamental taboos of nature.378 
Prohibitions of interracial marriage occasioned the most audible classical 
discourse on the existence and extent of a right to choose one’s spouse. Legal 
challenges to these laws saw some success during Reconstruction,379 then 
consistently failed, with one exception, between 1878 and 1967.380 Remarkably, in 
none of those failed challenges was it claimed that racial endogamy laws violate a 
distinct right to marry. Whether based on the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, or the Civil Rights Act of 1866, legal protests against 
interracial marriage bans focused on invidious racial classification.381 When litigants 
did raise arguments about a substantive right to contract marriage, they emphasized 
“contract,” not “marriage.”382 They claimed exclusion from one of many domains of 
                                                   
377 Witherspoon, supra note 190, at 69. But see J.C. Bluntschli, Freedom, and Rights of 
Freedom, in 2 CYCLOPÆDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 281, 281–84 (John Lalor ed., 1883) 
(counting “matrimony” among “the individual rights of freedom” and explaining that “it is a 
question of life for the individual, whether he is to be allowed to follow his own inclination 
and choice, or . . . is to be prevented from concluding an intended marriage”). 
378 See, e.g., SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895), supra note 243, at 30–
31 (mentioning “race, color, social rank, [and] religion” as possible “disqualifications of civil 
condition” and noting “statutes formerly forbidding marriage between a Roman Catholic and 
a Protestant”); see also PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 445 (“Though Persons are Naturally 
free to Marry whom they please, yet a Government, if it seem for the Interest of the State, 
may in some Cases . . . limit this Privilege: for instance it may be order’d, that no Subject 
shall Marry a Foreigner, none of the Nobility a Plebeian.”). 
379 Arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally understood to 
protect a right to interracial marriage, an impressively researched study identifies eleven 
cases between 1869 and 1877 in which courts from eight different states held or suggested 
in dicta that miscegenation laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 267–73 (2015).  
380 “Acts . . . prohibiting marriage between members of the white race and persons of 
African descent . . . have been universally upheld as constitutional and valid.” Scott v. 
Epperson, 284 P. 19, 21 (Okla. 1930) (per curiam); see also infra notes 416–419, 553–558 
and accompanying text (discussing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)). 
381 Courts answered this objection with the doctrine of “equal application,” which was 
satisfied so long as one party to an illicit interracial union was punished just as harshly as the 
other. The doctrine was definitively rejected in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 
(1964) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). 
382 Outside the courtroom, legal writers and civil-rights advocates occasionally did 
speak of a right of intermarriage under the Fourteenth Amendment that was not subsumed 
under a broader liberty of contract. See, e.g., A. O. Wright, Citizenship—State and National, 
4 WIS. J. EDUC. 53, 55 (1874). 
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contractual freedom, not a special, matrimonial sphere of discretion.383 As a 
sympathetic court put in 1872, “[m]arriage is a civil contract, and . . . [t]he same 
right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white citizens, means the right to make any 
contract which a white citizen may make.”384 Time and again, this logic was defeated 
by a very different gloss on the term “civil contract,” which underscored the word 
“civil” and stressed marriage’s public, not private, character—the same “doctrine of 
status” that entitled legislators to cabin or altogether abolish common-law 
marriage.385 So when the Supreme Court pointedly blessed “[l]aws forbidding the 
intermarriage of the two races” in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), it explained that such 
prohibitions were “universally recognized as within the police power of the state.”386 
Only “in a technical sense” did they “interfere with the freedom of contract.”387 
Classical jurists differed as to interracial marriage’s permissibility under natural 
law. One camp called it positively unnatural, akin to incest, and therefore an 
exception to the presumptive, natural right to select one’s spouse.388 Another denied 
that such right existed at all.389 A third camp, finally, held that “marriage is a natural 
right into which the question of color does not enter except as an individual 
preference expressed by the parties . . . .”390 However unpopular with the public, this 
last appears to have been the dominant jurisprudential position.391 Miscegenation 
                                                   
383 In one case, counsel for a man imprisoned for marrying a white woman argued that 
his client “was deprived of the right to make contracts, which a white man could make; that 
is, to contract marriage with a white woman.” The attorney acknowledged that marriage is 
also “a civil status, but he insisted that . . . it was within the class of contracts contemplated 
in the first section of the Civil Rights Bill.” Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287, 288–89 (1871). 
384 Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197 (1872). 
385 See, e.g., In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 263–64 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); State v. Tutty, 
41 F. 753, 757–58 (S.D. Ga. 1890); State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233, 234 (La. 1959); State v. 
Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402 (1871); Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 307–08; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
263, 275 (1877). On the doctrine of status, see supra notes 124, 349–351 and accompanying 
text, as well as infra note 484 and accompanying text. 
386 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896). 
387 Id. 
388 See, e.g., State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872) (asserting that neither parent-child 
incest nor a “harem” housing “numerous wives . . . are more revolting . . . or more unnatural” 
than the marriage of a white man and a black woman); West Chester v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 
213 (1867) (“The natural law which forbids [the races’] intermarriage . . . is as clearly divine 
as that which imparted to them different natures.”). 
389 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (“[N]or is it one of the natural 
rights of man to marry whom he may choose.”); Lonas, 50 Tenn. at 310 (“[D]iscrimination 
as to race and people, in this most important institution, has been observed, even from the 
days of the patriarchs, and even as to different people of the same race.”). 
390 See, e.g., Gordon A. Stewart, Our Marriage and Divorce Laws, 23 POPULAR SCI. 
MONTHLY 224, 234 (1883) (observing that this principle was “recognized by the laws of all 
nations except our own”); D.A.S., The Southern Problem, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1883, at 1 
(“When a law prohibits a black man from marrying a white woman, because of his color, it 
strikes at the root of natural liberty.”). 
391 Stewart, supra note 390, at 234. 
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statutes, after all, were just that: statutes. Jurisdictions permitting interracial 
marriages needed no legislation to do so. In places with statutes prohibiting mixed-
race unions, judges held their noses and refused to apply those bans retrospectively, 
finding no bar to interracial marriage in whatever law, common or natural, had 
governed prior to legislative intervention.392  
 
C.  The Right to Stay Married 
 
The natural right to stay married was a matter of respect for marital contracts. 
It promised two things: portability and permanence. If a marriage contract was valid 
where executed, it could not be gainsaid anywhere; nor could it be terminated, if at 
all, without fault or consent. 
 
1.  Portability 
 
Marriage . . . [is] of natural and of international law. . . . It could not be 
international, unless there was a uniform rule among all nations whereby 
to determine whether it exists or not; it could not be treated as resting in 
private or natural right, unless the relation lawfully established was 
respected everywhere . . . .393 
 
Presumably, in a true state of nature, marriages would have no need of 
extraterritorial recognition. Conflicts of law would never arise because there would 
be but one global standard, supplied by a universal moral code. Only in a world of 
many sovereigns, each with its own nuptial procedures and qualifications, can there 
be questions of portability. For instance, if country A sets the age of marital consent 
at sixteen and country B sets it at twenty, will eighteen-year old newlyweds from A 
become legal strangers when honeymooning in B? Or if country C permits informal 
solemnization and D does not, would a couple united in C by clandestine agreement 
become fornicators if they live as husband and wife in D? To both questions, “the 
jus gentium, the common law of nations, the law of nature as generally recognized 
by all civilized peoples” answered no: “the validity of a marriage depends upon . . . 
                                                   
392 “[N]o authority, before or after the [Civil W]ar, made the manifestly false assertion 
that interracial marriages were generally recognized as unlawful in the world in general, in 
the Christian world, or even the Anglo-American world,” and “no one asserted that in the 
absence of some local statute, such marriages were invalid by force of natural law or common 
law.” Upham, supra note 379, at 219–20; see also Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of 
Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159–61 (1819) (denying that “marriage[s] of negroes and mulattoes 
with white persons . . . tend to outrage the principles and feelings of all civilized nations”); 
Follansbee v. Wilbur, 44 P. 262, 263–64 (Wash. 1896) (implicitly conceding that 
miscegenation statutes did not apply retroactively to interracial common-law marriages); 
State v. Baltimore, 15 W. Va. 362, 385–86 (1879) (positing that “intermarriage[s] of a white 
person with a negro” are neither “mala in se” nor “contrary to religion or abstract morality”). 
393 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 719. 
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whether it was valid where . . . contracted; if valid there, it is valid everywhere.”394 
By this “rule of universal recognition,”395 one of the great “rules of comity,”396 
marriage claimed its place as “an international institution.”397  
To a great extent, classical American judges upheld the portability principle. 
Though “the doctrine, in its broad extent,” had been doubted by some English and 
continental jurists of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries,398 Kent’s 
Commentaries (1827), Story’s Conflicts of Laws (1834), and Parson’s Law of 
Contracts (1853) all held (to quote Kent) that, “as marriage is part of the jus gentium, 
. . . the lex loci contractus prevails over the lex domicilii” in ascertaining validity.399 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Bishop considered the rule “well 
established in . . . America.”400 By the turn of the twentieth century, treatises 
announced its general acceptance with certitude.401  
Like other natural entitlements of marriage reflected in positive law, the right 
of portability admitted limitations imposed “by the law of nature” itself.402 Such 
restraints involved “contracts of marriage . . . which outrage our most fundamental 
                                                   
394 Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 462–63 (1873) (enunciating “the law of 
nature as generally recognized by all civilized peoples”). 
395 LONG, supra note 200, at § 40. 
396 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d 706, 716 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951). 
397 LONG, supra note 200, at § 40; see also MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 244 (stating 
“the meaning” of the expression that “the law of marriage is part of the law of nations”). 
More often than not, the portability principle is what classical judges had in mind when they 
called marriage jus/juris gentium. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 548–549 548 
(Ark. 1957); Griswold v. Griswold, 129 P. 560, 561 (Colo. App. 1913); State ex rel. Gentry 
v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 129 (1835); True v. Ranney, 21 N.H. 52, 55 (1850); Overseers of the Poor 
of the Town of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151, 157 
(1829); 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 79, at 93. 
398 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 125; see also Stevenson 
v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193, 207 (1856) (noting “a diversity of opinion among writers and judges” 
but calling lex loci contractus “the settled general rule of law in England, and in most, or all, 
of the United States.”). 
399 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 78; PARSONS, supra note 
61, at 565; STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at §§ 87, 90, 101. 
400 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 125. Inhabitants of 
Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 160 (1819), was especially influential in 
promoting this doctrine in the United States. Courts in sister states cited the case well into 
the twentieth century. See, e.g., Smith v. Goldsmith, 134 So. 651, 653, 655 (Ala. 1931); 
Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 548–49; In re Miller’s Estate, 214 N.W. 428, 429 (Mich. 1927); In 
re May’s Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 490, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1953). 
401 See KEEZER, supra note 11, at § 21; LONG, supra note 200, at § 40.  
402 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at §§ 130, 149 (calling it a 
“common-law exception[]” to the portability doctrine that “Christian nations” withhold 
recognition from “polygamous and incestuous marriages entered into in foreign 
countries, . . . though they were there allowed by law.”); see also LONG, supra note 200, at 
§ 40 (excluding “marriages deemed contrary to the law of nature as generally recognized in 
Christian countries”). 
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concepts” and are everywhere deemed “odious.”403 As Kent explained, departures 
from the “comity giving effect to the lex loci” were not to be taken lightly, but were 
reserved “for gross cases . . . repugnant to the morals and policies of all civilized 
nations.”404 A half-century later, James Schouler described these disqualified unions 
as “immoral marriages, or such as may be considered prohibited by the law of 
God.”405 Thus “[n]o Christian nation would tolerate polygamy within its borders on 
the plea that the marriage took place in some Asiatic country. Nor would incest be 
permitted. Nor . . . would the marriages of such as are mentally and physically 
incapable.”406 
Classical jurists viewed statutory departures from the jus gentium of marital 
portability much as they viewed statutory departures from the common-law right to 
marry by mutual agreement.407 Few went out of their way to affirm, in Bishop’s 
words, that “it would . . . be perfectly competent for the legislative power . . . to 
refuse to recognize any foreign marriages whether between its own citizens or 
foreigners,”408 but even fewer (if any) questioned lawmakers’ final authority to 
withhold recognition from marriages legally solemnized abroad but inconsistent 
with local policy in “form, ceremony, [or] qualification.”409 Some courts, including 
the U.S. Supreme Court, declined to recognize exercises of that authority unless the 
legislature spoke in “express words of nullity,” just as they did with statutes 
mandating nuptial formalities410—the only difference being that here the governing 
presumption was against “a legislative intent to contravene the jus gentium,” not the 
common law.411 Other courts enunciated the broader and more frankly subjective 
doctrine that the rule of lex loci contractus should yield before a “positive,” 
“known,” “manifest and distinctive policy of the state as understood by the 
                                                   
403 McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163, 164 (Cal. 1936); Rubin v. Irving Tr. Co., 305 
N.Y. 288, 305–06 (1953). 
404 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1827), supra note 90, at 78. 
405 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 48 (2d 
ed. 1875). 
406 Id. 
407 See supra notes 271–284 and accompanying text. 
408 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 148 (emphasis added). 
Bishop explained that, “because it would be not only inconvenient and oppressive[,] but a 
violation of the good faith and comity which nations owe each other,” “no government of a 
civilized country would . . . [apply such a drastic policy] in respect to persons who were 
domiciled in the foreign country at the time their marriages were solemnized . . . .” Id. 
409 Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1889) (“The legislature has, beyond all 
possible question, the power to enact what marriages shall be void in its own state, 
notwithstanding their validity in the state where celebrated.”). 
410 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (holding that “marriages not 
polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of 
the state where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction”) (emphasis 
added); Griswold v. Griswold, 129 P. 560, 562, 563–65 (Colo. App. 1913). 
411 Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 18 (1881) (demanding a “clear and 
unmistakable expression” of legislative intent). 
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courts . . . concerning the morals and good order of society.”412 Finally, whether by 
judicial decree or legislative command, many states came to reject marriages that 
were contracted abroad with “the express purpose of violating the law of the[ 
parties’] domicile.”413 While “most writers on public law” favored or at least 
tolerated recognition of such “evasive” marriages,414 others, more jealous of state 
sovereignty, protested that doing so would stretch comity “to an extreme limit.”415 
Over the course of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, deviations from 
the norm of marital portability were championed with increasing vehemence. One 
reason may be that concern about “migratory marriage”—marriages contracted 
extraterritorially, in purposeful evasion of the parties’ home-state law—was stoked 
by concurrent, more intricate, and ever angrier contests over “migratory divorce,” a 
species of forum shopping that pitted jurisdictions with more restrictive divorce laws 
against those with less restrictive rules.416 Another reason was surely American 
culture’s heightened cathexis onto prohibitions of interracial marriage in the wake 
of Emancipation. A large share of the most zealous rhetoric around the portability 
doctrine can be found in criminal and civil challenges to mixed-race marriages 
solemnized abroad in conformity with the lex loci.417 A minority of judges 
grudgingly stayed faithful to the jus gentium in cases of that sort. Dissenting in 
Goldman v. Dithrich (1938), for example, Florida Supreme Court Armstead Brown 
quoted an 1877 ruling from North Carolina to support his view that, “[h]owever 
revolting to us” (i.e., Southern whites) a mixed-race “marriage may appear,” such 
disgust could not be called “the common sentiment of the civilized and Christian 
                                                   
412 Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 306–08. 
413 In re Stull’s Estate, 39 A. 16, 17 (Pa. 1898) (refusing to recognize a marriage 
celebrated in Maryland in evasion of a Pennsylvania law prohibiting the marriage of an 
adulterous couple “during the life of the injured [ex-]wife or husband”); see also Lanham v. 
Lanham, 117 N.W. 787, 789 (Wis. 1908) (refusing to recognize a marriage celebrated in 
Michigan in evasion of a Wisconsin law prohibiting remarriage within one year of a divorce 
decree). 
414 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed. 1870), supra note 49, at 48; see also 
Horton v. Horton, 198 P. 1105, 1106–07 (Ariz. 1921) (concluding that “the overwhelming 
weight of the better reasoned cases on the subject” supported recognizing the marriages of 
Arizona “citizens and residents” who “have gone abroad for the purpose of evading our 
laws”); PARSONS, supra note 61, at 565 (calling the at-home validity of an “evasive 
marriage” the “established . . . law of . . . this country”). 
415 Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 307. 
416 See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 388 (2007); Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Divorce Decrees, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 210–17 (1951). 
417 See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 124–25 (1875) (grudgingly accepting the 
“intermarriage” of a master and his slave in the Utah Territory); Goldman v. Dithrich, 179 
So. 715, 718 (Fla. 1938) (explaining that the lex loci contractus would not control in Florida, 
for “[i]n the south miscegenation is socially odious”); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. 
858, 865 (Va. 1878) (articulating the rule of “the southern states” to reject interracial 
marriages celebrated out of state “for the purpose of evading the law . . . of the domicile”). 
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world.”418 Some states foreclosed the portability doctrine’s application to interracial 
unions by adopting legislation that specifically banned migratory marriage, while 
others added words of express nullity, like “absolutely void,” to existing 
miscegenation statutes—even though quite a few courts read those statutes to state 
a “strong public policy” regardless of their precise language.419  
Notably, the issue of portability played a minor role in Perez v. Lippold (1948), 
the first and only ruling between Reconstruction and Loving to hold an interracial 
marriage ban unconstitutional.420 Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis brought the case 
after the Los Angeles County clerk had denied them a license. To impugn that 
refusal’s rationality, one of their briefs described how they could “reach the Republic 
of Mexico within three or four hours, contract a marriage” there, then promptly—
and legally—“resume their domicile” in L.A.421 The argument hit its mark. 
According to the state’s highest court, California’s anomalous treatment of mixed-
race marriages celebrated elsewhere was one of several indications of an “arbitrary” 
and “irrational” policy.422 
Nearly twenty years after Perez, in a case involving plaintiffs who actually did 
go out of state to marry, the portability issue received no attention whatsoever. 
Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving had “married in the District of Columbia pursuant 
to its laws” and were charged upon returning home with violations of Virginia’s 
“Racial Purity Law,” including the specific offense of “Leaving State to evade 
law.”423 Both were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial judge “suspended the 
sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that” they not set foot again in 
Virginia.424 Almost a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed their 
convictions. Like the couple’s attorneys and amici, the Court’s decision said nothing  
                                                   
418 Finding it “impossible” to class interracial marriages alongside the “incestuous or 
polygamous marriage[s] admitted to be [objectionable] jure gentium,” Justice Brown felt 
“compelled” by “the law of nations” and by “comity to our sister States” to defer to the lex 
loci contractus. Goldman, 179 So. at 715, 718 (Brown, J. dissenting) (quoting State v. Ross, 
77 N.C. 242, 246 (1877)). 
419 An 1878 Virginia decision managed to apply all three approaches simultaneously, 
holding that where “a white person and a negro . . . go to another state . . . for the purpose of 
evading the law . . . [of] their domicile, [the foreign] marriage is no bar to a criminal 
prosecution [at home].” Such was Virginia law as expressly “declared by statute” (albeit a 
statute “passed after the marriage of the parties in th[e] case”). And even “without such 
statute, the marriage was a nullity. It was . . . prohibited and declared ‘absolutely void.’ It 
was contrary to . . . a public policy affirmed for more than a century; and one upon which 
social order, public morality, and the best interests of both races depend.” Kinney, 30 Gratt. 
at 865–66. 
420 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948). 
421 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Perez, 198 P.2d 17 (No. 20305). 
422 Perez, 198 P.2d at 18–19; see also id. at 33 (Carter, J., concurring). 
423 The statute imposed a prison sentence of one to five years. Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 4 (1967). 
424 Id. at 3. 
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about portability, comity, jus gentium, or the lex loci contractus. Instead they all 
spoke of equal protection—and, more tentatively, of a “fundamental . . . freedom to 
marry.”425 
 
2.  Permanence 
 
Recall that slaves were widely deemed capable of forming “natural” 
marriages.426 What they lacked was legal, not moral, capacity.427 Without de jure 
recognition, their de facto unions were vulnerable to all kinds of interference—
including, most infamously, exercises of droit de seigneur and permanent 
separations wrought by sale.428 Each of these paradigmatic interferences—
encroachment onto marital exclusivity and forced dissolution—was an evil that 
natural law condemned.429 The first we discussed in our survey of the conjugal right 
to marry, noting that natural law prohibited adultery and imposed on states a positive 
duty to forbid and punish it. The present section looks at the threat of forced 
dissolution—a hazard that, for free citizens with bona fide civil marriages, emanated 
not from human interlopers but from civil government itself. What limits, if any, did 
natural law place on sovereign power to undo extant marriages? And how were such 
limits observed in practice? 
                                                   
425 Id. at 12–13; see also infra notes 599–621 and accompanying text (describing right-
to-marry arguments in Loving). 
426 See supra notes 132–141 and accompanying text. 
427 “A slave, being subject to his master’s will, had not the legal capacity to contract 
marriage, yet the so-called marriages of slaves had a certain moral force. . . .” LONG, supra 
note 200, at § 19. 
428 Privation of legally assured permanence goes far in explaining why, in 1865, so 
many “enslaved women of Kentucky . . . flooded Northern military and civilian officials with 
requests . . . to exchange marital vows with their husbands . . . and be issued a formal marriage 
certificate” even though “the Enlistment Act had automatically married . . . couples” who 
had “cohabited . . . or associated as husband and wife.” FRANKE, supra note 136, at 43, 49–
50; see also HUNTER, supra note 135, at 7 (arguing that legal marriage “bolstered the ability 
of ex-slaves to keep their families together . . . and to stay out of the unscrupulous grasp of 
erstwhile masters.”); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 39 (1998) (counting 
“the right to marry and the ‘sanctity of our family relations’ as badges of freedom”) (quoting 
Letter from L. Maria Child, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 5, 1866)); Burnham, supra note 265, at 202 
(“[T]he threat of separation . . . hung like a dark cloud over every slave couple and family.”). 
429 Davis, supra note 369, at 383–84 (quoting Senator John Sherman’s successful 
argument in favor of amending the Civil Rights Act of 1866 “to ‘secure to the freedmen of 
the southern States certain rights, . . . including the right . . . to be protected in their homes 
and family as a . . . natural right of free men’”). 
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Classical marriage jurisprudence harbored a range of views as to whether and 
in what circumstances natural law permitted or even compelled divorce.430 
Subscribing to the letter of the biblical command that “what . . . God hath joined 
together, let no man put asunder,”431 some jurists insisted that the natural ideal of 
lifelong union amounted to an absolute prohibition of divorce.432 Arguing from fault, 
others called it “the dictate of natural justice” that aggrieved spouses be permitted to 
separate for adultery, and perhaps also for desertion and other causes that “frustrate 
. . . the ends for which [marriages] were created.”433 Arguing from consent, still other 
legal thinkers supposed that, in a state of nature, husband and wife could agree to 
dissolve their contract at any time and for any reason, or even that one spouse could 
do so unilaterally.434 
Amid this diversity of opinion, at least one proposition about divorce claimed 
general support. Classical lawyers roundly agreed that there would be something 
intolerable—or particularly intolerable, if one opposed divorce across the board—
for the state to dissolve a marriage without cause. Whatever permutations of fault 
and consent particular jurists favored, none believed that a just government, 
respectful of natural law, would impose divorce in the absence of either. 
There was a moment early in the nineteenth century when a limited guarantee 
of marital permanence seemed like a contender for constitutional status. The 
Contracts Clause offered the necessary textual hook. For if marriage was really a 
contract, were not its obligations immune from “impairment”? The Supreme Court 
first addressed this question in the famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819), a challenge to New Hampshire’s attempt to rewrite Dartmouth’s 
                                                   
430 See 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 33 (predicting 
that states’ divorce legislation would be more uniform “[i]f the voice of Christendom 
were . . . [as] united on this subject, as it is on [polygamy]”). 
431 Mark 10:9 (King James). 
432 Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237, 239 (1858) (“[T]he law of nature requires that the 
[marriage] contract should be perpetual.”). 
433 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (5th ed. 1873), supra note 216, at § 34 (specifically 
mentioning “desertion”). This view was sometimes expressed in the proposition that, “when 
divorce makes its appearance” by operation of civil law, “the real union has [already] 
ceased,” such that divorce “is not the violent destruction of marriage, but the legal end of a 
union, which no longer exists in fact.” LUIGI MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
§ 469 (John Lisle trans., Macmillan 1921). But see WOOLSEY, DIVORCE LEGISLATION, supra 
note 50, at 101 (doubting that natural law permits divorce for any ground but adultery). 
434 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 30 Mo. 72, 88 (1860) (“It can hardly be said 
that the power of divorce, in one or both of the parties to the contract, at his or her pleasure, 
is inconsistent with the law of nature.”); see also PALEY, supra note 175, at 186 (arguing that 
natural law permits “dissolution of the marriage-contract” of a childless couple “by the act, 
and at the will, of the husband”); PUFENDORF, supra note 93, at 458 (concluding that it is 
“repugnant to the Law of Nature, for either of the married Couple, to depart from the other 
unconsenting, . . . without being able to alledge [sic] any Breach of the matrimonial Pact on 
the other’s side”) (emphasis added). 
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charter so as to reconstitute it as a public institution.435 In the course of holding this 
maneuver unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, Chief Justice Marshall 
answered a slippery-slope problem that counsel for New Hampshire had “urged with 
great earnestness”: If the Contracts Clause was construed to encompass Dartmouth’s 
governmentally-commissioned charter, what would keep it from reaching compacts 
of marriage? Could not the state “unquestionably impair the obligation of the nuptial 
contract” by granting a divorce “without the consent of both parties”?436 Marshall 
disclaimed such a “broad, unlimited” interpretation. First, he said, divorce laws are 
remedial. Far from “impairing a marriage contract,” they “liberate one of the parties” 
when that contract “has been broken by the other.”437 Second, marriage is a “civil 
institution” and hence materially different from the private transactions of property 
the Clause was meant to protect.438 “The framers . . . could never have intended . . . 
a provision so unnecessary, so mischievous,” explained Marshall, that it would 
“render immutable those civil institutions,” like marriage, “which must change with 
circumstances . . . , which deeply concern the public, and which . . . the public 
judgment must control.”439 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case didn’t totally 
foreclose the possibility that the Contracts Clause might place some constraint, 
however remote, on civil control over civil marriage: “When any state legislature 
shall pass an act annulling all marriage contracts, or allowing either party to annul 
it, without the consent of the other, it will be time enough to inquire, whether such 
an act be constitutional.”440 The hypothetical is evocative, almost whimsical, and 
perplexing if taken literally. Assuming the essentially conjugal definition of 
marriage that prevailed at the time,441 just what effect did Marshall think this 
imagined “act” would have? Would single people (now everyone) “level up,” 
acceding to the once-exclusive privileges of marriage, with nothing but self-restraint 
and self-help to prevent “wanton and lascivious cohabitation, . . . a prostration of 
morals, and a dissolution of manners”?442 Or would formerly married people “level 
down,” and like everyone else face a cruel choice between celibacy and fornication? 
The ludicrousness of either alternative amplifies the hint of cheek in Marshall’s tone 
and suggests that he may have been having a little fun with his readers—and in 
particular with his colleague Joseph Story. 
Concurring in Dartmouth College, Justice Story raised points similar to 
Marshall’s, but his rhetoric was less extravagant. Like the Chief Justice, Story began 
by arguing that divorce is no impairment of contract; rather, he said, it’s a remedy 
                                                   
435 17 U.S. 518, 600 (1819). 
436 Id. at 600. 
437 Id. at 629. 
438 Id. at 628. 
439 Id. 
440 Id. at 629. 
441 See supra Section II.A. 
442 Inhabitants of Town of Milford v. Inhabitants of Town of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 
52–53 (1810). 
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for breach of contract.443 New Hampshire’s proposed analogy between a divorce 
decree and the new charter it tried to “force upon” Dartmouth only made sense, he 
insisted, if the imagined marriage were dissolved “without . . . breach on either side, 
against the wishes of the parties, and without any judicial inquiry to ascertain a 
breach.”444 Story was “not prepared to admit such a power, or that its exercise would 
not entrench upon the . . . constitution.”445 He had difficulty perceiving a 
constitutionally meaningful difference between divesting a man, without fault or 
consent, of his “right to his wife . . . , her society and her fortune” and “the 
confiscation of his own estate.”446 
Story was more dogmatic than Marshall in his assumption of a necessary, 
causal relation between divorce and breach of marital obligation, but both retreated 
from that assumption in their most explicit descriptions of the kinds of divorce that 
might be constitutionally problematic.447 At those moments, spousal consent 
suddenly joined or replaced marital fault as the ultimate limit on states’ power to 
                                                   
443 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696 (Story, J., concurring) (“A general 
law regulating divorces, . . . like a law regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of 
contracts, is not necessarily a law impairing the obligation of such a contract.”). 
444 Id. at 696, 707. This rendition of Story’s argument is indebted to James W. Fox Jr.’s 
lucid account in The Law of Many Faces: Antebellum Contract Law Background of 
Reconstruction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 61, 102–03 (2007). 
445 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696 (Story, J., concurring).  
446 Id. at 696–97. Story’s assertion that “a man has just as good a right to his wife, as to 
the property acquired under a marriage contract” smacks of the same chauvinist entitlement 
expressed in his later statement that marriage, as it “arise[s] from the law of nature, . . . 
secures the peace of society . . . by assigning to one man the exclusive right to one woman.” 
Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316. To be clear, though, the former quotation (from 
Dartmouth College) equates a man’s claim “to his wife”—the natural right of every 
husband—with any claims a man might have under what Story also calls “a marriage 
settlement” (basically, a pre- or postnuptial agreement). As Story saw it, both the marriage 
itself and the settlement were “contracts for valuable consideration” that seemed to merit 
protection under the Contracts Clause. He wasn’t asserting any natural right of husbands to 
their wives’ property. Indeed, the terms of actual marriage settlements varied widely, and the 
instruments were often used to give wives greater financial independence than they’d have 
possessed under marriage’s default rules. Nor should Story be understood to imply that the 
Contracts Clause restrains a state from retroactively applying changes to those default rules. 
Although couples may well have wed “under the faith of existing laws,” they had no right to 
expect the lex loci contractus in effect on their wedding day to govern anything but the 
marriage’s validity. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text (on marriage 
settlements); STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 187 (“[W]here there 
is a change of domicil, the law of the actual domicil, and not of the matrimonial domicil, will 
govern as to all future acquisitions of moveable property; and as to all immovable property, 
the rei sitae.”). 
447 See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. 
512, 517–18 (1944) (citing both opinions to show that “it was recognized at an early time 
that, despite the contract clause, laws could . . . provid[e] for the dissolution of an obligation 
because of a breach by the other party to the contract.”). 
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transform husbands and wives into legal strangers. According to Story, again, the 
Contracts Clause might be infringed if a marriage were “dissolved without . . . breach 
on either side [and] against the wishes of the parties,” and he considered it “a 
violation of the principles of justice” to “divest” a man of his “wife . . . without his 
default, and against his will.”448 Taken at face value, these statements suggest that 
Story would have permitted divorce where there was breach but no consent and also 
where there was consent but no breach, but not where there was neither breach nor 
consent—by which he almost certainly meant bilateral consent.449 Meanwhile, in 
Marshall’s rendering, fault drops out entirely and a constitutional question is 
foreseen only where consent is absent—be it the consent of either spouse under “an 
act annulling all marriage contracts” or the consent of both spouses under “an 
act . . . allowing either party to annul” the marriage at pleasure.450 Altogether, then, 
it sounds as if Marshall, like Story, wouldn’t have interposed the Contracts Clause 
against a divorce between two faultless but mutually consenting parties. 
Story never recanted the constitutional misgivings about marriage’s 
vulnerability to dissolution that he aired in Dartmouth College, but neither did he 
flaunt them.451 One imagines he sensed where American law was headed. As early 
as 1838, the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that marriage “is not embraced 
by the constitutional interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of 
contracts.”452 Not only “could [marriage] not, like mere contracts, be dissolved by 
the mutual consent of the contracting parties, but it might be abrogated by the 
sovereign will whenever the public good, or justice to both parties, or either of the 
                                                   
448 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 696–97 (Story, J., concurring). 
449 See Story, Natural Law, supra note 150, at 316 (arguing that “a power on either side 
to dissolve the marriage at will[] would rob . . . matrimony of many of its principal blessings 
and advantages” and was “prohibited” by “natural law”); see also David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 887, 975, n.132 (1982) (“Story . . . strongly suggested [in Dartmouth] that a unilateral 
divorce without fault would be unconstitutional.”). None of this is to suggest that Story 
favored divorce by bilateral consent. He didn’t. But his disapproval apparently sought no 
recourse to the Constitution. See STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 
202 (speaking dismissively of “frivolous” causes for divorce, the Roman civil law’s “almost 
unbounded license” of divorce, and of dissolution “even at the pleasure of the parties”). 
450 Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 629. 
451 Fifteen years later, disavowing any “design to enter into . . . discussion, as to the 
general . . . legislative power to authorize directly or indirectly a dissolution of the 
matrimonial state, and to release the parties from all future obligation,” Story acknowledged 
somewhat coyly that “it is deemed by all modern nations to be within the competency of 
legislation to provide for . . . dissolution and release, in some form and for some causes.” 
STORY, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1834), supra note 11, at § 201 (emphases added). 
452 Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181, 184 (1838). 
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parties, would thereby be subserved.”453 By 1852, Bishop was stating this principle 
as black-letter American law.454  
Yet it would take the Supreme Court nearly seventy years after Dartmouth 
College to hold unequivocally that the Contracts Clause places no limit on states’ 
power to divorce lawfully wedded couples. In Maynard v. Hill (1888), a majority 
led by Justice Stephen Field flatly stated “that marriage is not a contract within the 
meaning of the provision.”455 The permissive implications of this exclusion were 
evident from the facts of Maynard itself. As a federal appeals court recalled in 1938, 
“in Maynard v. Hill, it was even held that a special act of the Legislature . . . granting 
a divorce . . . for no named cause and where none existed . . . did not infringe any 
provision of the Constitution of the United States.”456 The Legislature’s “will” alone 
“was . . . sufficient reason for its action.”457 Ironically, it was precisely marriage’s 
superlative importance that permitted lawmakers to so casually denigrate its bond: 
“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with 
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been 
subject to the control of the legislature.”458 
Maynard’s interpretation of the Contracts Clause effected a categorical 
exclusion equally applicable to marriage contracts breached by adultery, renounced 
by the consent of one or both parties, or annulled sua sponte “by the will of the 
sovereign.”459 There are clues in the opinion that the Court wasn’t entirely 
                                                   
453 Id.; see also Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Del. 440, 442 (Del. Super. Ct. 1846) (“[T]he 
marriage contract . . . can be violated and annulled by law, which no other contract 
can . . . .”); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 193 (1877) (“[I]t can be violated and annulled by 
law, which no other contract can be; it cannot be determined by the will of the parties, as any 
other contract may be . . . .”). 
454 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 34 (quoting Maguire, 37 
Ky. at 181, 183, as an example of the kind of “language . . . employed in the American 
tribunals”). But see PARSONS, supra note 61, at 527–28 (explaining that the Clause’s 
“relation to . . . marriage and divorce” remained unsettled, with one view of the matter being 
that “this clause may operate on the contract of marriage; leaving only the question as to 
what is [its] effect and operation”). 
455 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). 
456 Leon v. Torruella, 99 F.2d 851, 855 (1st Cir. 1938) (emphasis added). 
457 Id. 
458 Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206; see also Halley, supra note 9, at 52 (arguing that 
“marriage-as-status cases” before and after Maynard “intensif[ied] . . . commitment to the 
idea that marriage and its stability were fundamental to the social order, while 
simultaneously intensifying the exposure of actual marriages to divorce. . . .”). 
459 Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211 (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863)). 
Mark Strasser finds “language” in Maynard “suggest[ing] that the marital contract might 
indeed fall within the protections of [the Contracts C]lause under certain conditions and that 
those conditions might well include . . . a legislature[’s attempt] to retroactively nullify a 
marriage contrary to the wishes of each of the individual parties.” MARK PHILLIP STRASSER, 
THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 80–81 (1999). But Maynard says nothing about 
divorce contrary to the will of both parties and its holding that marriage “is not embraced” 
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comfortable with treating these different scenarios as perfect equivalents.460 Perhaps 
it did so because, already, certain Justices could see past the Contracts Clause to 
                                                   
by the Contracts Clause carries no qualification. Professor Strasser appears to read an 
implicit limitation in the Court’s statement of the legislature’s prerogative to “prescribe[] the 
age at which parties may contract to marry, . . . the duties and obligations [marriage] creates, 
its effects upon the property rights of both, . . . and the acts which may constitute grounds 
for its dissolution.” Id. at 79–80 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205). Is it warranted to infer 
from the italicized text that Maynard leaves open a door for Contract-Clause prohibition of 
divorce without marital fault? As Strasser appears to recognize, such a prohibition would 
necessarily encompass dissolutions by mutual consent, which even Justice Story hadn’t 
called into constitutional doubt. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
when read in context, the passage in question simply presents a non-exhaustive list of ways 
in which marriage differs from a regular contract; it does not state the outer bounds of divorce 
legislation.  
Professor Strasser also notes Justice Field’s speculation that, “[i]f the act declaring the 
divorce should attempt to interfere with the rights of property vested in either party, a 
different question would be presented.” Id. at 80, 86 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206). 
Whatever Field exactly meant here by “vested” property rights, it suffices for present 
purposes to observe that the Contracts Clause wasn’t the only constitutional provision that 
might be implicated by those rights’ infringement. For discussions relevant to this question, 
see McDuffie v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 170, 176 (2006) (“Any interest a spouse may 
have in marital property is an inchoate right that becomes vested only upon entry of a decree 
of equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding.”); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Dower and Curtesy § 8 
(2014) (citing decisions that distinguish between a legislature’s “extensive authority” to 
modify or abolish “inchoate dower . . . and curtesy” rights from its constitutional inability to 
modify “vested or consummate dower or curtesy,” the latter interest being protected by 
provisions other than the Contracts Clause); BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra 
note 47, at § 773, 776–82 (discussing the effect of constitutional prohibitions of 
“retrospective laws” and observing that Contract-Clause protection of vested marital 
property rights would mean that “nothing could ever be made a ground of divorce which was 
not so at the time it was entered into,—contrary to the universal doctrine concerning 
marriage, about which there is no dispute”); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: 
A HISTORY 17 (2000) (noting that the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause both proved 
to be “relatively unimportant constraints” on marriage regulation, even though both could 
have been construed to protect “valuable property rights vested as a result of marriage”).  
460 Regarding consensual divorce, Maynard resignedly acknowledged that upholding 
David Maynard’s divorce from his wife Lydia probably meant sanctioning a dissolution that, 
in substance if not in form, was obtained unilaterally against a spouse who had committed 
no fault. The Court expressed “reprobation” of David’s “loose morals and shameless 
conduct,” which included obtaining a divorce without notice to Lydia for an abandonment 
more properly attributed to him; and it predicted that, “if the facts stated had been brought to 
the attention of congress, that body might and probably would have annulled the [legislative] 
act” that had granted the divorce. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 208–10. As to divorces imposed 
without either fault or consent, the evidence of the opinion is less explicit, but, if witting, 
only more suggestive of the Court’s unease with its own holding. Discussing state-level 
rulings to the same effect as Maynard, the Court invoked a fifty-year-old Kentucky case and 
quoted from it verbatim—almost. See id. at 212 (discussing Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. 181 
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other constitutional bulwarks against the most extreme insults to marital 
permanence.461 Or maybe the wholly involuntary dissolutions that Marshall and 
Story conjured in Dartmouth College were so fantastical that Maynard’s bright-line 
rule seemed to pose no genuine threat. Both rationalizations, evidently, could inhabit 
the same judicial brain.462 
While no state ever passed legislation “annulling all marriage contracts,”463 
there did arise after Maynard a fair number of cases involving petitions to apply 
retroactively, without the consent of either spouse, statutes prohibiting certain 
matches: common-law marriages, interracial marriages, marriages between a man 
and his niece, etc. In all such cases, courts refused to void the challenged marriages; 
in all but one, they reached that result on the ground that retroactivity, though 
constitutionally permissible, wouldn’t be found without “plain and unmistakable” 
statutory language to that effect.464 Most courts took roughly the same approach to 
divorce petitions based on a fault ground unavailable when the alleged breach took 
                                                   
(1838)). Aside from transposing the original passage from the present to the past tense, the 
Court’s only alteration was to omit the text that here appears in italics: “[M]arriage . . . is 
regulated and controlled by the sovereign power of the State, and can not, like mere contracts, 
be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the contracting parties, but may be abrogated by 
the sovereign will either with or without the consent of both parties, whenever the public 
good, or justice to both or either of the parties, will be thereby subserved.” Maguire v. 
Maguire, 37 Ky. 181, 184 (1838) (emphasis added). 
461 See infra notes 491–493 and accompanying text (discussing a hint of due-process 
protection of marriage in Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874)). 
462 About thirty years after Maynard, Alabama Supreme Court Justice J.J. Mayfield 
authored a totally advisory concurring opinion in which he both contested Maynard’s 
interpretation of the Contracts Clause and proffered “due process of law” as an alternative 
constitutional ground on which to prohibit divorce without fault. Like Chief Justice Marshall 
in the Dartmouth College case, Mayfield illustrated his concerns by way of a hypothetical 
statute “divorc[ing] all married persons” in one fell swoop. Could a government do this? No, 
he answered, “but . . . I do not think the courts will ever be called upon to decide the question, 
because there is no possibility that the Legislature will ever pass such a bill. . . .” Barrington 
v. Barrington, 7670 So. 81, 90 (1917) (Mayfield, J., concurring). Fifteen years earlier, 
speaking of yet another hypothetical involving forced marital dissolution, the Supreme Court 
of Virginia had called the imagined scenario “extreme, . . . remote and improbable,” but 
conceded that it might be unconstitutional even in the absence of a “precise [textual] 
limitation.” Farmville v. Walker, 43 S.E. 558, 561 (Va. 1903). 
463 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 629 (1819). 
464 Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 21 (Okla. 1930) (per curiam) (speaking of an interracial 
marriage ban); see also Succession of Yoist, 61 So. 384, 385 (La. 1913) (finding “nothing in 
the provisions” of a miscegenation statute to indicate that it should have “retroactive effect”); 
Collins v. Hoag & Rollins, 241 N.W. 766, 767 (Neb. 1932) (“[W]here . . . a state ha[s] 
recognized common–law marriages as valid[,] no new statute should be held to invalidate 
such marriages, unless upon clear language in the statute nullifying [them].”); Weisberg v. 
Weisberg, 98 N.Y.S. 260, 262 (1906) (holding, without mention of Maynard or any other 
relevant precedent, that a statute prohibiting marriage between a man and his niece could not 
be applied retroactively without violating the Contracts Clause). 
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place,465 to say nothing of grounds available under the original lex loci contractus.466 
Eventually, of course, the “no-fault revolution” of the latter half of the twentieth-
century made divorce by bilateral consent available everywhere and divorce by 
unilateral consent available almost everywhere.467 These schemes’ constitutionality 
was unsuccessfully challenged on multiple occasions and today seems irrevocably 
settled.468 If anything, the constitutional needle points in the opposite direction. 
Relying largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971),469 
a number of legal scholars have argued that access to unilateral divorce is, may be, 
or ought to be a constitutional right.470  
Meanwhile, in a separate line of decisions beginning with Cheever v. Wilson 
(1870),471 the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence proved only more 
                                                   
465 See, e.g., McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 
(acknowledging but diverging from “certain jurisdictions where . . . constitutional provisions 
against retrospective and retroactive laws . . . have been held to restrain retrospective 
operation of” new or amended divorce laws). 
466 HARTOG, supra note 459, at 17 (asserting that the Contracts and Takings Clauses 
failed to place “limits on the powers of states to change the terms of marriage or divorce, on 
the theory that when couples married, each spouse relied on [the specific] marital regime” 
that then existed). 
467 See Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An 
Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 385–86 (1989); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family 
Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445, 1471–72, 1477 (1992). 
468 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 476 (Ct. App. 1972) 
(upholding California’s no-fault divorce law); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1973) 
(upholding Florida’s law); Cowsert v. Cowsert, 259 N.W.2d 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(upholding Michigan’s law); Saltarelli v. Saltarelli, 670 S.W.2d 785 (Tx. Ct. App. 1984) 
(upholding Texas’s law). 
469 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (invaliding a law that required 
anyone seeking a divorce, including indigents, to pay fees and costs). 
470 See, e.g., Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals 
to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609, 621–32 (1997); Pearl Berg, 
Are Fault Requirements in Divorce Actions Unconstitutional?, 16 J. FAM. L. 265 (1977–78); 
Cathy J. Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered 
Questions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 577 (1985); Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and 
Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 897–98 (1988); 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 671 (1980). The 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the only American tribunal to have specifically considered 
the question, held in 1978 that the “right of privacy” under the Commonwealth’s constitution 
guarantees prompt access to divorce by mutual—and perhaps also unilateral—consent. 
Although the decision speaks mainly of “mutual consent divorce,” some of its language 
could be construed to admit a right to divorce pursuant to only one’s spouse’s “declaration 
of the irretrievable breakdown of the[] marriage.” Figueroa Ferrer v. E.L.A., 107 D.P.R. 250, 
292–93, 296–98, 300–03 (1978); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society . . . to 
approve of no-fault divorce . . . .”). 
471 Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1870). 
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hostile to the natural right of marital permanence. Affirming the “well settled” 
principle that a wife could, in certain circumstances, establish a domicile in a 
different state than her husband’s, Cheever held that a divorce judgment obtained in 
that new domicile was secure nationwide under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.472 
The phenomenon enacted in Cheever was hardly new,473 but it was only in the mid-
to-late nineteenth century that it earned the moniker “migratory divorce.”474 From 
that point it proceeded to stimulate more Supreme Court rulings on marriage than 
any other issue—by a long shot.475 Most of those cases involved people who 
obtained a divorce in one state without the participation or even the knowledge of a 
spouse located in another state.476 Superficially, the doctrine governing such 
domestic disputes was unremarkable: A judgment warrants full faith and credit so 
long as it issues from a court with proper jurisdiction. But therein lay the rub. The 
rules of matrimonial jurisdiction were and remain distinctive. “Under our system of 
law,” wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1945, “judicial power to grant a divorce . . . 
is founded on domicil. The framers of the constitution were familiar with this 
prerequisite, and since 1789 . . . [no] court in the English-speaking world has 
questioned it.”477  
Domicile-based jurisdiction posed no problem in the ordinary case. Divorcing 
spouses overwhelmingly tended to live in the same state (if not the same dwelling); 
even when they did not, the marriage was still presumptively subject to the common-
law rule that a wife’s domicile follows her husband’s.478 Admit exceptions to that 
rule (as Cheever did), and migratory divorce suddenly becomes possible; liberalize 
                                                   
472 Id. at 123–24.  
473 For some early American cases, see Richardson v. Richardson, 2 Mass. 153, 153 
(1806) and Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806). 
474 Thomas Charles Carrigan, The Law and the American Child, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS 
OF CHILDREN 121, 178 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1974) (referring to “recommendations of the 
Commissioners on Uniformity relative to migratory divorce”). 
475 In 1948, one commentator likened the Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter to 
“episodes in some long judicial soap opera, each one advancing the plot to a degree, but also 
posing a new set of questions to be resolved upon the next occasion.” Monrad G. Paulsen, 
Migratory Divorce: Chapters III and IV: The Appearance of Sherrer and the Ghost of 
Haddock, 24 IND. L.J. 25, 25 (1948). In addition to Cheever, the Court’s migratory divorce 
decisions included Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), Johnson v. Muelberger, 
340 U.S. 581 (1951), Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 
(1948), Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949), Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), 
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), 
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), and 
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901). 
476 See, e.g., Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 416–17; Rice, 336 U.S. at 674–75.  
477 Williams, 325 U.S. at 229–30. 
478 See generally Comment, Capacity of a Married Woman to Acquire Separate 
Domicil, 38 YALE L.J. 381, 381 (1929) (“The domicil of the wife, both in England and in the 
United States, is, in general, determined by that of the husband, even [if] the wife has never 
lived at her husband’s domicil.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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residency requirements and substantive grounds for divorce, as happened 
spectacularly but unevenly over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and migratory divorce becomes rampant. At root, however, it was neither the general 
command of full faith and credit nor the Cheever rule on separate domiciles that 
made marriage more vulnerable to dissolution than other contracts. It was the 
domicile rule itself. The principle that matrimonial jurisdiction derives from 
spouses’ “residence” in a state, as defined by that state, was and remains a significant 
relaxation of the usual due-process standards of personal jurisdiction, whose main 
concern has been fairness to those being “hailed into court”—fairness to defendants, 
not complainants.479 
The Supreme Court specifically blessed a lower standard for matrimonial 
jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), which laid the constitutional foundation of 
personal-jurisdiction doctrine for years to come.480 Pennoyer held that a court has 
jurisdiction only over defendants who voluntarily appear before it or are served 
process within the forum state. This was what the Due Process Clause required—
“except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff.”481 Pennoyer illustrated 
the point by reference to marriage, the status par excellence: “The State, for 
example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage 
relation between its own citizens shall be created, the causes for which it may be 
dissolved,” and “the conditions on which proceedings affecting [it] may be 
commenced and carried on within its territory.”482 And what justified this “absolute 
right”? Why were parties to a marriage contract due less process than ordinary 
                                                   
479 See Rice, 336 U.S. at 680 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for 
exempting divorce cases from “the usual requirements of procedural due process”); see also 
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum 
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1676–77 (2011) (finding the domicile rule “increasingly 
difficult to square . . . with contemporary principles of personal jurisdiction” and calling for 
its “abandonment”); Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (characterizing the domicile rule as “the precise opposite” 
of the jurisdictional principles “that apply in all other cases” and urging its abolition). 
480 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. 
SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 67 (9th ed. 2016) (calling Pennoyer “the great-grandparent 
of personal jurisdiction”).  
481 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733 (“[W]e do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, 
that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens 
towards a non-resident, . . . though [commenced] without service of process or personal 
notice to the non-resident.”). 
482 Id. at 734–35. Marriage was sometimes said to fall into the only other category of 
litigation that Pennoyer specifically exempted from its rule of personal service in the state 
claiming jurisdiction—namely, cases where “the action is in the nature of a proceeding in 
rem.” Id. at 715. For much of the nineteenth century and for part of the twentieth, courts and 
commentators commonly spoke of marriage as a “res,” referring not to the specific property 
interests associated with it but to the marital status itself: the state, the legal condition, of 
being married. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) (disavowing “the 
historical view that a proceeding for a divorce was a proceeding in rem”). 
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litigants? For the same reason that marriage deserved no protection under the 
Contracts Clause: because it was so important; because it “gives rights and imposes 
duties and restrictions upon the parties, affecting their social and moral 
condition, . . . of which every civilized state, and certainly every state of this Union,” 
must be “the sole judge, so far as its own citizens or subjects are concerned.”483 Far 
from qualifying spouses to heightened constitutional protection against government 
interference, matrimony’s unique significance entailed, as one angry Justice put it in 
1945, that “family relationships may be destroyed by a procedure that . . . would not 
[pass muster] if the suit were to collect a grocery bill.”484 
 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RISE OF THE NATURAL RIGHT TO MARRY 
 
The previous Part sorted classical understandings of the natural right to marry 
into several specific entitlements: a right to “conjugality,” or a mode of relationship 
defined by exclusive privileges as to sex and procreation and strongly associated 
with cohabitation and parenthood; a right to contract marriage voluntarily, without 
formalities, and with the willing partner of one’s choice; and finally a right to remain 
wedlocked, such that a marriage valid at its inception would be valid worldwide and 
could not be dissolved without fault or consent.  
In the nineteenth century, constitutional argumentation about these natural 
rights was unusual and, from today’s vantage point, conspicuously devoid of appeals 
to specifically marital entitlements. Challenges to interracial marriage bans invoked 
not a fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice but rather broad rights 
of equality and contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. Challenges to out-of-
state divorce decrees relied not on any natural right to marital permanence but to 
procedural due process and the generic protection of the Contracts Clause. Claims 
of this sort rarely reached the Supreme Court and found little sympathy when they 
did. In the Dartmouth College case, John Marshall and Joseph Story both toyed with 
the thought of affording extant marriage contracts some degree of protection against 
impairment, but their successors on the bench unequivocally rejected that possibility 
in Maynard v. Hill, where it was the permissive “doctrine of status,” not a wronged 
wife’s failed argument from contract, that stressed the distinctiveness of marriage.485 
For American lawyers of the nineteenth century, the notion of a fundamental 
right to marry belonged almost entirely to natural law.486 Witness the famous case of 
                                                   
483 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 166–67 (1901). 
484 Williams, 317 U.S. at 316 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
485 See supra notes 103, 301–306, 332, and 420, and accompanying text. 
486 For a paradigmatic formulation of positive marriage law’s latitude to diverge from 
natural law, see BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 150 (“[B]y the 
laws of all civilized countries, as marriage is a natural right, all subjects may marry at 
pleasure, except when specifically inhibited or restrained by statute.”) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, two respected scholars of family law argue that, “[b]efore Loving, the Supreme Court 
. . . had never suggested that individuals had some kind of right to marry, nor that states faced 
constitutional limits.” JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE 
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Reynolds v. United States (1878).487 Plaintiff George Reynolds, a Mormon, 
challenged his conviction for bigamy as a violation of the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause.488 That was his sole ground of constitutional complaint. Reynolds’s 
attorneys, plucky enough to deny that bigamy defies natural law,489 said nothing of 
a natural right to marry—even though this was, as we have seen, a familiar concept 
at the time, and even though Reynolds’s second marriage easily could have been 
cast as an exercise of that liberty. A constitutional right-to-marry claim was simply 
“off the wall” in 1878; even a weak free-exercise claim, rejected by a unanimous 
Court, seemed to have a better chance of sticking.490 This state of affairs changed 
drastically in the century to follow. 
 
A.  Before Skinner 
 
The present Part describes how the right to marry came to be conceived as an 
independent substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This progression would have been hard to foresee from the perspective 
of the nineteenth century, but the Supreme Court started clearing a path for it a full 
fourteen years before Maynard. The case was Citizens Savings & Loan v. Topeka 
(1874), which invalidated a state taxation scheme because it served “private interest” 
rather than “public use.”491 That holding was founded on constitutional “limitations 
. . . which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments”—“implied 
reservations of individual rights, without which,” said the Court, in language 
reminiscent of the Due Process Clause, “the lives, . . . liberty, and . . . property of . . . 
citizens” would be enslaved to the “absolute disposition and unlimited control of . . . 
a despotism.”492 To illustrate the existence of such implicit constitutional limitations, 
                                                   
CASTLE: LAW AND FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 37 (2011). Yet it’s not perfectly 
accurate to say that, prior to 1967, the Court “had never invalidated a state’s marriage or 
divorce law.” Id. Twelve years before Loving, the Court held that the Virgin Islands 
Legislative Assembly had exceeded Congress’s permission to legislate on “subjects of local 
application” when it empowered the Territory’s courts to grant divorces regardless of 
whether either spouse was domiciled there. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 
10–12 (1955). A dissenting judge in the case wondered whether the majority was 
“motivated” by “constitutional doubts”—specifically, “doubt that domicile is not a 
constitutional requirement” for jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Id. at 26 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
487 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
488 Id. at 161–62.  
489 “The offence prohibited by sect. 5352 is not a malum in se; it is not prohibited by 
the decalogue; and, if it be said that its prohibition is to be found in the teachings of the New 
Testament, we know that a majority of the people of this Territory deny that the Christian 
law contains any such prohibition.” Id. at 152–53 (summarizing Reynolds’s argument). 
490 See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 
YALE L.J. 1407, 1444 (2001) (using the terms “off the wall” and “on the wall” to differentiate 
between arguments that “any well-trained lawyer could [and could not] accept”). 
491 Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875). 
492 Id. at 662. 
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Justice Samuel Miller proclaimed that “[n]o court . . . would hesitate to declare void 
a statute which enacted that A and B who were husband and wife to each other 
should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the 
wife of D.”493  
Citizens Savings & Loan is remembered as a harbinger of the Lochner era494—
more, of course, for its holding as to property, taxation, and public use than for its 
passing allusion to divorce by fiat and remarriage by force.495 But Justice Miller’s 
hypothetical carved a niche for marriage in the nursery of modern substantive due 
process.496 It was a small niche. Compared to the economic rights identified with 
Lochner, the notion of a distinct right to marry under the Due Process Clause 
emerged slightly later and developed far more tentatively, coming into its own well 
after Lochner was “repudiated.”497 Yet if the idea progressed slowly from dictum to 
doctrine, it passed through several of the most iconic decisions of the first half of the 
                                                   
493 Id. Roscoe Pound called this passage a “striking example of the purely personal and 
arbitrary character of all natural law theories.” Pound, Common Law and Legislation, supra 
note 332, at 392 (contrasting the Supreme Court’s statement with Lord Holt’s assertion in 
London v. Wood [1702] 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1603, “that Parliament ‘may make the wife of A 
to be the wife of B’”). 
494 “The phrase ‘Lochner era’ refers to the period from the late nineteenth century until 
1937 in which the Court used economic substantive due process to invalidate state . . . 
regulations,” a practice justified as judicial “‘restor[ation of] . . . the natural order.’” Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 50 n.22 (1989) (quoting 
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567–68, 578–79 (2d ed. 1988)). For 
accounts of the natural-law background of Lochner and like cases, see HOWARD GILLMAN, 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1993); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner 
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2003); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987).  
495 For scholarship situating Citizens Savings & Loan in the development of modern 
substantive due process and associating it with Lochner, see generally Bernstein, supra note 
493; Chemerinsky, supra note 493, at 65–66; Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: 
Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 622 
(1996); Pound, Ideal Element, supra note 44. 
496 Because Justice Miller’s example combines a violation of the right to marital 
permanence with a violation of the right against involuntary marriage, we can’t know (or at 
least can’t tell from the face of the decision) whether he or anyone who joined the opinion 
considered the first offense alone unconstitutional. 
497 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (observing that “the more 
durable precursors of modern substantive due process” were being decided “[e]ven before 
the deviant economic due process cases had been repudiated”) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923)); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 501 n.8 (1977) (noting 
that the Constitution’s protection of “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage” 
traces its lineage to Lochner-era cases that “have survived and enjoyed frequent 
reaffirmance, while other substantive due process cases of the same era have been 
repudiated.”).  
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twentieth century: Meyer v. Nebraska (1923),498 Skinner v. Oklahoma (1943),499 and 
the California Supreme Court’s braver but lesser-known ruling in Perez v. Lippold 
(1948).500 
Meyer held that the Due Process Clause prohibited states from mandating 
English-only instruction in schools.501 Citing Lochner and a dozen other cases, 
Justice James McReynolds, like Justice Miller before him, invoked the 
Constitution’s language of “life, liberty, or property” and proceeded to declare that 
“the liberty thus guaranteed . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right . . . to contract, . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
. . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”502 Again like Justice 
Miller, McReynolds reinforced the doctrine of substantive due process with a 
fanciful hypothetical involving marriage—specifically, Plato’s vision for the ideal 
republic, where “the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children 
are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his 
parent.”503 This would not do in America. Here, McReynolds stated confidently, a 
government could not “impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without 
doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.”504 
Meyer’s nomination of constitutional rights to “marry, establish a home and 
bring up children” may have been fleeting, but by 1923 a number of state courts had 
already paid this set of ideas more concerted attention. The chief impetus to this 
development, other than the Lochner-era atmosphere of emboldened judicial review, 
was eugenic regulation.505 In the first decades of the twentieth century, marital 
disqualifications once stated as precepts of natural law—exogamy as to kin, 
endogamy as to race, no marriage by anyone incapable of consent—were 
reinterpreted and sometimes revised to comport with a twisted law of natural 
selection.506 State-imposed and state-facilitated sterilizations severely damaged 
                                                   
498 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.  
499 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
500 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
501 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.  
502 Id. at 399. 
503 Id. at 401. 
504 Whereas other substantive due process cases of the Lochner era avoided “the term 
‘natural law’” even as they “continue[d] to use the concept under a different name,” Meyer 
explicitly invoked parents’ “natural duty” and “corresponding . . . right” to educate their 
children. WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 276–77; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400–02. 
505 Between 1895 and 1929, “29 states barred ‘imbeciles,’ ‘idiots,’ ‘lunatics,’ the 
‘feebleminded,’ and those of ‘unsound mind’ from marriage.” And of the “19 states [that] 
made venereal disease a bar to marriage, . . . 10 . . . required a health certificate from a 
physician to obtain a . . . license.” Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: 
Dependency, Eugenics, and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860–1920, 23 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 541, 542 (1998). 
506 See William E. McCurdy, Insanity as a Ground for Annulment or Divorce in English 
and American Law, 29 VA. L. REV. 771, 794–98 (1943) (discussing “eugenic reasons,” as 
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many individuals’ prospects of finding a spouse, and institutionalization could 
foreclose that possibility for however long it lasted.507 Many jurisdictions simply 
branded certain individuals, or certain permutations of individuals, ineligible to 
wed.508  
Widely cited as the nation’s first self-consciously “eugenic” law, Connecticut’s 
1895 “act concerning crimes and punishments” imposed a minimum three years 
imprisonment for marriage, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse with an “epileptic, 
imbecile, or feeble-minded” person where the female partner was “under forty-five 
years of age.”509 The state supreme court considered the statute’s constitutionality in 
Gould v. Gould (1906), which sustained a divorce awarded to a woman who had 
been “fraudulently induced” to marry a man with concealed epilepsy.510 As 
concurring Justice William Hamersley emphasized, this conclusion didn’t depend 
on “the validity of the [1895] act,” as there could have been fraudulent inducement 
with or without the criminal statute.511 Nonetheless, in considering whether the 
enactment ipso facto rendered the marriage void, the court majority expressly denied 
any violation of Connecticut’s constitutional guarantee of “equality . . . in the rights 
to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’”—a guarantee, it said, that included 
“the right to contract marriage.”512 The statute was both reasonable in its purpose 
(preventing “disease of a . . . serious and revolting character”) and reasonable in its 
means (“preclud[ing] such opportunities for sexual intercourse as marriage 
                                                   
distinct from concerns about “capacity or mistake,” for states’ revision of statutes prohibiting 
certain “insane” persons from marrying); Edward W. Spencer, Some Phases of Marriage 
Law and Legislation from a Sanitary and Eugenic Standpoint, 25 YALE L.J. 58, 63–64 (1915) 
(describing how “conscious eugenic” planning supplemented “vague notions of general 
morality and social convenience” to rationalize limitations on the right to marry and noting 
that “statutes against miscegenation . . . have also been defended on the ground that they save 
both races from deterioration, physical and moral”). This ideological shift was already 
underway by the mid-nineteenth century, when Bishop explained that “modern opinions” on 
incestuous marriage stressed “deterioration of the race” rather than “the quiet and accord of 
families, . . . female chastity, and . . . the formation of favorable alliances.” BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES (1st ed. 1852), supra note 47, at § 214.  
507 Some eugenicists preferred these methods over specifically marital regulation. One 
author proclaimed that “no cheap device of a law against marriage will take the place of 
compulsory segregation of gross defectives. They should be eliminated from the eugenic 
problem by segregation during the reproductive period, or by sterilization as a last resort.” 
Spencer, supra note 506, at 73; see also MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL 
TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 10–11 (1999) (counting “sexual 
segregation” as a primary goal of institutionalization). 
508 See Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
667, 676 (2016) (discussing laws forbidding epileptics to marry); Spencer, supra note 506, 
at 65–70 (discussing laws preventing “marriage of the unfit”). 
509 Gould v. Gould, 61 A. 604, 604, 608 (Conn. 1905).  
510 Id. at 604, 609.  
511 Id. at 613 (Hamersley, J., concurring in result) 
512 Id. at 604 (citations omitted) (majority opinion). 
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furnishes”).513 Justice Hamersley dissented from this portion of the decision, fearing 
that it conceded too broad a “legislative power . . . to exscind . . . persons from . . . 
the proper domain of individual right, namely, the natural right of marriage [and] 
the freedom of contract in the exercise of the right.”514 Although Hamersley agreed 
that all liberty is “protected by the Constitution from arbitrary invasion,” he also 
suggested, citing Lochner, that these particular “personal freedom[s]” were 
“guarantied” [sic] and could not be “destroyed by legislation merely because such 
destruction [is] deemed . . generally useful . . . .”515 
The “constitutional right of marriage” met with greater but still qualified 
success in Peterson v. Widule (1914), a challenge to Wisconsin’s “Eugenic Marriage 
Law.”516 Enacted in 1913, the measure required male applicants for a marriage 
license to submit a clean bill of venereal health and fixed at three dollars the 
maximum fee a doctor could charge for the necessary examinations.517 Pursuant to 
this provision, Alfred Peterson “presented himself to four physicians,” payment in 
hand, but was turned away each time.518 Three dollars, the doctors all explained, was 
“insufficient” to cover the “delicate and expensive . . . Wassermann test” that was 
“specially valuable if not practically indispensible” in detecting a certain type of 
syphilis.519 Unable to obtain a license, Peterson filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, 
“an unreasonable restriction upon the inalienable right of marriage.”520 The trial 
court agreed, finding a violation of “inherent rights” implicit in the state 
constitution’s explicit purpose to secure “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”521 On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded Peterson a 
narrower victory. It conceded that a law mandating the Wassermann test would lay 
“a practical embargo on marriage,” but, rather than assuming so “absolutely 
unreasonable” a legislative purpose, it interpreted the law to permit less costly 
procedures.522 Two dissenting judges refused to construe the statute so forgivingly 
                                                   
513 Id. at 604–05 (majority opinion). 
514 Id. at 612 (Hamersley, J., concurring in result). 
515 Id. at 612, 613 (citations omitted) (“[T]he nature and importance of the prohibition 
as related to the right it cripples or destroys must determine the validity of the act.”). 
516 Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 975 (Wis. 1914) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
517 Id. at 967–68 (majority opinion). 
518 Id. at 966–67. 
519 Id. at 967, 969, 970. 
520 Id. at 968. 
521 The trial court also held that the law violated “freedom of worship and liberty of 
conscience,” a conclusion that the state supreme court casually dismissed with the assertion 
that “no church . . . desires its ministers to profane the marriage tie by uniting a man afflicted 
with a loathsome disease to an innocent woman.” Id. at 971 (citing WIS. CONST., art. 1, § 1). 
This one-liner likely fails to convey the precise content of Peterson’s argument; a similar 
claim in Perez v. Lippold suggests one idea the plaintiff may have had in mind. See infra 
notes 554–558 and accompanying text. 
522 Regarding Peterson’s equal protection claim, the court concluded that requiring 
medical certifications from grooms but not from brides was justified by certain 
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and voted to hold it unconstitutional.523 “To marry is a natural right,” they argued, 
“guaranteed by the purpose and spirit of the constitution,” and the Eugenic Marriage 
Act “impose[d] such an oppressive burden” on that right “as to . . . destroy it.”524  
One more pre-Meyer case bears mention. Barrington v. Barrington (1917) 
involved an Alabama statute enacted in 1915 to authorize divorce “in favor of [any] 
wife” who lived five years “without support . . . and separate and apart from the 
husband”—a ground that, with patience and independent means, a woman could 
satisfy unilaterally, without any fault on her husband’s part.525 In 1916, pursuant to 
this provision, Mary Barrington secured a divorce. Her erstwhile husband then 
appealed, claiming violations of both due process and equal protection.526 The 
Alabama Supreme Court ruled in his favor, but it reached that result on statutory 
rather than constitutional grounds. It held that the 1915 law wasn’t retrospective and 
therefore that Mary shouldn’t have obtained a divorce based on a separation begun 
in 1911.527 Although this interpretation was sufficient to dispose of the case, two 
judges wrote concurrences airing their constitutional misgivings. Justice J.J. 
Mayfield endorsed the husband’s due process theory, stating, like Justice Story in 
Dartmouth College, that he was “not yet willing to hold that either the Legislature 
or a court can annul a marriage contract without any breach thereof . . . by one of 
the parties.”528 Justice William Thomas endorsed Barrington’s equal protection 
argument. In language that vacillated between low and high constitutional 
expectations, he called the statute’s sex-based “classification unreasonable, 
capricious, and arbitrary,” and he identified the interest at stake as “the natural right 
of marriage,” “a fundamental right . . . protected under the equality clause of the 
constitution.”529 
                                                   
“discreditable” conduct more prevalent among “the class of unmarried men.” Peterson, 147 
N.W. at 968, 969–70. 
523 Id. at 975–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
524 Id. A note in the Harvard Law Review that appeared between the two Peterson 
opinions enthusiastically endorsed legislation like Wisconsin’s on the condition that it 
“provide for [medical] examinations at the state’s expanse,” so as not “to deprive a healthy 
man of the right to marry merely because he is poorer than his fellows.” Note, 
Constitutionality of Eugenic Marriage Laws, 27 HARV. L. REV. 573, 574 (1914) (arguing 
that unaffordable requirements for marriage could “deprive [a poor person] wholly of the 
legal means of exercising an all-important function of mankind”). 
525 Barrington v. Barrington, 76 So. 81, 81 (Ala. 1917). 
526 Id. at 81–82. 
527 Id. 
528 Id. at 92; see also supra note 462 (discussing Justice Mayfield’s belief that, 
“abundant authority” to the contrary notwithstanding, the statute ought to be held to violate 
the Contracts Clause). 
529 Barrington, 76 So. at 93. Four years later, when the Barrington case resurfaced and 
the constitutional question was no longer avoidable, a majority of the Alabama Supreme 
Court found no violation of equal protection and said nothing about a fundamental or natural 
right to marry. The statute’s discrimination between husbands and wives, it said, was “the 
exercise of a permissible discretion, operating upon the moral, social, economical, and 
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In Gould, Peterson, and Barrington, we see a natural right to marry beginning 
to take constitutional form. In none of the three suits did a court majority invalidate 
a law on that ground, but at least one judge in each case would have done so, and 
only one judge in any of the cases (Peterson) openly doubted the marriage right’s 
constitutional stature.530 Every member of the Gould court signed on to one or 
another opinion explicitly acknowledging a fundamental right to marry, and at least 
three (maybe four) of the seven justices in Peterson were ready to strike Wisconsin’s 
Eugenic Marriage Law on that basis if the statute could not be interpreted to “save 
it from condemnation.”531 For a liberty whose constitutional status the U.S. Supreme 
Court had suggested only passingly in 1874, these pre-Meyer rulings of 1906, 1914, 
and 1917 were a pretty decent showing.  
The constitutionalization of the natural right to marry slowed considerably after 
Meyer. Doctrinally, this deceleration owed mainly to Buck v. Bell (1927), an 
infamously ugly decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that eugenic 
ends easily trump any right—none mentioned by name—that a “mental defective” 
might have against sterilization.532 After Buck, appeals to Meyer’s liberties “to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children” lost much of their promise, especially 
in contests over eugenic regulation, where, as we’ve seen, the most auspicious 
developments around those rights had taken place.533 Indeed, Buck dismissed with a 
sneer the argument that had seen the greatest traction in constitutional litigation 
against eugenic policies—namely, that states engaged in arbitrary classification and 
thereby violated equal protection when they took eugenic action only against 
individuals who were in state custody or otherwise institutionalized.534 In Smith v. 
Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded (1913), for example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the “particular vice” of that state’s sterilization law dealt 
its painful “remedy” to one of two “arbitrarily create[d] classes”: “epileptics . . . in 
charitable institutions” and “epileptics . . . not [so] confined.” Given the stature and 
magnitude of the personal liberty at stake, Smith explained, evenhanded regulation 
                                                   
physical differences which distinguish the sexes and divide them into natural classes, and 
which have always invited or demanded . . . many differences or inequalities in legislative 
treatment.” Barrington v. Barrington, 89 So. 512, 514 (Ala. 1921). 
530 In Peterson, a single justice appeared to doubt the premise that marriage is a 
constitutional right, but even this outlier was willing to “assum[e] for argument’s sake that” 
the “pursuit of happiness” mentioned in the state constitution “does guarantee . . . certain 
rights which the Legislature may not take away.” Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 973 
(Wis. 1914) (Timlin, J., concurring). 
531 Id. at 970. 
532 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). 
533 Davis v. Walton, 276 P. 921, 923 (Utah 1929) (calling Buck v. Bell “a complete 
answer” to the claim that the state’s sterilization law was “against the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
534 See Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 967 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1913); see also Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
101, 115 (2009) (calling the decline of this argument “the ultimate constitutional tragedy of 
the [Buck] opinion”). 
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was particularly important in this context: “When we consider that such [a law] 
necessarily involves . . . constitutional rights, it is not asking too much that [its end] 
. . . be accomplished, if at all, by a statute that does not deny to the persons 
injuriously affected the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution.”535  
To the extent that Smith and a handful of similar rulings enforced the equality 
principle more stringently than usual because of the substantive “constitutional 
rights” at stake,536 they prefigured what would become known as the “fundamental-
interest” branch of equal protection jurisprudence. As Gerald Gunther described it 
in 1969, this doctrine was a “resurrection” of the kind of “aggressive judicial review 
. . . reflected in . . . Lochner,” except that it involved specially important “personal 
interests” (as opposed to “economic concerns”) and was presented “under the guise 
of equal protection rather than substantive due process.”537 Like later scholars, 
Gunther cited Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) as the inaugural decision in this line of 
cases.538 
 
B.  From Skinner to Loving 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Skinner about a month after the United 
States entered World War II.539 By that point, in the brutal light of Nazism, the 
eugenic vocabulary employed so enthusiastically in Buck v. Bell—“defective,” 
“degenerate,” “socially inadequate,” “manifestly unfit”—sounded more sinister to a 
greater swath of the American public.540 This cultural shift goes far in explaining 
why the 8-to-1 majority permitting Carrie Buck’s salpingectomy in 1927 gave way, 
fifteen years later, to a unanimous rejection of Oklahoma’s power to subject Jack 
Skinner to a vasectomy.541 
The specific law at issue in Skinner provided for sterilization of “habitual 
criminal[s]” who had committed “felonies involving moral turpitude.”542 As defined 
by Oklahoma, such felonies included armed robbery and chicken stealing (Jack 
                                                   
535 Id.  
536 See Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 166 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. 1918); Osborn v. 
Thomson, 103 N.Y.S. 638, 645 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Cline v. State Bd. of Eugenics, No. 15,442 
(Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1921), reprinted in HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL 
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 287–88 (1922). 
537 Gerald Gunther, Standards of Review, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1076, 1128–31 (1969).  
538 Id. at 1130, 1131; see also Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 28 (1972) (dubbing Skinner “the grandfather of fundamental interest equal protection 
cases”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1388 (calling Skinner “arguably the first decision” 
in “the fundamental interest branch of equal protection law”). 
539 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
540 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927). 
541 VICTORIA NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS 111–34 (2008). 
542 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.  
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Skinner’s offenses), but they did not include, for instance, embezzlement, though 
that too was a theft and a felony.543 As Justice William Douglas put it, the law laid 
“an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of 
offense.”544 Therefore it violated the Constitution no less “than if it had selected a 
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”545  
As in the Smith case discussed in the previous section, Skinner’s holding was 
unambiguously rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, but its reasoning seemed to 
lean only more heavily on the “fundamental” interests at stake: “marriage and 
procreation.”546 “Strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a 
sterilization law is essential,” Justice Douglas wrote, because such “legislation . . . 
involves one of the basic civil rights of man,” a “sensitive and important area of 
human rights,” “a basic liberty,” “the right to have offspring.”547 Only Chief Justice 
Harlan Stone declined to endorse Douglas’s analysis, preferring to strike the law as 
a violation of due process—procedural, not substantive.548 Also concurring 
separately, Justice Robert Jackson backed both opinions and hinted at a third 
rationale, albeit without abandoning the language of invidious classification. “There 
are limits” he noted, “on the power of a legislatively represented majority . . . to 
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and 
natural powers of a minority—even those who have been guilty of what the majority 
define as crimes.”549 Jackson’s concurrence “reserved judgment” on just what those 
limits might be, but he flagged the issue to preempt any “implication that such a 
question may not exist because not discussed.”550  
Skinner was a milestone for the natural right to procreate—and, derivatively, 
for the natural right to marry.551 True, the decision specifically preserved Buck v. 
Bell, eschewed any mention of Meyer v. Nebraska, and lodged its own holding in 
the constitutional command of equality, not liberty.552 Yet its repeated references to 
these “basic . . . rights of man” added more than rhetorical flourish; they fairly 
described the interests at stake and significantly, perhaps decisively, shaped the 
Court’s standard of review—“strict scrutiny,” the Court called it.553 
                                                   
543 Id. at 541. 
544 Id. 
545 Id. 
546 Id. For a discussion of Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913), see supra notes 533–535 and accompanying text. 
547 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536, 541. 
548 Id. at 543. 
549 Id. at 546–47 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
550 Id. 
551 See Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1351 (2010) (situating Skinner within “the history of the origins 
of the right to marry”).  
552 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–43. 
553 Interestingly, the phrase “strict scrutiny,” in its modern constitutional sense, wasn’t 
uttered again by a Supreme Court Justice until two other cases involving marriage and 
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Six years later, in Perez v. Lippold (1948), an interracial couple drew shrewd 
analogies between Oklahoma’s defunct sterilization policy and California’s 
proscription of “marriages of white persons with negroes, Mongolians, members of 
the Malay race, or mulattoes.”554 Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis argued that both 
laws pursued “the same result”—eugenic selection; and, as “two decent citizens,” 
they asked to be afforded no less “solicitude” than the Skinner Court had shown a 
“habitual criminal.”555 “The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,” they 
claimed, “includes the right of the individual to marry. Marriage is a natural right.”556 
By a four-to-three vote, the California Supreme Court held that state’s 
miscegenation law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a separate concurrence declaring that 
marriage is “grounded in the fundamental principles of Christianity,” Justice 
Douglas Edmonds also found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.557 This last ground, forcefully urged by plaintiffs’ counsel, was 
predicated on their shared Roman Catholic faith, whose canonical rules on marriage 
formation were indifferent to race.558 It was a weak argument, foreclosed by the 
Reynolds decision on Mormon polygamy,559 but it carried a moral if not legal force 
that time has understandably obscured. In 1948, Perez and Davis couldn’t have 
partaken of the sacrament of marriage—neither its ecclesiastical solemnization nor 
its one-flesh union—without the state’s blessing. As Justice Roger Traynor’s 
majority opinion perceived, plaintiffs’ claim of religious freedom was more properly 
a claim of freedom to marry.560 
Conceding marriage’s place among the natural rights of humanity, the State of 
California asserted in Perez a prerogative to “interfere with the exercise of [those] 
rights” when doing so might avoid “the conception of defective or socially 
                                                   
reproduction. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (White, J., 
concurring) (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541). 
554 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948). 
555 Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 421, at 31. 
556 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2, 6, Perez, 198 P.2d 17 (No. 20305) (calling the 
challenged law “an interference with [plaintiffs’] natural right to marry”). 
557 Perez, 198 P.2d at 34 (Edmonds, J., concurring). 
558 Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
559 See supra notes 487–490 and accompanying text. 
560 “If the miscegenation law . . . is directed at a social evil and employs a reasonable 
means to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of its incidental effect upon . . . particular 
religious groups. If, on the other hand, the law is discriminatory and irrational, it 
unconstitutionally restricts not only religious liberty but the liberty to marry as well.” Perez, 
198 P.2d at 18. The closing “as well” here suggests that the court, perhaps for reasons of 
delicacy and collegiality, shied away from entirely or at least overtly rejecting the free 
exercise argument even though the preceding sentence necessarily (but implicitly) excluded 
it. 
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maladjusted offspring.”561 The State argued that the case should be controlled by 
Pace v. Alabama (1882), where the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a law making 
extramarital sex between persons of the same race a misdemeanor while punishing 
as a felony identical conduct between blacks and whites.562 Without accepting Pace 
as good law, Justice Traynor dismissed the precedent as irrelevant because “adultery 
and non-marital intercourse are not, like marriage, a basic right.”563 That right, he 
said, encompassed what earlier discussions of natural law had posited rarely or else 
tacitly: “the right to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice.”564 At one 
point, he even called such choice “the essence of the right to marry.”565 Rebutting 
the argument that racial segregation in marriage was no less constitutional than 
“segregation in . . . common carriers and schools”—Plessy v. Ferguson, remember, 
was still viable precedent in 1948—Traynor deemed the separate-but-equal principle 
inapplicable to the case before him because “human beings” are not “as 
interchangeable as trains.”566 A man who “find[s] himself barred from marrying the 
person of his choice” is denied what “to him may be irreplaceable.”567  
Perez, then, left no doubt about the existence of a constitutional right to marry, 
nor about the aspect of that right—spousal choice—most acutely constrained by 
California’s law against interracial marriage. The ruling was similarly 
straightforward about the right’s textual basis in the “liberty” secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and about its sufficiency as an independent ground of 
decision.568 Moreover, this “fundamental right of free men” triggered heightened 
scrutiny not only under the doctrine of “substantive due process” and (à la Skinner) 
under the Equal Protection Clause, it also demanded more scrupulous adherence to 
the constitutional guarantee of fair notice. In view of the difficulty of precisely 
defining and consistently applying the challenged racial classifications (“white,” 
“negro,” “Malay,” etc.), the Court concluded that, “even if a state could restrict the 
right to marry upon the basis of race alone,” California’s statute would still be “too 
vague and uncertain to constitute valid regulation. A certain precision is 
essential . . . in regulating a fundamental right.”569 
                                                   
561 Return by Way of Demurrer at 10–11, Perez v. Moroney, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), sub 
nom. Perez v. Lippold, Perez v. Sharp; see also Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing at 3, 
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), sub nom. Perez v. Sharp (agreeing that marriage “is a 
fundamental right of free men” but denying that this “attribute[] . . . bring[s] it within the 
scope of . . . constitutional provisions relating to religious freedom.”). 
562 Perez, 198 P.2d at 26 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883)). 
563 Perez, 198 P.2d at 26. 
564 Id. at 19. “Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of 
one’s choice, a statute that prohibits . . . marrying a member of a[nother] race . . . restricts . . . 
choice . . . and thereby restricts [the] right to marry.” Id. 
565 Id. at 21. 
566 Id. at 25. 
567 Id. 
568 Id. at 19–21, 29. 
569 Id. at 27. 
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In the nearly two decades between Perez and Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused several opportunities to review decisions upholding interracial marriage 
bans.570 But it changed the constitutional law of marriage on other controversial 
questions. One line of cases, involving migratory divorce, actually predated Perez. 
After Williams v. North Carolina (1942) curtailed what little room states had under 
the Due Process Clause to refuse full faith and credit to foreign divorce decrees,571 
Sherrer v. Sherrer (1948) and Johnson v. Muelberger (1953) eliminated that 
freedom entirely in cases where both spouses had participated in the divorce 
proceedings.572 Together these cases allowed married people to decide for 
themselves “which jurisdiction would control their marital status”; and in Ann 
Laquer Estin’s astute observation, the decisions “fundamentally altered state power 
to set the normative boundaries of family life.”573 Divorce by mutual consent, once 
the bogeyman of Joseph Story’s concurrence in Dartmouth College, now enjoyed a 
degree of constitutional protection. Estin suggests that Williams, Sherrer, and 
Johnson located in “the interstices of the Full Faith and Credit Clause” a new, 
“individual right” of marital self-determination—and that assessment seems right.574 
But to be clear, this right was contingent—not, or not yet, fundamental. Married 
couples were still at the mercy of legislative decisions about which divorce grounds 
to authorize, what procedures to institute, how long a residency to require, and 
whether, indeed, to permit divorce at all.575  
                                                   
570 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (justifying denial of certiorari by 
reference to an insufficient record and an incomplete presentation of relevant issues); 
Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954) (denying certiorari without explanation); Monks 
v. Lee, 317 U.S. 590 (1942) (denying certiorari due to untimely appeal). Archival research 
has revealed another dodge: McLaughlin v. Florida, 377 U.S. 974 (1964), which invalidated 
a criminal statute imposing special punishment on interracial couples who cohabited outside 
of marriage. In early deliberations on the case, at least five Justices believed it was proper if 
not necessary to “reach the anti-miscegenation issue.” See Rebecca Schoff, Note, Deciding 
on Doctrine: Anti-Miscegenation Statutes and the Development of Equal Protection 
Analysis, 95 VA. L. REV. 627, 646–47 (2009). 
571 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (overruling Haddock v. Haddock, 
201 U.S. 562, 570 (1906), which had permitted states to ignore foreign divorces obtained by 
a party who had “wrongfully” abandoned the shared marital domicile). 
572 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (prohibiting either party to a divorce from 
attacking the decree on jurisdictional grounds if both had participated in the proceedings); 
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (extending Sherrer’s holding to attacks by third 
parties).  
573 Estin, supra note 416, at 383. 
574 Id. (arguing that these later migratory divorce cases “anticipate[d]” future decades’ 
“more extensive infusion of constitutional principles into family law”). 
575 The last state to introduce divorce was South Carolina in 1949. Kellen Funk, “Let 
No Man Put Asunder”: South Carolina’s Law of Divorce, 1895–1950, S.C. HIST. MAG., 
July–Oct. 2009, at 134. 
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Compared to the migratory divorce rulings of midcentury, Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965)576 and its harbinger Poe v. Ullman (1961)577 produced a more 
memorable but ultimately more fragile shift in marriage’s pre-Loving constitutional 
position. Plaintiffs in both cases claimed that it was unconstitutional for Connecticut 
to forbid married couples to use contraception.578 Poe avoided the question on 
justiciability grounds, with Justices William Douglas and John Marshall Harlan 
arguing in separate dissents that the challenged statute violated a “right of 
privacy . . . implicit in a free society” and embedded in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.579 When the full Court finally reached the merits in 
Griswold, Justice Douglas wrote a majority opinion deriving that privacy right from 
“penumbras” of more “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”580 Justice Harlan, 
now concurring, stayed true to the substantive due process theory he had advocated 
in Poe (and that prevailed soon enough in Roe v. Wade).581  
On either theory—penumbras or due process—Griswold was a momentous 
ruling. Substantively, it was the first Supreme Court case to extend the evolving right 
of privacy to matters of sex and reproduction.582 Methodologically, it reaffirmed (or 
revived from Lochnerian ignominy) the Court’s “authority to strike down . . . 
legislation which . . . violates ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice.’”583 
Dissenting in Griswold, Justice Hugo Black decried the majority’s divination of 
constitutional rules from “subjective considerations of ‘natural justice’” and 
“mysterious and uncertain natural law concepts.”584 The objection pertained to 
method, but its irony owed to Griswold’s substance. Like the conceit of “marital 
privacy” in which it was enveloped, Griswold’s spousal prerogative to engage in 
purposely nonprocreative sex wasn’t one traditionally recognized by natural law. 
Classical discussions of natural marriage made as much provision for marital 
contraception as they did for marital sodomy—which is to say, none.585 To the extent 
                                                   
576 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
577 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
578 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86; Poe, 367 U.S. at 500. 
579 Poe, 367 U.S. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to “the right of ‘privacy’”); 
id. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
580 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483–85, 487. 
581 410 U.S. 113, 154, 164 (1973); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., 
concurring) (relying on substantive due process). 
582 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion). 
583 Id. at 512, 514, 518–19, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice 
Goldberg’s concurrence and decrying the Court’s reliance on “natural law due process 
philosophy,” “mysterious and uncertain natural law concepts,” and “subjective 
considerations of ‘natural justice’”). 
584 Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). “Natural law due process philosophy,” though 
clunky, was Black’s favored epithet. Id. at 511 n.3, 515, 516, 517 n.10, 524, 527 n.23. 
585 For an extremely rare and predictably unsuccessful claim of such a right, see State 
v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (Conn. 1940) (rejecting defendants’ argument “that people have 
a natural right ‘to decide whether or not they shall have children’ and a concomitant right to 
use contraceptives”). 
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the subject was raised at all, using “devices to prevent the birth of children” was 
considered “contrary to the natural law.”586 
Even as Griswold identified a constitutional right where no natural right had 
been, the decision did chime faintly with natural law’s designation of (hetero)sexual 
indulgence as a primary purpose of marriage—and one distinct from procreation. 
Nature, recall, was said to have instituted marriage not only to order human 
procreation but “to remedy and avert loose-living and concupiscence.”587 The 
elderly could marry in accordance with nature; and in some circumstances, so could 
people unable to beget children for other reasons. Griswold evinced respect for this 
dimension of natural marriage. With righteous delicacy, the majority Justices gave 
constitutional sanctuary to sex for its own sake—though no further, they all insisted, 
than what Justice Douglas called the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.”588 
Decided two years before Loving by a nearly identical Court,589 Griswold 
attests to an intense and perhaps defensive loyalty to the traditional model of natural 
marriage. A conventional, conservative, and conjugal ideal was no mere background 
assumption in Griswold; it was the decision’s dispositive and limiting principle. 
According to Justice Douglas, Connecticut’s law was different from regulations 
dealing with “economic” and other “social conditions” because it interfered 
“directly” in the “relation of husband and wife,” a relation “intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.”590 Reciting Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe, Justice Arthur Goldberg 
“found it difficult to imagine what is more private and more intimate than a husband 
                                                   
586 Hafner v. Hafner, 66 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1946). This precept was strongly 
associated with Christian and especially Catholic doctrine, whose expositors more than 
adequately compensated for the reticence of ostensibly secular jurisprudes. See, e.g., 
GERMAIN GABRIEL GRISEZ, CONTRACEPTION AND THE NATURAL LAW (1964) (arguing that 
contraception is immoral because it violates a basic moral principle); Noonan, Tokos and 
Atokion, supra note 163.  
587 JOSEPH JACKSON, THE FORMATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 20 (2d ed., 
1969) (describing Christian teaching on marriage’s “essential function as an institution” in 
light of the Pauline admonition that “[i]t is better to marry than to burn”); see also supra 
notes 165–168 and accompanying text. 
588 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). This sanctuary was cramped. 
The majority implied that there was a constitutionally salient difference between statutes 
prohibiting marital use and marital purchase of contraceptives, see id. at 485–86, and Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Poe noted that a state could legislate its moral disapproval of marital 
contraception through less restrictive means, such as “tax benefits and subsidies for large 
families,” rules providing for annulment of “a marriage in which only contraceptive relations 
had taken place,” and laws making “use of contraceptives . . . a ground for divorce.” See Poe 
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 533, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
589 Justice Abe Fortas replaced Justice Arthur Goldberg about three months after 
Griswold was decided. See Arthur J. Goldberg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/arthur 
_j_goldberg [https://perma.cc/3KVX-33UL] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019); Abe Fortas, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/abe_fortas [https://perma.cc/L6DG-UV2Y] (last visited Aug. 
5, 2019). 
590 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481, 482, 486. 
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and wife’s marital relations.”591 Obviously, “marital fidelity” had a claim that 
“sexual promiscuity and misconduct” did not: “Adultery, homosexuality and the like 
are . . . intimacies which the State forbids . . . , but the intimacy of husband and wife 
is necessarily an essential . . . feature of . . . marriage, an institution which the State 
not only must allow, but . . . in every age . . . has fostered and protected.”592 
For the most part, Justice Harlan didn’t bother to rehearse in Griswold 
arguments he had set forth at admittedly “unusual length” four years earlier.593 One 
can easily see why. Every member of the Griswold majority seemed to endorse his 
characterization of the constitutional harm that Connecticut’s criminal law inflicted: 
an invasion of the sole space in which, by that law’s own precepts, “the sexual 
powers may be used.”594 Taken at their word, Harlan’s seemed to understand and 
agree that the legal structures “confining sexuality to lawful marriage form a pattern 
so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine 
in this area must build upon that basis.”595  
It was not to be. 
 
IV.  FROM LOVING TO LAWRENCE 
 
A.  Loving’s Natural Right to Marry 
 
During and after Reconstruction, legal challenges to interracial marriage bans 
invoked a broad, natural right to contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and specifically enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.596 In Loving v. Virginia, 
that argument barely surfaced. Richard and Mildred Loving’s brief seeking certiorari 
from the Supreme Court contained a pithily stated claim, dropped from subsequent 
filings, that they were “denied the right ‘to make and enforce contracts.’”597 Except 
for a single question at oral argument from Justice Potter Stewart (“You’re arguing 
                                                   
591 Id. at 495 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 551–52 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
592 “It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality 
. . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage 
and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the 
details of that intimacy.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
593 Poe, 367 U.S. at 523. 
594 Id. at 548 (protesting the contraception statute’s intrusion into couples’ “private use 
of their marital relations.”); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502–03 (Byron, J., concurring) 
(including “the right . . . to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship” 
among “the freedoms of married persons”). 
595 Poe, 367 U.S. at 545. 
596 See supra notes 327–330 and accompanying text. 
597 Jurisdictional Statement at 17, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 
1966 WL 115359 at *17. 
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complete freedom to contract, aren’t you, under the Due Process Clause?”), an 
undifferentiated, Lochner-style freedom of contract did not reappear in the case.598 
The Loving plaintiffs had more to say—in substance, certainly, and at one point 
in name—about Virginia’s incursion onto the “natural right” to marry.599 Their main 
authorities for this “basic [and] fundamental” entitlement were the twentieth-century 
cases surveyed in Part III. Mildred and Richard Loving claimed the conjugal 
prerogatives of marriage mentioned in Meyer v. Nebraska and Skinner v. 
Oklahoma.600 They claimed what the California Supreme Court’s Perez decision had 
called “the right to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice.”601 And, more 
tentatively, they claimed the right or rights of marital privacy newly minted in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.602  
In a savvy reversal of conventional wisdom, an amicus brief filed by the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund called “laws against interracial marriage the weakest, 
not the strongest, of the segregation laws,” because “they intrude a racist dogma into 
the private and personal relationship of marriage,” thereby violating the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.603 The Japanese American Citizens League went further, asserting “that even 
under the now-rejected ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,” the 
“vitally personal right . . . to marry” is so “basic,” so “fundamental,” that it “could 
not be abrogated” by prohibitions of interracial marriage.604 Invoking not only dicta 
from Meyer and Skinner, but also “the right to marry and to found family” named in 
                                                   
598 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 
https://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/loving-v.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F5L-
6S6H] [hereinafter Loving Oral Argument].  
599 Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 15–16 (noting that “marriage is such a 
basic, fundamental, and natural right . . . that the choice of a mate must be left to one’s own 
desires and conscience”). 
600 Id. at 16 (invoking Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) and Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 
as Amicus Curiae at 9–10, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter 
NAACP LDF Brief] (same); Brief of Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae 
at 7–9, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter JACL Brief] (same); 
Brief Urging Reversal, on Behalf of Bishop John J. Russell et al. as Amicus Curiae at 6, 20–
21, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Catholic Bishops’ Brief] 
(same). 
601 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948); see also Jurisdictional Statement, 
supra note 597, at 15 (invoking Perez); Brief for Appellants at 38, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Appellant Brief] (same); NAACP LDF Brief, supra note 
600, at 3 (same); Catholic Bishops’ Brief, supra note 600 at 17–18, 21 (same); JACL Brief, 
supra note 600, at 9 (same). 
602 Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 3, 17 (invoking Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Appellant Brief, supra note 601, at 38–39 (same); NAACP LDF Brief, 
supra note 600, at 9 (same); JACL Brief, supra note 600, at 3, 9 (same). 
603 NAACP LDF Brief, supra note 600, at 14–15. 
604 JACL Brief, supra note 600, at 9–11. 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two Roman Catholic organizations and 
sixteen southern bishops argued that laws proscribing “marriage between persons of 
different race . . . deny to such persons the right to beget children, . . . one of the 
chief lawful rights in marriage,” and therefore “contravene a fundamental liberty 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”605 In their own 
briefs, the Lovings cast their right to marry as a “‘liberty’ . . . protected by the due 
process clause” and, more speculatively, by some or all of Griswold’s constitutional 
potpourri.606 
Overall, however, right-to-marry arguments were ancillary to the Lovings’ 
main grievance against Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act.” By far the greater part of 
their challenge was staked and fought on the terrain of equal protection, as the 
couple’s counsel haltingly—and, it would seem, apprehensively—assured the Court 
at oral argument. On the heels of Justice Stewart’s question about “complete 
freedom of contract . . . under the Due Process Clause,” attorney Bernard Cohen 
pivoted back to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “protect[ion] against racial 
discrimination,” which he considered his strongest argument.607 He then confessed: 
“I do not think that the other arguments are completely invalid. I—I don’t even know 
if the Court ever has to reach them.”608 Indeed it did not. By 1967, the Equal 
Protection Clause had developed into a crushingly effective weapon against Jim 
Crow.609 Anyone following the logic of the Court’s decisions from Brown v. Board 
                                                   
605 “Such persons may have children only if they are willing to pay the penalty of having 
them legally denominated as bastards.” Catholic Bishops’ Brief, supra note 600, at 20; see 
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810, art. 16 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
606 See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 597, at 15–17 (citing Griswold and claiming 
violations of the “right of privacy,” the “liberty retained by the people” via the Ninth 
Amendment, “freedom of association under the First Amendment,” and “penumbras formed 
by emanations” of “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights”); Appellant Brief, supra note 
601, at 38–39 (citing Griswold and claiming violations of the “right of privacy” and “freedom 
of association”); see also Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598, at 6 (invoking Griswold 
and claiming a violation of the Ninth Amendment). 
607 Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598, at 7. 
608 Id. 
609 See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756–57 (1966) (holding that even 
minimal state participation in a conspiracy to perpetrate discrimination “[b]y causing the 
arrest of Negroes by means of false [criminal] reports” violated the Equal Protection Clause); 
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135, 137 (1964) (holding under the Equal Protection 
Clause that arrests by a state deputy acting under his own authority constituted impermissible 
state action enforcing segregation); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–69 (1964) 
(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require that state legislative districts be equal in 
population); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (concluding that a local 
government violated equal protection when it closed public schools for the express purpose 
of avoiding desegregation); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (holding that racial 
segregation in courtrooms violated equal protection); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 
539 (1963) (holding that racial segregation of public parks violated equal protection); Turner 
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of Education (1954) to McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) could have predicted that 
miscegenation laws’ days were numbered.610 The real question at that point was 
whether Loving could be decided on any ground other than equality. No matter who 
articulated them—the NAACP, the Catholic bishops, the Japanese Citizens League, 
the plaintiffs themselves—claims about Virginia’s infringement of fundamental 
liberty invariably devolved into arguments about the arbitrariness and irrationality 
of the racial classification employed to constrain the right’s exercise.611 
Although the Supreme Court embraced the Lovings’ substantive due process 
claim, it too subordinated that rationale to the principle of equality. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren’s majority opinion—joined by all but Justice Stewart, who filed a two-
line concurrence rejecting any law that makes “the criminality of an act depend upon 
the race of the actor”—consisted of two parts.612 The first, comprising roughly ninety 
percent of the Court’s analysis, explained why interracial marriage bans are 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.613 The remaining ten percent, 
which had been significantly trimmed after several Justices professed to see “no 
reason” to include it at all, held that Virginia’s law “also deprive the Lovings of 
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”614 The remainder of the relevant passage is sufficiently 
terse to be quoted in full: 
 
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.  
                                                   
v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353–54 (1962) (holding that racial segregation in municipal 
airport restaurant violated equal protection); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 
(1960) (construing the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit states from drawing electoral 
district boundaries to disenfranchise black voters). 
610 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword, “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 n.5 (1967) (calling Loving the 
“expectable result” of a “process” begun in Brown). The sense of expectation is palpable, for 
example, in Edmund L. Walton, Jr., The Present Status of Miscegenation Statutes, 4 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 28 (1963) and Lee M. Miller, Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes – 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 25 MD. L. REV. 41 (1965). 
611 See supra notes 597–602 and accompanying text. 
612 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
613 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–13. 
614 Id. at 12. Responding to an early draft, Justice Hugo Black wrote: “I heartily agree 
with the equal protection part . . . but having decided the whole case there I see no reason for 
adding what follows. The case comes so fully under equal protection that I think [that] should 
end it. Besides there are statements in the due process part with which I would not agree.” 
Justice Byron White likewise told the Chief Justice that he saw “no reason to reach the due 
process question.” See Hugo L. Black, Draft Opinion (May 31, 1967) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Earl Warren Papers, Box 620); Draft Opinion 
Letter from Byron White to Earl Warren (May 31, 1967) (same). 
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Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our 
very existence and survival. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly 
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without 
due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom 
of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State.615 
 
Behold how swiftly invidious classification and discrimination reenter the 
Court’s discussion.616After declaring an independent violation of the fundamental 
“freedom to marry,” the decision “slips right back into equality rationales.”617 Count 
one reason, other than sheer brevity, to look askance at this portion of the opinion. 
The Court’s use of precedent is another. Citing Skinner and Maynard, respectively 
decided under the Equal Protection and Contracts Clauses, Chief Justice Warren 
ignored Meyer and Griswold, the only twentieth-century cases in which the Court 
had derived substantive marital rights from the Due Process Clause.618 The reference 
to Maynard is especially strange. Presumably it was meant to evoke Justice Field’s 
deathless pronouncement that marriage has “more to do with the morals and 
civilization of a people than any other institution,” as if this statement—and the 
affirmation of legislative supremacy that immediately followed it—had not served 
for eighty years to shield miscegenation laws from constitutional attack.619 
Despite the decision’s oddities, early legal commentary on Loving evinced little 
surprise at the Court’s near-unanimous enforcement of an unenumerated, 
substantive entitlement pertaining to marriage—just the kind of right that had moved 
                                                   
615 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
616 The paragraphs are consistent with Justice White’s advice to the Chief Justice: “If 
the statute satisfied the Equal Protection Clause, I would not hold it a violation of due process 
as ‘arbitrary.’ On the other hand, since it does not meet equal protection standards, it may 
automatically be a violation of due process also.” Letter from Byron White to Earl Warren, 
supra note 614. 
617 Sasha Volokh, Is Marriage Really a Liberty Right?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 
2015), http://reason.com/volokh/2015/06/26/is-marriage-really-a-liberty-r [https://perma.cc/ 
2DTB-GWK4]; see also Jane C. Atkinson, Califano v. Jobst, Zablocki v. Redhail, and the 
Fundamental Right to Marry, 18 J. FAM. L. 587, 594 (1979) (remarking how “easily [one] 
could argue that the right to marry is so interrelated with the question of racial classifications 
in Loving as to be merely dicta”). 
618 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
619 See supra note 332 and accompanying text. 
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the Justices to such passionate disagreement only three years earlier in Griswold.620 
To both the Court and its audiences, Loving’s “right to marry” struck a wholly 
different note than Griswold’s “right of marital privacy.” One idea was directly 
traceable through centuries of legal thought; the other was yesterday’s coinage. 
 
B.  Decline and Fall 
 
For all of its doctrinal audacity, Griswold v. Connecticut was premised no less 
than Loving on an age-old conception of marriage that lived most pristinely in 
natural law. At that conception’s center, the human relationship to which all other 
aspects of the right to marry referred, was a tightly circumscribed conjugality.621 
This was the “essential” and “sacred” prerogative that Connecticut claimed the 
power to “invade” in Griswold.622 This is what Virginia sought to deprive couples 
like Richard and Mildred Loving, and why the deprivation was so cruel. The 
Lovings’ desire to wed had little if anything to do with government benefits, marital 
property rules, or any of civil marriage’s myriad and variable incidents.623 What they 
                                                   
620 Some commentators had forecasted Loving’s due-process holding and, after the fact, 
most commentators noted it offhandedly (if they mentioned it at all). For scholarly 
anticipations of this portion of the decision, see David E. Seidelson, Miscegenation Statutes 
and the Supreme Court: A Brief Prediction of What the Court Will Do and Why, 15 
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 156, 160, 162, 165–66 (1966); Miller, supra note 610, 41, 43–44, n.20, 
n.24; Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in 
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1966) (noting that the Court had already 
described “marriage in terms of a right” in Meyer, Skinner, and Griswold). For examples of 
scholarly nonchalance about Loving’s resort to substantive due process, see W.M. Bonesio, 
Marriage and Divorce Under the Texas Family Code, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 100, 104 (1970–
1971); Donald W. Merritt, Recent Cases: Constitutional Law—Anti-Miscegenation Statutes 
Held to Violate Equal Protection and Due Process, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 511 (1968); 
Sidney L. Moore, Constitutional Law—Civil Rights—State Anti-Miscegenation Statutes 
Banned, 19 MERCER L. REV. 255, 255 (1968); George Schuhmann, Miscegenation: An 
Example of Judicial Recidivism, 8 J. FAM. L. 69, 77 (1968). See also Homer H. Clark, The 
New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 445 (1975–1976) (including Loving’s 
characterization of marriage as a fundamental right among “statements of a traditional kind” 
about the institution). For two unusually animated reactions to Loving’s right-to-marry 
holding, see Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 358, 368 (1968) (asserting the longevity of Americans’ “conviction that the freedom to 
marry the person of one’s choice is . . . so basic that no law should restrict or delay its 
fulfillment” and speculating that Loving might “stimulate litigation” over “legal restrictions 
on th[is] freedom”) and Foster, supra note 366, at 52 (crediting Griswold and Loving with 
“challeng[ing]” courts’ longtime deference to regulations of marital status, but doubting that 
marriage, qua “status,” is “a constitutional right in the sense that free speech and . . . freedom 
of religion . . . are constitutionally guaranteed rights”). 
621 See infra Parts I and II(A). 
622 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486, 499 (1965). 
623 Richard Loving famously advised his attorney, “Tell the Court I love my wife, and 
it is just unfair that I can’t live with her in Virginia.” Loving Oral Argument, supra note 598, 
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sought was, or then seemed, eternally necessary and unique to the institution: the 
right to share a home and a bed, and the opportunity to parent legitimate offspring.624 
Hence a federal district court’s determination only six years later that Loving gave 
individuals imprisoned for life no basis to challenge regulations forbidding them to 
marry: “Those aspects of marriage which make it ‘one of the basic civil rights of 
man’—cohabitation, sexual intercourse, and the begetting and raising of children—
are unavailable to [prisoners] in [that] situation . . . .”625 
The Lovings’ liberty claim under the Due Process Clause was intelligible in 
1967 because the Court and much of its public still imagined civil marriage’s 
defining attributes to be those of natural marriage. And so they were, legally, in the 
vast majority of states. But the resemblance was fading fast. In 1955, a draft of the 
American Law Institute’s much-anticipated Model Penal Code had advocated 
“removing adultery and fornication entirely from the area of criminality.”626 State 
legislatures began implementing this guidance in 1961,627 repealing prohibitions of 
fornication, adultery, and sodomy that, if not totally moribund, were drastically 
unenforced.628 Spurred by rapidly changing moral norms, social practices, and 
                                                   
at 9. For accounts of the Lovings’ relationship, see THE LOVING STORY (Icarus Films 2011); 
CHERYL CASHIN, LOVING: INTERRACIAL INTIMACY IN AMERICA AND THE THREAT TO WHITE 
SUPREMACY 100–19 (2017); PETER WALLERSTEIN, RACE, SEX, AND THE FREEDOM TO 
MARRY: LOVING V. VIRGINIA (2014); Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical 
Assessment and Personal Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOWARD L.J. 229 (1998). 
624 As Michigan’s Attorney General tried to explain in defense of that state’s same-sex 
marriage ban, “in Loving, if the couple could not get married, they could not . . . enjoy private 
intimacy at all because it was subject to criminal prosecution and jail time.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 77, Obergefell v. Hodges, 173 S. Ct. 1732 (2015) (No. 14-556). 
625 Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The U.S. Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed Johnson in Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974). In Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987), the Court stood by that affirmance but held that prisoners 
generally retain the right to marry when “the limitations imposed by prison life” make sexual 
relations impossible. On one hand, Turner expressly declined to endorse Johnson’s rationale; 
on the other hand, it saw fit to mention that “most inmate marriages are formed in the 
expectation that they will ultimately be fully consummated.” 
626 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, n.1 (AM. L. INST., Tent. Draft No. 4), April 25, 1955; 
see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 145–46 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft), May 4, 
1962 (recommending decriminalization of “private homosexuality not involving force, 
imposition or corruption of the young”). 
627 Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007) (discussing law reform based on tentative 
drafts of the MPC and the “host of . . . recodifications” that followed the Code’s formal 
promulgation in 1962).  
628 See MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments on Article 207 – Sexual Offenses 12, 13, 18 
(AM. L. INST., Council Draft No. 8) 1955 (finding “no need to retain dead-letter adultery and 
fornication statutes”). 
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political conditions, this wave of statutory reform only intensified in the decade after 
Loving.629  
By the time the Supreme Court next held a state law to violate the constitutional 
right to marry, that tribunal had done much to help the Sexual Revolution along. 
Even as it ruled in Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) that the State of Wisconsin couldn’t 
condition a marriage license on applicants’ fulfillment of child-support 
obligations,630 the Court’s own recent decisions had drastically undermined the 
once-exclusive claim to legitimate sex and procreation that had made license to 
marry so crucial. Less than a year after Loving, Levy v. Louisiana (1968) became the 
first in a line of cases establishing illegitimacy as a presumptively invidious 
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.631 In the same month that 
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) extended Griswold’s marital privacy right to nonmarital 
couples, again under the Equal Protection Clause,632 Boddie v. Connecticut at least 
glanced toward—on some readings required—a right, of all things, to divorce.633 
And between 1968 and 1978, the Court invalidated a range of gender-based 
distinctions in marriage and family law,634 announced a right to abortion,635 and 
afforded limited protection to individuals’ choices about whether and with whom to 
cohabit.636 
                                                   
629 Robinson & Dubber, supra note 627, at 326; see also Brief of the CATO Inst. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 
02-102) (noting eighteen legalizations of consensual sodomy between 1969 and 1976). The 
trend was hardly universal, especially with regard to adultery. See Deborah L. Rhode, 
Adultery: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 179 (2015). 
630 434 U.S. 375, 406 (1978). 
631 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
632 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
633 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (“[A] State may not . . . pre-empt the right to dissolve this 
legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for 
doing so . . . .”); see also Berg, supra note 470 (claiming that Boddie effectively recognized 
a “fundamental right to divorce”); Karst, supra note 470 (citing Boddie for the proposition 
that divorce implicates “all the values that make marriage a ‘fundamental’ interest” and 
suggesting that fault requirements are likely unconstitutional). 
634 See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for 
calculating Social Security benefits paid to surviving spouses); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 
7 (1975) (rejecting different definitions of adulthood based on sex); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for eligibility to collect 
Social Security benefits to support minor children); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for provision of family benefits to military personnel); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting a sex-based criterion for choosing the 
administrator of an estate). 
635 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
636 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973); cf. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1975) (upholding a single-
family zoning ordinance, but noting that, since the restriction applied only to groups of three 
or more, it reflected “no animosity toward unmarried couples”). Belle Terre has been widely 
disparaged as “incompatible with the Court’s modern associational rights jurisprudence.” 
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Zablocki invoked some of these fresh precedents, admitting no tension between 
them and the scheme of sexual regulation in which Wisconsin’s harsh child-support 
law was situated.637 “[I]f appellee’s right to procreate means anything it all,” the 
Court stressed, “it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the 
State . . . allows sexual relations to legally take place.”638 Never mind that judges 
were already folding Loving’s right to marry into an “emerging right of privacy” 
capacious enough to embrace nonmarital sex.639 Those intrepid rulings would be 
vindicated a quarter-century later, in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), whose libertarian 
doctrine on “matters pertaining to sex,” said the Court, was “apparent” from a short 
line of cases ending in 1977.640 Following the lead of numerous state legislatures 
and courts, and ratifying the lived expectations of most Americans, Lawrence 
enshrined under the federal Constitution a right to sex without marriage—the precise 
antithesis of natural law’s positive right to marry.641 
 
CONCLUSION: AFTER OBERGEFELL 
 
The original meanings of the right to marry have been legally superseded and—
some more than others—widely forgotten. But they aren’t lost in every sense. They 
aren’t lost to history. The annals of American legal thought abound in evidence of 
the marriage right’s provenance and meaning in natural law. This Article has taken 
a first pass at collecting, interpreting, and synthesizing that evidence. It has 
developed a vocabulary for classifying and describing the main facets of the natural 
right to marry. And it has traced the right’s genealogy in American jurisprudence 
over nearly two centuries. 
We’ve seen that the natural right to marry was a right, first and foremost, to 
marriage—a necessarily and exclusively sexual relationship, potentially 
procreative, wherein a man and woman were privileged to share a home and raise a 
family. This conjugal structure was “entered through, and only through, the door of 
                                                   
Rigel C. Olivieri, Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right to Choose 
Household Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1404, 1429 n. 177 (2015) (collecting 
examples of scholarly criticism); see also Sara L. Dunski, Make Way for the New Kid on the 
Block: The Possible Zoning Implications of Lawrence v. Texas, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 847 
(2005); John T. Messerly, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2008). 
637 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 375, 385 (1978). 
638 Id. at 385–86 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1976), Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453–54 (1972)). 
639 State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 356 (Iowa 1976) (invalidating a sodomy law 
insofar as it applied to heterosexual intimacies between consenting adults). 
640 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986), “was not correct when it was decided” and naming Carey v. Population 
Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), as the last of three decisions that “should have 
been controlling in Bowers,” as Justice John Paul Stevens had urged at the time).  
641 See supra Section II.A. 
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contract,”642 a threshold that natural law guarded with several guarantees of 
autonomy. Individuals couldn’t marry except by their own free will. When they did 
so, a simple exchange of consent was all the ceremony nature required. In some 
quarters it was also thought that, apart from a few limitations imposed by natural 
law itself, any eligible man could marry any eligible woman. Then, having entered 
the hallowed estate of matrimony, husband and wife were entitled to stay there. A 
marriage valid where celebrated was valid everywhere; and the union was 
indissoluble, if at all, without at least one party’s fault or consent. 
Whether respected or flouted by positive law, the natural right to marry was a 
recurrent touchstone in classical deliberations on the practical regulation of civil 
marriage. In addition to limited due-process protections against unwarranted 
dissolution (developed mainly in litigation over migratory divorce), two natural 
rights of marriage, conjugality and mate selection, eventually worked their way into 
twentieth-century constitutional doctrine. The first of these was recognized most 
prominently in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942), an equal-protection case that ranked 
“marriage and procreation” among “the basic civil rights of man.”643 Loving v. 
Virginia (1967) was the case that vindicated a right to marry the person of one’s 
choice.  
Loving appeared at the dawn of a new era in American family law. Through 
statutory and constitutional reform, marriage was stripped in subsequent years and 
decades of the exclusive claims to licit sex and legitimate procreation that had 
defined the institution since time immemorial. Admittedly, the demise of the 
marriage right’s original, conjugal meaning—American law’s renunciation, that is, 
of the ideal upon which each and every aspect of the natural right to marry was 
founded—doesn’t conclusively prove that its contemporary avatar is philosophically 
bankrupt. But it’s hard to imagine stronger evidence to that effect. Were it not for a 
Supreme Court that persists in cloaking its decisions in this antiquated doctrinal 
garb, who would dream that Loving’s right to marry survives the implosion of its 
core content? Essences are not so easily replaced. 
The spectral remnant of a defunct legal regime, the constitutional right to marry 
is a problem of more than theoretical interest. It has tangible consequences, 
beginning with an inherent bias toward the regulatory status quo. Recall the scholars 
who hypothesize civil marriage’s abolition in order to test the notion of a positive 
right to marry.644 Quite sensibly, those thinkers ask whether the state can “get out of 
the marriage business” in order to ascertain what, if anything, that business might 
be.645 The tenacious pretense of a constitutional right to civil marriage signals that 
                                                   
642 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES (4th ed. 1864), supra note 12, at § 121. 
643 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
644 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
645 For uses of this and similar expressions, see Alan Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, 
Government Should Quit the Marriage Business, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2003), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-dec-03-oe-dersh3-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XT8-GFXN]; Anita Bernstein, Afterword: Narrowing the Status of 
Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 217, 230–31 (Anita 
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there’s a live bird at the end of that goose chase. It sends the chilling (if usually 
subliminal) message that, somehow or other, we’re stuck with the institution we 
have.  
Even as Obergefell v. Hodges dealt the coup de grâce to natural marriage’s 
inscription in constitutional law,646 its endorsement of a fundamental right to marry 
implicitly warned of limits to further experimentation. Yes, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s glorification of wedlock was appalling for all of reasons given by 
Obergefell’s early, left-of-center critics. But the decision’s sentimental moralism 
was more than a regrettable rhetorical choice; it was a discursive mode perfectly 
suited to the ruling’s regressive reliance on the right to marry. Surely that doctrinal 
fault merits condemnation at least as strong the opinion’s pompous dicta.647 After 
all, for all its prestige, the Court is merely a participant in our culture’s ubiquitous 
mythology of marriage; but no person or institution bears greater responsibility for 
promulgating the myth of the constitutional right to marry. 
                                                   
Bernstein ed., 2006); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1405; Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 
672 (2010); TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE 
FOR THEIR DIVORCE 120 (2010); Nicolas, supra note 8, at 129. 
646 Opponents of same-sex marriage are correct on this score. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, 
CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES 133–34 (2013) (acknowledging that “a culture of divorce, the 
widespread practice of nonmarital sexual cohabitation, the normalization of nonmarital 
childbearing, and other practices . . . weakened people’s grasp of marriage as a conjugal 
union,” but lamenting that same-sex marriage “completes the rout”); David Novak, Response 
to Martha Nussbaum’s “A Right to Marry?,” 98 CAL. L. REV. 709, 712 (2010) (arguing that 
marriage, when “redefined” to include same-sex unions, “loses any essential continuity with 
what previously has gone by the name ‘marriage,’” and that therefore “one must wonder 
whether the continued use of the . . . name . . . does not turn [it] into a homonym.”); George 
W. Dent, Jr., Meaningless Marriage: The Incoherent Legacy of Obergefell v. Hodges, 17 
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 21 (2017) (“Recognition of same-sex marriage destroys [the 
institution’s] traditional core meaning and offers no replacement.”). 
647 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 31 (2015) (calling Obergefell “an unnecessary paean to marriage” 
that demeaned “the lives of nonmarital families”); Leib, supra note 7, at 51 (criticizing 
“Justice Kennedy’s over-the-top preaching about the virtues of marriage”); Catherine 
Powell, Up from Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the Shadow of 
Marriage Equality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 72–73 (2015) (faulting “Justice Kennedy’s 
celebration of the married couple” for “elevating the dignity of marriage over the autonomy 
of individuals”); Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of 
Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 107, 107, 111–12 (2015) (condemning Obergefell for 
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CAL L. REV. 1207, 1210, 1240 (2016) (worrying that Obergefell’s “hyperveneration of 
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nonmarital equality”); Clifford Rosky, Same-Sex Marriage Litigation and Children’s Right 
to Be Queer, 22 GLQ: A J. LESBIAN & GAY STUDIES 541, 541–43 (arguing that Obergefell 
“denigrates millions of unmarried persons and nonmarital relationships”). 
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Mercifully, Obergefell did hold that prohibitions of same-sex marriage violate 
the Equal Protection Clause, not just a “right to marry [that] is fundamental under 
the Due Process Clause.”648 Yet Justice Kennedy’s relatively brief discussion of 
equality, aside from being interwoven with and muddied by musings on the 
“profound . . . synergy” between “the two Clauses,” was not nearly so compelling 
or useful as the more straightforward explanations he eschewed:649 why gay 
marriage bans unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sex and sexual 
orientation;650 why they deny “equal access” to an important civil (not 
constitutional) right;651 why they impermissibly burden individuals’ freedom to 
choose same-sex relations and relationships.652 Such missed opportunities are 
probably the most immediate and concrete costs of maintaining the illusion of a 
constitutional right to marry. When a court invalidates a law on that basis, it perforce 
rules incorrectly. When “marriage” has ceased to have any necessary meaning, a 
right-to-marry opinion conceals the true moral and legal stakes of a dispute and 
stifles development of more suitable doctrine. 
Unmoored from its origin in natural law, the fundamental right to marry is 
logically and ideologically incoherent. Its continued recitation obscures salutary 
developments in family and constitutional law, obstructs further progress, and limits 
political imagination about a flawed but mutable institution. Is it not time to give up 
this ghost? If we cease scrambling for a definition of what marriage is and must 
remain, we might finally begin to learn the freedom that comes without one.  
                                                   
648 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
649 Id. at 2603–04 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, 
prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”). 
650 See, e.g., Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 251–62 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(finding a violation of the Vermont Constitution’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination); 
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651 See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 7, at 1377. 
652 See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from 
Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 416–17 (2012). 
